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SA Policy Space

BRICS+ Trade Facilitation and Alternative Payment Systems

Trade OpennessDebatedMedium TermRaised 3× in committeeTrade, Industry and Competition

Theme: Trade agreements

First raisedFeb 2024Last discussedSept 2024No committee discussion in 12+ months3 meetings on the record ↓
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Reform at a glance

What changes
BRICS+ Trade Facilitation and Alternative Payment Systems
Responsible actor (recorded)
DIRCO / SARB / National Treasury / DTIC
Recorded status
Debated — editorial assessment.
Milestone described by this status
Status scope has not yet been independently documented; it may cover only part of this reform.
Next documented milestone
Next milestone not yet documented
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Description

South Africa assumed the BRICS chairmanship in 2023 and hosted the Johannesburg Summit that expanded the bloc to BRICS+ with Saudi Arabia, UAE, Ethiopia, Iran, Egypt, and Argentina. The trade facilitation agenda under SA's chairmanship prioritised: local currency settlement frameworks to reduce USD dependency in intra-BRICS trade, New Development Bank (NDB, headquartered in Shanghai) expanded rand-denominated lending for infrastructure, and BRICS+ standards harmonisation for mutual recognition of product certifications and SPS measures. The MTBPS 2025 notes that BRICS+ trade accounts for 24% of SA's total trade but 35% of mineral export value — making BRICS+ a strategically irreplaceable commercial relationship. The South African Reserve Bank's Project Khokha 2 explored CBDC (Central Bank Digital Currency) interoperability as the settlement infrastructure. The PC on Finance BRRRs flag a structural tension: deepening BRICS+ engagement (including the Russia relationship) complicates SA's AGOA retention, FATF greylisting exit, and diplomatic standing with the EU. Alternative payment systems development must be calibrated not to trigger secondary sanctions exposure or correspondent banking withdrawal by Western financial institutions.

Assessment

Growth Impact3/5

Responsible: DIRCO / SARB / National Treasury / DTIC

Feasibility Assessment

Low-medium: Geopolitical complexity high; sanctions risk real. NDB project finance is concrete and actionable. Currency settlement pilots possible but scale limited by rand liquidity.

Stakeholder Landscape

Who backs this reform, who needs convincing, and which interests or red lines shape political feasibility.

Backers

17

2 stakeholders

Negotiation weight

8

1 conditional actor

Opposition weight

0

0 opposing actors

Coalition Read

AI-drafted stances · 0 reviewed

88/100Mapped support: strong

Anchor: Presidency / Operation Vulindlela. Highest-leverage swing actor: South African Reserve Bank.

Political Tractability

—Needs reviewed signals

No reviewed signals · 0% of mapped influence has been reviewed.

Backers2 stakeholders
Presidency / Operation VulindlelaCoalition anchorInfluence 10/10

BRICS+ trade facilitation aligns with the Presidency's multi-lateral foreign policy and South-South economic cooperation.

Interest: Cross-cutting structural reform coordination across energy, logistics, water, digital infrastructure, and visa reform. Operation Vulindlela, establish…

Concern: Implementation bottlenecks within line departments; regulatory capture of NERSA and ICASA; SOE institutional inertia; ensuring quick wins translate in…

Engagement path: Already fully engaged. Seeks line department buy-in, NEDLAC social compact legitimacy, and international DFI financing alignment on key reform milesto…

DTIC (Dept. of Trade, Industry & Competition)Operational backerInfluence 7/10

DTIC supports BRICS+ trade facilitation as it diversifies SA's export markets beyond Western economies.

Interest: Industrial policy objectives — local content requirements, beneficiation, BBBEE transformation, SEZ development, and protection of manufacturing emplo…

Concern: Full logistics liberalisation without local content protections could hollow out domestic manufacturing by reducing input costs asymmetrically for ext…

Engagement path: Logistics and energy reforms include localisation provisions and domestic content requirements; trade agreements include industrial policy safeguards;…

Negotiation Priorities1 stakeholder
South African Reserve BankCritical swing actorInfluence 8/10

SARB is cautious about BRICS+ alternative payment systems that could create unregulated channels outside NPS oversight.

Interest: Price stability under the 3–6% inflation targeting framework; financial system stability under the Twin Peaks prudential model; integrity of the Natio…

Concern: Fintech entry that could destabilise the payment system or create unregulated credit channels; fiscal dominance risks if public debt crowds out moneta…

Engagement path: Fintech reforms must operate within SARB's NPS oversight framework; fiscal reforms must maintain credible debt trajectory; new financial entrants requ…

OECD

Referenced in OECD Economic Surveys: South Africa

OECD SA Survey (2017, 2020, 2022). Trade liberalisation and regional integration have been recommended since the 2017 survey on SADC integration.

SA must leverage BRICS+ membership to diversify export markets and reduce dollar dependence — but financial integration must not compromise SWIFT access. — SARB Governor, PC on Finance 2024

Implementation Roadmap

DIRCO, the SARB, and National Treasury will pursue a calibrated BRICS+ trade facilitation agenda focused on expanding NDB rand-denominated lending, piloting local currency settlement in bilateral mineral trade, and advancing CBDC interoperability through Project Khokha 2. The programme must be carefully sequenced to avoid secondary sanctions exposure or correspondent banking withdrawal by Western financial institutions, given SA's concurrent AGOA retention and FATF greylisting obligations. Responsible departments will manage a dual-track engagement: deepening BRICS+ commercial relationships while explicitly ringfencing SA from BRICS geopolitical dimensions incompatible with its WTO, AGOA, and IMF obligations. Success is measured by a 10% increase in rand-settled intra-BRICS trade and NDB rand loan portfolio exceeding R30 billion by 2027.

1

SARB and National Treasury publish a local currency settlement policy framework defining permissible bilateral settlement arrangements with BRICS+ central banks; include risk limits and correspondent banking safeguards

Q2 2025South African Reserve Bank / National Treasury
2

NDB Board engagement to expand the NDB's rand-denominated bond programme (existing rand bonds: R5 billion); target R30 billion rand loan portfolio for SA infrastructure by 2027 through NDB board resolutions

Q2 2025-Q4 2026National Treasury / DIRCO / NDB Board
3

Project Khokha 2 CBDC interoperability pilot: conduct bilateral CBDC settlement test with at least two BRICS+ central banks for mineral commodity trade settlement; publish technical assessment and risk framework

Q3 2025-Q2 2026South African Reserve Bank / DIRCO
4

Annual diplomatic and trade review: monitor rand-settled intra-BRICS trade share, NDB portfolio growth, CBDC pilot outcomes, and any correspondent banking risk indicators; report to Cabinet's Economic Cluster

Annual (Q1 each year)DIRCO / National Treasury / SARB
Timeline

2025-2027 for core milestones; CBDC interoperability is a medium-term (3-5 year) horizon

Estimated Cost

Minimal direct fiscal cost; NDB lending is off-balance-sheet; SARB Project Khokha 2 operational budget (~R50 million over 2 years already allocated)

Required Legislation

No new primary legislation required; SARB administrative instruments under the SARB Act and Currency and Exchanges Act govern settlement arrangements; NDB obligations under the Treaty for the Establishment of a New Development Bank

Political Feasibility

Moderate feasibility. NDB rand lending has political support across the GNU. Russia-linked BRICS dimensions remain diplomatically sensitive given SA's non-alignment posture. SARB is cautious on CBDC interoperability given correspondent banking risk. National Treasury supports NDB expansion as a non-fiscal infrastructure financing mechanism.

International Precedents

India-UAE bilateral local currency settlement (INR-AED) launched in 2023, reducing USD dependency in a bilateral trade relationship exceeding $80 billion. China's CIPS processes over $50 trillion annually in yuan-denominated transactions - demonstrating the infrastructure feasibility of non-dollar multilateral settlement. Brazil's NDB-funded infrastructure bond programme (R$12 billion in BRL-denominated bonds since 2018) provides the closest precedent for SA's NDB rand strategy.

Evidence & Research

No linked research evidence yet. Coverage is incomplete.

Policy documents

No linked official-document evidence yet. Coverage is incomplete.

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Status History

tracked since Mar 2026
  1. Recorded as Debated when status tracking began — held since at least Mar 2026.
    Mar 2026

Data as of 2026-10-10 · latest PMG meeting 2026-10-02