Digital InfrastructureDebatedMedium TermTrade, Industry and Competition

Digital Platforms Competition Framework (Buyer Power Regulations)

Theme: Digital/4IR/e-commerce

First raisedMar 2023Last discussedJul 2024Dormant — not discussed in 12+ months3 meetings on the record ↓

Generate Brief Compare Feasibility Matrix

Assessment

Growth Impact3/5

Responsible: Competition Commission / Department of Trade, Industry and Competition / Information Regulator

Feasibility Assessment

Medium: Statutory amendment required. Commission has investigative capacity; legislative drafting timeline uncertain. Aligns with global regulatory trend.

Stakeholder Landscape

Who backs this reform, who needs convincing, and which interests or red lines shape political feasibility.

Reviewer

Open review workspace

Backers

1 stakeholders

Negotiation weight

0 conditional actors

Opposition weight

0 opposing actors

Review coverage

0/1

All mapped stance notes are still draft

Provenance warning

Every mapped stakeholder stance for this idea is still draft. The coalition score is directional only until at least the high-influence actors are reviewed.

Coalition Read

100/100Coalition-ready

Anchor: Competition Commission.

Political Tractability

—Needs reviewed signals

No reviewed signals · 0% of mapped influence has been reviewed.

Backers1 stakeholder

Competition CommissionOperational backerdraftInfluence 7/10

Digital Platforms Competition Framework is a direct extension of the Commission's market inquiry findings.

Interest: Reducing market concentration and promoting effective competition across freight, telecoms, financial services, food retail, and healthcare. Statutory…

Concern: SOE concessioning that creates private monopolies rather than competitive markets; spectrum concentration in telecoms post-auction; banking sector bar…

Engagement path: Already actively engaging across sectors. Needs reform designs to address market structure, not just ownership change — concessioning must include com…

Description

Following the Competition Amendment Act 2018's introduction of buyer power provisions for designated sectors (initially agri-food), the Competition Commission and DTIC proposed extending buyer power regulations to digital platform markets in 2024. The framework targets three platform categories: online marketplaces (where dominant platforms impose extractive commission structures on third-party sellers — Takealot charges 6–30% depending on category), app stores (where 15–30% Apple/Google commissions are under global regulatory scrutiny), and payment platforms (where interchange fee structures disproportionately affect SMME financial inclusion). South Africa's competition law framework — recognised as among the most progressive in the Global South — already includes complex merger assessment, excessive pricing provisions (Section 8), and abuse of dominance remedies. The Digital Platforms Framework builds on Online Intermediation Platforms Market Inquiry findings and aligns with EU Digital Markets Act standards, positioning SA as a regulatory reference for African digital markets governance. The SMME Development Committee (NCOP) flagged that high platform commissions reduce SMME e-commerce viability, directly linking digital competition policy to employment outcomes.

OECD

Referenced in OECD Economic Surveys: South Africa

OECD SA Survey (2017, 2020, 2022, 2025). Pro-competition reforms are a core OECD recommendation; the 2025 survey estimates they could add ~4.5pp to GDP over 10 years.

Platform self-preferencing and data advantages create moats that ordinary competition law cannot breach in real time — ex ante rules are necessary. — Competition Commission DMI Interim Report 2023

Implementation Roadmap

The Competition Commission finalises Buyer Power Regulations for digital markets by Q3 2025, designating online marketplace, app store, and payment platform categories under the Competition Amendment Act 2018. A Digital Markets Monitoring Unit publishes annual platform market reports tracking commission rates, data access terms, and SMME financial inclusion metrics. DTIC tables a Digital Markets Bill by Q1 2026 providing ex-ante interoperability and data portability obligations for designated gatekeepers. Success is measurable reductions in platform commission rates within 18 months of designation and entry of new competitors in previously foreclosed market segments.

International Comparisons

View all →

🇪🇪Estonia2000

Estonia built a national digital identity infrastructure (X-Road data exchange layer, e-ID card) from 2000. By 2020, 99% of public services were available online, tax filing took 5 minutes, and company registration 18 minutes. Estimated savings: 2% of GDP annually in civil servant time. The X-Road interoperability layer — allowing government databases to communicate securely — is now licensed to Finland, Japan, and Azerbaijan. SA's GovTech and SITA have proposed equivalent systems but lack the political mandate and interoperability standards that drove Estonian success.

Approach

Estonia built interoperability as a common rulebook rather than as a single system. X-Road is a thin standardised exchange layer: each agency and licensed private party keeps its own register and exposes it through a common interface, with no central database. A mandatory national e-ID gave digital signatures the same legal force as handwritten ones, and a once-only rule in law barred agencies from demanding data the state already held. Banks and telecoms were connected on the same published terms as ministries, and citizens could audit who had queried their records.

Timeline: Exchange layer and e-ID legislated and launched around 2000–2002; near-universal service coverage within a decade

Lessons for South Africa

The Digital Platforms Framework's core problem is that dominant marketplaces and payment platforms hold data and interfaces that third-party sellers cannot reach on fair terms. Estonia's answer to the same structural problem was mandated interoperability on published, non-discriminatory terms plus a portable identity no single platform owns — closer to the Digital Markets Act's access remedies than to a commission cap. For the Competition Commission this argues for pairing conduct remedies on commission structures with interoperability and data-portability obligations, so an SMME leaving a marketplace or a payment provider can carry its trading history with it.

Evidence & Research

Research corpus →

Regulating digital platforms: A comparative analysis of Kenya and South Africa
ERSA · Jun 2026
The paper directly compares South Africa's market inquiry approach to digital platform regulation with Kenya's Competition Amendment Bill approach, both addressing platform dominance concerns in e-commerce and digital ecosystems — the core subject of the buyer power regulations framework.
Narrow Price Parity and Market Power in Digital Platforms
ERSA · Jul 2026
The paper directly analyses price parity obligations imposed by dominant digital platforms on business users (Booking.com case), examining how platform market power operates through contractual terms — a mechanism analogous to the commission extraction and fee structures the buyer power framework t…

Links proposed by lexical matching and screened by a calibrated research judge. Follow the paper for the full argument and its caveats.

Parliamentary record

3 meetings

Committee sittings this reform was drawn from, most recent first. Each row opens the meeting on this site; the PMG link goes to the source record.

Status History

tracked since Mar 2026

Recorded as Debated when status tracking began — held since at least Mar 2026.
Mar 2026

Data as of 2026-08-24 · latest PMG meeting 2026-08-21