Theme: Nuclear energy
Responsible: Department of Mineral Resources and Energy / Eskom / National Treasury / NNR
Low-medium: IRP target set but financing, procurement, and timeline unresolved. SMR technology not yet commercially proven at scale. Political economy includes strong pro- and anti-nuclear constituencies.
Who backs this reform, who needs convincing, and which interests or red lines shape political feasibility.
Backers
16
2 stakeholders
Negotiation weight
8
1 conditional actors
Opposition weight
26
3 opposing actors
Review coverage
0/7
All mapped stance notes are still draft
Provenance warning
Every mapped stakeholder stance for this idea is still draft. The coalition score is directional only until at least the high-influence actors are reviewed.
Coalition Read
Anchor: COSATU. Highest-leverage swing actor: Eskom. Most serious blocker: National Treasury.
Political Tractability
No reviewed signals · 0% of mapped influence has been reviewed.
COSATU supports nuclear new build as it creates unionisable, well-paid energy jobs unlike IPP contract work.
Interest: Worker protections under the Labour Relations Act and Basic Conditions of Employment Act; collective bargaining rights; equitable wage growth; just tr…
Concern: Labour market flexibility reforms that erode LRA and BCEA protections; Eskom unbundling without adequate just transition planning for NUM members; pri…
Engagement path: Meaningful social dialogue through NEDLAC before structural reforms are finalised; just transition funding ring-fenced in MTEF; skills retraining and…
NUM supports new nuclear build as it creates long-term high-quality energy sector employment comparable to coal generation.
Interest: Mining employment security and worker safety; just transition pace that protects coal-dependent community livelihoods; collective bargaining rights in…
Concern: Accelerated coal phase-out without adequate income support, skills retraining, and community economic diversification; renewable energy job quality —…
Engagement path: Just transition fund with dedicated skills retraining and income support; coal community economic diversification plans with government commitments an…
Eskom recognises baseload value of new nuclear but its institutional focus is on completing unbundling and debt restructuring first.
Interest: Managing R400bn+ debt restructuring with government support; maintaining grid stability during the unbundling transition; preserving technical and ins…
Concern: Unbundling of the distribution arm (EDI) could fragment operational coherence and create regulatory gaps; transmission entity capitalisation requires…
Engagement path: Credible debt restructuring plan with government guarantees; adequate transition period for unbundling with clear milestones; grid investment ring-fen…
Treasury opposes new nuclear build due to massive upfront capital costs and long-term contingent liabilities given Eskom's fiscal history.
Interest: Fiscal consolidation with public debt stabilising below 75% of GDP; structural reforms that improve revenue without expanding contingent liabilities;…
Concern: Unfunded mandates in energy transition (JETP co-financing); Eskom's R400bn+ debt and how restructuring socialises costs; reform proposals that create…
Engagement path: Reforms must be fiscally neutral or revenue-positive over the MTEF window; SOE restructuring must demonstrably reduce contingent liabilities; credible…
Treasury opposes new nuclear given the R200bn+ estimated cost, long construction timelines, and fiscal space constraints.
Interest: Fiscal consolidation with public debt stabilising below 75% of GDP; structural reforms that improve revenue without expanding contingent liabilities;…
Concern: Unfunded mandates in energy transition (JETP co-financing); Eskom's R400bn+ debt and how restructuring socialises costs; reform proposals that create…
Engagement path: Reforms must be fiscally neutral or revenue-positive over the MTEF window; SOE restructuring must demonstrably reduce contingent liabilities; credible…
BUSA opposes nuclear new build due to massive cost overrun risk and the availability of cheaper renewable alternatives.
Interest: Cross-sector structural reform across energy security, logistics efficiency, regulatory certainty, labour market flexibility, and digital infrastructu…
Concern: Slow implementation pace relative to policy announcements; inconsistency between reform rhetoric and regulatory decisions (e.g. NERSA tariff approvals…
Engagement path: Already actively engaged. Seeks implementation accountability mechanisms with published milestones, predictable regulatory timelines, and NEDLAC outco…
Eskom is neutral on new nuclear build, recognising baseload value but focused on managing the current fleet and unbundling.
Interest: Managing R400bn+ debt restructuring with government support; maintaining grid stability during the unbundling transition; preserving technical and ins…
Concern: Unbundling of the distribution arm (EDI) could fragment operational coherence and create regulatory gaps; transmission entity capitalisation requires…
Engagement path: Credible debt restructuring plan with government guarantees; adequate transition period for unbundling with clear milestones; grid investment ring-fen…
South Africa's Integrated Resource Plan (IRP 2023/24) includes 2,500 MW of new nuclear capacity as part of the baseload mix, a policy direction endorsed by Cabinet in 2024 following two decades of contested proposals (the Zuma-era R1 trillion nuclear deal collapsed in 2017 after court rulings and public outcry). The current programme, led by DMRE in consultation with the National Nuclear Energy Executive Coordination Committee (NNEECC), envisages a competitive procurement process for small modular reactors (SMRs) or conventional light-water reactors at sites including Thyspunt (Eastern Cape) and Bantamsklip. The MTBPS 2025 does not allocate direct capital but notes the programme is to be financed through the Eskom balance sheet or a dedicated project vehicle with an independent power producer (IPP) structure. International technology suppliers (Westinghouse, EDF, Rosatom, CGNPC, NuScale, Holtec) have all engaged with the DMRE process. The NNR capacity constraints for new-build oversight (id=48) are the regulatory bottleneck. A government financial guarantee of R100–200 billion would be required for any conventional new-build under current debt structures.
The question is not whether SA needs nuclear, but whether we can afford it and govern the procurement — both remain open. — Energy Expert Panel, DMRE IRP Review 2023
The IRP 2023/24 allocates 2,500 MW of new nuclear capacity as firm baseload to complement variable renewables, reversing the post-2017 moratorium following the collapse of the Zuma-era deal. DMRE is leading a competitive procurement process through the NNEECC with technology options including large light-water reactors (AP1000, EPR, VVER, HPR1000) and small modular reactors; a formal RFI process is underway. Site preparation work continues at Thyspunt (Eastern Cape) and desktop reviews at Bantamsklip (Western Cape). A government financial guarantee of R100–200 billion must be accommodated within the fiscal framework and represents the single largest constraint on programme viability.
Complete the RFI process and publish a formal Request for Proposals for the 2,500 MW nuclear new-build: technology requirements, financing structures, local content obligations (40% by value target), and skills transfer provisions
Finalise site selection between Thyspunt and Bantamsklip: environmental impact assessment under NEMA, NNR site characterisation approval, and National Ports Authority assessment for marine access
Negotiate the intergovernmental agreement with the selected vendor country (France, Russia, China, USA, or South Korea) establishing technology transfer, financing terms, and the government-to-government guarantee framework
Electricity Regulation Amendment Act — Competitive Electricity Market
Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) 2024 Update — Revised Electricity Mix
Energy Bounce-Back and Industrial Energy Self-Generation
National Transmission Company Capitalisation and Grid Expansion
Eskom Restructuring — Generation, Transmission, and Distribution Unbundling
How to cite
Wilse-Samson, L. (2026). Nuclear New Build Programme — 2,500 MW New Nuclear Sites. SA Policy Space. NYU Wagner School of Public Policy. Retrieved 11 May 2026, from https://sa-policy-space.vercel.app/ideas/nuclear-new-build-programme-2500-mw-new-nuclear-sites?snapshot=2026-05-11
Data as of 2026-05-11 · latest PMG meeting 2026-05-08
Obtain financial close: structure the funding package (DFI debt, export credit agency support, government guarantee, equity) and have National Treasury publish the contingent liability note in the MTEF
NNR construction licence application: submit and obtain construction authorisation under the NNR Act for the selected site and technology
First-concrete milestone and parliamentary oversight report to Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources and Energy on programme cost and schedule
RFP Q4 2025; site selection 2026; IGA signed 2027; financial close 2029; construction licence 2031; first power ~2035–2038
R150–250 billion total capital cost (technology-dependent); government guarantee R100–200 billion; DBSA and industrial development finance may cover 20–30% of debt component
No new primary legislation required for procurement. Nuclear Energy Act 46 of 1999 and NNR Act 47 of 1999 provide the framework. A ministerial Section 34 determination under the ERA formalises procurement. An amendment to State Finance Guarantee legislation may be required to accommodate the scale of the contingent liability.
Nuclear new-build historically divides the ANC (pro-nuclear industrial wing vs. fiscal conservatives). The Zuma-era scandal creates political sensitivity. DA broadly supportive if fiscally sound. GNU dynamics make a R150B+ government guarantee politically difficult without National Treasury concurrence. Labour (NUM, COSATU) supports on job-creation grounds.
UAE's Barakah NPP (4×APR1400) demonstrates a government-to-government procurement model in a non-OECD country — directly relevant. UK's Hinkley Point C provides a cautionary tale on cost overruns. South Korea's domestic nuclear programme (24 operating units, <$3,000/kW) is the global benchmark for cost control.
Freight Rail Third-Party Access and Transnet Separation