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Reform records with linked evidence. Growth and feasibility ratings are editorial assessments.
40 ideas · sorted by Combined Score
Pursue debt stabilisation through expenditure restraint, wage-bill management and control of state-owned enterprise transfers.
Construction site extortion and business protection rackets have become a major barrier to infrastructure delivery, with the construction mafia disrupting projects worth billions of rands. The committee heard that over 80% of major construction sites in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng face extortion demands. Dedicated anti-extortion units, established in some provinces, have had mixed results due to the intersection of organised crime with local political structures. The committee has called for inter-departmental coordination between SAPS, NPA, and DTIC to protect infrastructure investment.
As part of the 2023 Eskom debt relief package, National Treasury assumed R254 billion of Eskom's approximately R400 billion debt burden over a multi-year period extending to 2028/29, subject to strict conditions including restructuring milestones, cost reduction targets, and renewable energy procurement progress. The restructuring framework requires Eskom to separate its balance sheets for generation, transmission, and distribution. As of early 2026, tranches have been transferred on schedule and the programme runs to 2028/29 per the revised Treasury framework. Eskom's Energy Availability Factor improvement from approximately 58% in 2023 to approximately 69% by 2025 demonstrates progress against restructuring milestones.
Strengthen public-private partnership preparation and streamline Treasury approvals for infrastructure financing.
Rebuild SARS capacity through specialist staffing, digital systems and stronger tax compliance and revenue collection.
Strengthen anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist-financing rules, beneficial ownership transparency and enforcement.
The SIU Special Tribunal, established in 2019, enables civil recovery of state losses from corruption without criminal prosecution requirements. The committee has monitored recovery outcomes — the SIU has referred matters worth over R50bn but actual recoveries remain a fraction of this. The June 2025 session reviewed the SIU Annual Performance Plan alongside Legal Aid SA. Strengthening the Tribunal pipeline from investigation to recovery order to execution is the critical bottleneck, particularly for Digital Vibes and PPE-era corruption matters.
The NPA, under NDPP Shamila Batohi (appointed 2019), has made progress rebuilding prosecution capacity following the state capture era. The Investigating Directorate Against Corruption (IDAC), established as a permanent unit, has secured several high-profile convictions. However, the committee has tracked persistent vacancy rates in complex commercial crime units and the slow pace of Zondo Commission referral prosecutions. The June 2025 Annual Performance Plan review noted that NPA conviction rates have improved but remain below the 92% target in priority crime categories.
South Africa recorded over 27,000 murders in 2023/24, a rate of approximately 45 per 100,000 — among the highest globally. SAPS detective-to-case ratios in some provinces exceed 1:100, far above the recommended 1:25. The committee has documented critical shortages in forensic capacity, with DNA backlogs and ballistic analysis delays undermining prosecution success rates. The 2025/26 BRRR recommended ring-fenced funding for detective recruitment and forensic services modernisation as a prerequisite for improving the 20% serious crime conviction rate.
Seven of South Africa's nine provincial health departments received qualified audit opinions from the Auditor-General in 2023/24, reflecting persistent failures in financial management, supply chain governance, and infrastructure maintenance. The cumulative effect—medicine stockouts, equipment breakdowns, staff non-payment, and facility collapse—falls disproportionately on the 84% of South Africans dependent on public health. The Provincial Health Department Turnaround Programme (modelled on National Treasury's Municipal Finance Improvement Programme for local government) deploys specialist financial management, supply chain, and HR teams to the three worst-performing provinces (Eastern Cape, Limpopo, North West) with a 2-year intensive support mandate. The PC on Health BRRRs 2022–2024 document the cyclical nature of provincial health crises: the same departments that were placed under Section 100 interventions in 2011–2013 are again in distress. NHI implementation requires a stable provincial health infrastructure as its foundation—without turnaround, NHI will formalise dysfunction rather than reform it.
The Two-Pot Retirement System, implemented on 1 September 2024, fundamentally restructured South Africa's retirement savings architecture by dividing all new pension contributions into two components: one-third into an accessible "savings pot" (from which a single withdrawal is permitted per tax year, minimum R2,000) and two-thirds into a "retirement pot" (accessible only at retirement or emigration). The reform addressed the longstanding tension between South Africa's low household savings rate and the economic hardship that historically drove members to preserve fund withdrawals on retrenchment (the primary cause of inadequate retirement outcomes). In the first four months of implementation, SARS and the National Treasury received R10.6 billion in withdrawal tax revenue from 2.1 million fund member withdrawals—indicating the scale of latent demand and the fiscal windfall from the transition. The reform was developed under the Pension Funds Act (amended by the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 2023) and required extraordinary coordination between FSCA, SARS, National Treasury, and all registered pension and provident funds. The PC on Finance BRRRs 2022–2024 document the legislative journey and note the retirement pot's long-term adequacy challenge: low income workers contributing only to the savings pot across short working lives will face severe retirement income shortfalls.
The Cybercrimes Act (2020) established a framework for criminalising cyber offences, preserving electronic evidence, and enabling international cooperation. Implementation has been slow — designated cybercrime courts are not yet operational, and SAPS digital forensic capacity remains limited. South Africa loses an estimated R2.2bn annually to cybercrime. The committee has examined readiness for Act enforcement, including capacity within the SAPS Hawks and coordination with the Information Regulator under POPIA.
Court case backlogs exceed 200,000 matters in the lower courts, with some criminal cases taking 3-5 years to reach trial. The committee has examined the causes: insufficient judicial officers, courtroom infrastructure in disrepair, and the impact of the COVID backlog that was never fully cleared. The Chief Justice has proposed case flow management reforms and expanded small claims jurisdiction. The November 2025 annual report review documented the gap between the Office of the Chief Justice modernisation plans and the Department of Justice budget allocation.
Illegal mining (zama-zama operations) in abandoned mines poses severe safety, environmental, and security risks. The Stilfontein tragedy in late 2024, where hundreds of illegal miners were trapped underground, brought national attention to the issue. The committee received an illegal mining petition in September 2025 and has examined inter-departmental coordination failures between SAPS, DMRE, and the Department of Home Affairs. Combatting illegal mining requires addressing both the criminal syndicates that control operations and the desperate economic conditions that drive participation.
South Africa has over 2.7 million registered private security officers — significantly more than the 180,000 SAPS members. PSIRA, the regulatory authority, oversees an industry worth ~R70bn annually. The committee has examined PSIRA regulatory effectiveness, including foreign ownership rules, training standards, and incidents involving security companies in community conflicts. Reform proposals include better coordination between private security and public policing, minimum qualification standards, and addressing the growing use of private security for essential public safety functions.
South Africa has one of the highest rates of gender-based violence globally, with femicide rates five times the global average. The National Strategic Plan on GBVF (2020-2030) established targets including expanded Thuthuzela Care Centres, dedicated FCS units, and the National Register for Sex Offenders. The committee has examined implementation progress, noting police station-level compliance gaps with the Domestic Violence Act. The June 2025 hearings focused on systemic failures in victim support and the low conviction rates for sexual offences.
National Treasury's PPP Unit administers South Africa's public-private partnership framework under Treasury Regulation 16, which requires extensive feasibility studies, value-for-money assessments, and multi-stage National Treasury approval. While this oversight protects public finances, the process has been criticised as too slow and costly — particularly for smaller social infrastructure PPPs covering schools, health centres, and correctional facilities — with fewer than 40 PPP agreements reaching financial close since 2000. DPWI and National Treasury are reviewing streamlined approval pathways for social infrastructure PPPs below a defined threshold, an off-balance-sheet framework for municipal-level PPPs, and better alignment with the Infrastructure Fund's blended finance model established in 2020.
The Department of Public Works and Infrastructure (DPWI) has received qualified or adverse audit opinions from the AGSA for multiple consecutive years, reflecting systemic failures in financial management, procurement, and consequence management. The department manages over R100 billion in infrastructure programmes — including EPWP, capital works, and government leases — yet has struggled to maintain accurate asset registers, resolve irregular expenditure findings, and take disciplinary action against officials implicated in procurement irregularities. DPWI's enterprise renewal programme — covering BAS and LOGIS financial system implementation and supply chain management overhaul — is under review by SCOPA. Active referrals to the SIU where criminality is suspected are central to the consequence management component.
The Property Management Trading Entity (PMTE) within DPWI manages approximately 83,000 immovable state assets valued at over R100 billion, including offices, warehouses, police stations, courts, and vacant land, yet operates at a chronic deficit because large portions of the portfolio are underutilised, poorly maintained, or yield below-market rentals from user departments. National Treasury spending reviews have identified the PMTE portfolio as a significant unrealised fiscal asset. Key reforms under review include disposing of non-strategic assets, commercialising well-located land parcels for affordable housing, enforcing accurate user department lease payments, and implementing a government-wide facilities management system. The AGSA has persistently flagged irregular expenditure, incomplete asset registers, and audit backlogs in the PMTE as governance concerns.
South Africa's State-Owned Enterprises operate under a regulatory environment—the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA), BBBEE procurement requirements, the National Treasury Regulations, and Ministerial directives—that creates structural impediments to operational efficiency and private participation. Specific reform targets include: revising Section 54 of the PFMA to reduce ministerial pre-approval requirements for commercial transactions (which delays Eskom, Transnet, and other SOE deals by months), clarifying BBBEE scorecard treatment for SOE-private joint ventures (a barrier to private sector participation in Transnet and PRASA concessions), and harmonising the Public Procurement Act (2023) with SOE-specific procurement needs. The Presidential SOE Council, chaired by the President, coordinates governance reform across the 10 major commercial SOEs. The MTBPS 2025 notes that SOE transfer payments have declined from R40 billion to R28 billion annually as restructuring conditions tighten. The textbook (Chapter 3) identifies the statutory board model (Singapore's statutory authorities) as the structural reform that could fundamentally change SOE governance dynamics.
The National Student Financial Aid Scheme's administration collapse became a national crisis between 2021 and 2024: delayed allowance payments left students unable to pay rent or buy food; a R2.1 billion irregular expenditure finding by the Auditor-General revealed procurement failures in the student accommodation and allowance payment systems; and a Special Investigating Unit (SIU) probe uncovered fraudulent registrations by students, ghost students, and institutions claiming NSFAS funding for enrolled students who had dropped out or never attended. The administration overhaul reform covers: replacing the current bursary management system with an integrated student information system linked to HEMIS and institutional student records, implementing biometric verification for allowance collection, establishing an NSFAS fraud investigative unit within the SIU, and restructuring the NSFAS board and executive management. The MTBPS 2025 notes NSFAS as a fiscal risk entity with qualified audit opinions in three consecutive years. The PC on Higher Education BRRRs 2022–2024 contain over 40 specific recommendations on NSFAS governance that remain partially implemented.
South Africa's system of intergovernmental fiscal transfers—governed by the Division of Revenue Act (DoRA), the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act (1997), and the equitable share formula—distributes approximately R900 billion annually between national, provincial, and local government. The equitable share formula for provinces (the largest transfer, R850 billion in 2025/26) has not been fundamentally revised since 2002, and its components—education (weighted by learner numbers), health (weighted by population and poverty), and basic services—no longer align with provincial fiscal needs or service delivery capacity. Key reform proposals from the FFC (Financial and Fiscal Commission): revising the health component to align with actual provincial disease burden (KZN and EC are undercompensated relative to their TB/HIV burden), introducing a conditional infrastructure maintenance grant (ring-fenced from the provincial equitable share to prevent maintenance budget raiding), and strengthening the local government equitable share to reflect the growing service delivery obligations of municipalities. The MTBPS 2025 commits to a comprehensive equitable share formula review to be completed by the 2026 Budget.
The Financial Matters Amendment Act and the Insurance Act (18 of 2017) created a dedicated microinsurance licence category to serve low-income households with simple, affordable products (funeral cover, crop insurance, household contents). The FSCA oversees approximately 12 licensed microinsurers and hundreds of cell captive arrangements. The reform agenda addresses: persistently high expense ratios (>60%) in the microinsurance market; exclusionary fine print in funeral policies; integration with SASSA grant payment infrastructure for premium deduction; and the extension of microinsurance to parametric agricultural products for smallholders. The PC on Finance has raised concerns about the Policyholder Protection Rules (PPR) enforcement and debit order abuse targeting grant recipients. Twin Peaks regulation gives both the Prudential Authority (SARB) and FSCA oversight roles.
The Municipal Fiscal Powers and Functions Amendment Bill (MFPFA), tabled in Parliament in 2024 and endorsed by both the National Treasury and the PC on Finance BRRRs, proposes to standardise the regulation of development charges—fees levied by municipalities on new property developments to recover the cost of bulk infrastructure connections (water, sewer, roads, electricity). Currently, development charge methodology varies enormously across municipalities: some municipalities charge developers nothing and cross-subsidise from rates; others levy charges that bear no relationship to actual infrastructure cost. The Bill introduces a national framework for development charge calculation (based on actual bulk infrastructure cost per connection), removes discretionary waiver powers that have been captured by politically connected developers, and requires municipalities to maintain a development charge reserve fund for bulk infrastructure investment. The PC on Finance BRRRs 2020–2023 repeatedly flag under-charging of development charges as a major cause of municipal infrastructure deficits—well-located urban land development subsidised by the rates base undermines municipal financial sustainability.