Demand for tariff change: Causes and consequences of trade lobbying

We study how strategic inputs—petitions, evidence, and lobbying claims—shape the making and incidence of trade policy. South Africa’s International Trade Administration Commission provides a rare, docketed forum where any stakeholder can seek product-specific tariff changes and must justify them with evidence, creating a transparent record of arguments, evaluations, and conditions. Leveraging this setting, we connect what is claimed in the rule-making process to what happens in markets and to workers: we digitize the universe of tariff petitions, code who requests what and with which arguments, track how officials test and condition approvals, and link decisions to customs and matched employer–employee data. We find no evidence of increased import competition within targeted products, as frequently claimed by applicants of the petitions. Approved tariff increases reallocate imports away from targeted lines and raise earnings and attachment for workers in beneficiary firms, while input