Academic and policy research papers mapped to South African reform themes.145 papers covering 36 themes.
Showing 145 of 145 papers
> Each year South Africa commemorates Human Rights Day, marking the 1960 Sharpeville massacre, when police opened fire on people protesting against the pass laws. The day invites reflection on the many ways apartheid denied millions of South Africans their rights and opportunities. The passbooks are gone. Job reservation laws are gone. The racially tiered wage schedules are gone. But tax records and payroll data filed as recently as 2018 tell a more unsettling story: the labour market distortions that apartheid’s economic laws had created are still measurably present today, in the very sectors and regions where those laws were enforced. For decades, these laws determined who could apply for skilled jobs, who could join a trade union, and how wages were set across industries. The system was granular, deliberate, and enforced at the level of individual sectors and specific geographic districts through ministerial decrees published in official government gazettes. What research shows is that those decrees left an economic imprint that neither the end of apartheid nor 30 years of subsequent reform has fully erased. To understand why, it helps to look at how the system actually operated. Under the 1956 Industrial Conciliation Act, white trade unions bargained for minimum wages set deliberately high to price black workers out of competition. Some job categories were legally reserved for white workers through ministerial decree. Black workers who wanted to change employers needed approval from a government bureau; those who moved to a city without permission could be convicted of a criminal offence. By 1967, nearly 700,000 people a year were being prosecuted under these mobility laws. That system left a paper trail. For 40 years, every decree, every wage determination, every job reservation was published in official government gazettes, the formal, legally binding record of who could work where, and who could not. Cross-referenced with modern payroll and tax data from the
Session report on investment climate in South Africa, examining barriers to private investment and policy levers to boost capital formation.
Session report on structural transformation research and its relevance to South Africa, examining sectoral shifts and productivity dynamics.
OECD keynote on foundations for growth and competitiveness and their application to South Africa, covering structural policy reforms needed to reignite growth.
Session report on affordable housing policy in South Africa, examining spatial planning, housing delivery, and urban development strategies.
Session report on agriculture, employment and growth in South Africa, examining the agricultural sector's role in job creation and economic development.
Session report examining BEE policy outcomes, firm performance, and the relationship between transformation and economic growth.
Session report on firm productivity, labour mobility, and participation in South Africa's manufacturing sector.
Session report on competition policy reform, examining merger control, market concentration, and their effects on economic growth.
Session report on international trade policy and its relationship to South African economic growth, examining trade barriers and opportunities.
> Agriculture is a key sector of the South African economy. Research institutions play a crucial role in generating evidence that can inform decision-making across this critical sector. Introduction Agriculture contributes about 2.5% to national GDP (Stats SA, 2024). It is a dynamic system driven by farmers, consumers, financial institutions, processors, and retailers. Research institutions play a critical role by generating evidence that supports decision‑making across agricultural value chains (Laurie et al., 2017). Within this landscape, agricultural economics stands out as a discipline focused on farm efficiency, farmer and consumer welfare, market performance, and policy design that ensures a fair and competitive environment (Rahman, 2015). The discipline has more than 60 years of history in South Africa and continues to expand through investment in applied and policy‑focused research (Maredia & Byerlee, 2018). These themes dominated discussions at the 62nd Annual Conference of the Agricultural Economics Association of South Africa, held in Pretoria late last year. The conference theme, “ Market Concentration and Competition Law in Agriculture: Experience and Lessons, ” provided an important opportunity for reflecting on structural challenges affecting agricultural markets and value chains. Rather than simply presenting research outputs, the conference highlighted broader concerns regarding market power, trade policy, and digital transformation in agriculture. Agricultural economists, represented by the Agricultural Economics Association of South Africa (AEASA), convened the annual conference to share insights on emerging challenges in the sector (AEASA, 2025). Held in Pretoria, the 62nd Annual Conference brought together researchers from across the continent to reflect on competition law, market concentration, and agribusiness transformation. Research participation The 2025 conference attracted 129 research paper submissions from univers
> In the context of South Africa’s deep structural unemployment, neither the empirical evidence nor the underlying theory supports the current narrowly targeted wage subsidy of South Africa’s youth employment incentive. We outline recommendations for reform of the incentive as a broad-based employment subsidy, drawing in part on a comparison with the US earned-income tax credit. How should the ETI’s design be adapted, and what are the cost implications? Introduction The National Treasury introduced the Employment Tax Incentive (ETI) in 2014 to encourage employers to hire young work-seekers. A variation on the earlier recommendation of the International Panel on Growth for a “once-and-for-all” fixed wage subsidy to facilitate the school-to-work transition, the ETI also represented a considerably more modest intervention in the labour market than the general wage subsidy then under consideration as part of the comprehensive social security reform process . The social security wage subsidy proposal was to supplement the earnings of all low-wage employees, both as a redistributive measure and to assist in their participation in a statutory payroll-financed retirement and social insurance arrangement. The evidence from the current ETI arrangements suggests that a narrowly targeted youth incentive is an inadequate intervention in the context of high unemployment. On both redistributive and labour market grounds, there should be a reconsideration of the design of the ETI in favour of a broad-based wage incentive. While education and training reforms and targeted industry-support measures are also key components of an employment-focused growth strategy, South Africa needs to provide economy-wide support to labour-intensive firms. The current ETI provisions The ETI operates through employers’ PAYE returns to SARS. Employers can deduct the ETI amount from the total PAYE amount owed to SARS each month. If the ETI exceeds the employees’ tax payable, the excess can be rol
Synthesis report from the inaugural ERSA-SARB Growth Conference drawing together findings from all sessions into a coherent narrative about South Africa's growth crisis and policy responses.
> In his 2026 budget speech, Finance Minister Enoch Godongwana highlighted the need to remove bottlenecks in South Africa's ports. This follows the statements by President Cyril Ramaphosa in his 2026 State of the Nation address. The President said South Africa had begun to fix its ports. He pointed out that last month Transnet had signed a deal with an international port operator to manage the country's biggest container terminal in Durban's Pier 2, bringing in investment and getting the terminal back to "world class standards". Last year the Transnet National Ports Authority signed a 25-year deal with FFS Tank Terminals to operate and maintain a Liquid Bulk Terminal in the Port of Cape Town, bringing in more than R195-million in investment and doubling the terminal's storage capacity. This means there are now 10 licensed terminal operators in Cape Town's port, including bulk, fresh produce and passenger terminals, eight of them privately owned. President Ramaphosa promised that later this year, further public-private partnerships would be initiated, through a concession model "that preserves public ownership while mobilising private investment and expertise". But more must be done to bring competition into the harbours, argues economist Ryan Hawthorne. Durban, he says, should have four container terminal operators, and Cape Town two. To do this, he says, the Ports Authority needs to be separated from Transnet, in line with the National Ports act, and the Act itself may need to be amended. Every delay at South Africa’s ports ripples across the economy, from exporters missing shipment deadlines to higher prices for everyday goods. The World Bank estimates a country in the 75th percentile of efficiency will boost trade by 25% if it improves to being in 25th percentile. However, South Africa’s ports are among the least efficient in the world. Durban, for example, has recently been ranked last for efficiency among 403 ports analysed by the World Bank. In a recent paper
> Delivering the budget speech last Wednesday, Minister of Finance Enoch Godongwana said South Africa had reached a “turning point” in its finances. We asked four prominent economists for their opinion on the budget, South Africa’s prospects, and what still needs to be done. These economists are: Haroon Bhorat from the DPRU; Andrew Donaldson from SALDRU; Ada Jansen from Stellenbosch University, and Anna-Maria Oosthuizen from UNU-WIDER. Bhorat, Jansen, Oosthuizen and Donaldson approach the budget from different angles, from tax policy to infrastructure investment and state capacity, but a common theme runs through their assessments: fiscal stabilisation represents important progress, but it does not resolve the deeper constraints holding back economic growth. They agree that the fiscal outlook has improved in important ways. The projected stabilisation of public debt marks a meaningful change after years of rising borrowing. Financial conditions have also become more favourable, with lower bond yields and more stable inflation expectations easing pressure on debt-service costs. At the same time, they note that economic growth remains modest, unemployment remains high, and investment levels are still below those required to support a sustained expansion. In this environment, fiscal consolidation will be gradual. “Stabilising the gross debt-to-GDP ratio at 78.9% is the central fiscal achievement”, as Oosthuizen put it. “In the Treasury’s debt and financial projections, there is a clear turnaround,” says Donaldson. “Debt has peaked at just under 80% of GDP, and for the first time in more than a decade, interest on debt is projected to increase more slowly than spending on education or health.” Part of this success stems from the higher-than-expected revenue collection by SARS. The overrun bodes well for confidence in SARS, says Donaldson, it takes the pressure off the fiscal system, and has allowed the government to forgo the planned R20-billion revenu
Policy paper on competition policy reform focused on merger control and its implications for economic growth.
> In Part 1 of this article, we argued that inequality in South Africa is a core structural constraint on economic growth. Despite sustained income redistribution since 1994, the South African economy remains stuck in a cycle of stagnation, high unemployment, and deepening exclusion. There is little transformative vision capable of shifting the underlying structures of economic power and production. This can be remedied by a shift in emphasis from income redistribution to the redistribution of assets and endowments, including land, housing, education, and access to capital. From income to assets and endowments It has been observed that successful developmental states were built on a set of initial conditions that included a wide distribution of productive property (including land) and relatively high and broadly distributed levels of human capital [1]. In sharp contrast, South Africa's growth path relied on an extreme degree of accumulation by dispossession and environmental destruction [2]. Today, ownership of residential property or financial assets is concentrated in a small elite of affluent households and large corporations [3]. South Africa is also unusual because of the notable absence of a broader base of small asset owners and proprietors [4]. Extreme concentration of property ownership and a maldistribution of endowments have resulted in a cycle of economic stagnation, falling productivity, and rising mass unemployment. The endogenous growth theories of the 1990s pointed to the mechanisms through which we might expect this concentration of ownership of productive capital retards economic growth [5]. Investment projects can only be financed by the wealthy few who have access to collateral or surplus income. This small, capital-rich elite faces diminishing returns on each new investment because their private capital stock is already so high. This results in investments with low productivity, high levels of conspicuous consumption, and idle
> Inequality is not only a moral and political issue in South Africa but a core structural constraint on economic growth. Despite significant progress in income redistribution since 1994, the South African economy remains stuck in a cycle of stagnation, high unemployment, and deepening exclusion. The dominant development model—focused on enabling markets and fixing the state—lacks a transformative vision capable of shifting the underlying structures of economic power and production. This can be remedied by a shift in emphasis from income redistribution to the redistribution of assets and endowments, including land, housing, education, and access to capital. Introduction The relationship between inequality, redistribution, and growth is a central policy problem facing South Africa. A persistently high level of inequality limits the rate of economic growth through a multitude of channels. Inequality is also self-reinforcing. The rising incomes that growth generates accrue to large corporations and affluent investors. Growth that results from the extension of markets generates lower costs and efficiency gains but often entails new forms of exclusion or dispossession. A progressive policy agenda must envisage a path in which economic growth and social change are connected and mutually reinforcing. This requires revisiting some of the assumptions made in previous attempts to connect redistribution and growth. In the past 30 years, the democratic state has enacted a significant increase in income redistribution through fiscal means (i.e. taxation to finance income and services for the poor). However, this path of redistributing income has reached its limits. I suggest those concerned with growth and egalitarian transformation should shift their attention from income transfers towards the redistribution of assets and endowments. South Africa’s development trap and the GNU program Increasing GDP may not be the central goal of South Africa’s development age
Policy paper examining the causes and consequences of South Africa's mining sector decline.
> South Africa's alcohol taxation system requires urgent strengthening to address the devastating public health burden of harmful alcohol consumption. While National Treasury's proposed tiered excise structure represents progress, its thresholds are misaligned with current market realities and unlikely to reduce consumption. To effectively reduce alcohol-related harm, REEP proposes narrower tax tiers, higher uplift factors, and predictable above-inflation tax increases. Introduction On 13 November 2024, the National Treasury published its decadal discussion paper titled The Taxation of Alcoholic Beverages [1]. On 6 November 2025, Treasury hosted the first of a series of online stakeholder workshops. Currently, beer and spirits are taxed per litre of absolute alcohol (AA), while wine is taxed per litre of beverage, regardless of alcohol content. While keeping beer taxed per litre of AA and wine taxed per litre of beverage, Treasury’s main proposal is to introduce tiers so that beer and wine with higher alcohol content are taxed at higher rates. By introducing tiered excise taxes based on AA, Treasury aims to encourage consumers to substitute towards lower- or zero-alcohol alternatives (demand-side effect) and to incentivise the industry to reformulate beverages to contain less alcohol (supply-side effect) [2]. There is no proposal to change the excise tax on spirits, which are currently taxed at double the rate applied to beer. While we agree with the principle that higher-alcohol-content beverages should be taxed at a higher rate, the Research Unit on the Economics of Excisable Products ( REEP ) proposes an alternate placement of the tiers. We focus primarily on the beer proposal and briefly assess Treasury’s remaining recommendations. Why excise taxes matter Alcohol is a major public health problem in South Africa, contributing to violence, injuries and trauma presentations, mental disorders, infectious diseases, non-communicabl
> South Africa’s competitiveness debate is often framed around short-term constraints: exchange-rate volatility, electricity shortages, or weak global demand. These factors matter. But they do not explain why periods of recovery fail to translate into sustained export growth or durable improvements in productivity. The deeper problem lies in industrial stagnation. Over the past three decades, the manufacturing sector has lost momentum, and with it, South Africa’s long-term competitiveness. This is not a story of collapse. It is a story of flattening production, rising import penetration, and constrained export capacity, whose effects accumulate slowly but persistently. Why industry matters for competitiveness Manufacturing plays a central role in long-run economic development. It is the sector most closely associated with learning-by-doing, scale economies, technological upgrading, and export diversification [1]. Countries that sustain industrial growth tend to expand exports, improve cost competitiveness, and move into more complex products over time [2]. When industry stagnates, these channels weaken together. In South Africa, manufacturing has not disappeared, but it is no longer a dynamic engine of competitiveness. This pattern is consistent with broader evidence on premature deindustrialisation, where industrial activity peaks and declines at relatively low income levels [3]. How the data shows industrial stagnation Industrial stagnation becomes visible when production, trade, and structure are examined jointly rather than in isolation. Manufacturing output Real manufacturing gross value added (GVA) increased gradually from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s. Since then, growth has been weak and uneven. Indexed to the mid-1990s, manufacturing output flattens after the global financial crisis and fails to establish a strong upward trajectory thereafter [4][5]. This pattern points to persistent underperformance, not a temporary downturn. &
The 1973 Lokiriama accord shows how culturally rooted, elder-led peacebuilding can deliver lasting results where modern approaches have failed. The 1973 Lokiriama Peace Accord marked the start of a positive relationship between Kenya’s Turkana and Uganda’s Matheniko communities. This unwritten indigenous conflict resolution and peacebuilding mechanism favours consensus-building and reconciliation, making it more useful in post-conflict peacebuilding than contemporary punishment- and enforcement-focused approaches. While many other agreements in the region have faltered, this accord, with its culturally relevant, community-centred approach to settling disputes and restoring social order, still holds. About the author Guyo Turi is a Research Officer with the East Africa Peace and Security Governance Programme at the Institute for Security Studies in Nairobi. Publications --> Download Policy Brief 216 PDF Development partners This policy brief was funded by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency. The ISS is grateful for support from the members of the ISS Partnership Forum: the Hanns Seidel Foundation, the European Union, the Open Society Foundations and the governments of Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. <div class="con
Somalia's EAC membership offers strategic and economic gains, but security threats, weak institutions and governance fragility pose integration challenges. Somalia’s entry into the East African Community (EAC) presents both opportunities and challenges for the country and for the bloc. For the EAC, the rapid expansion presents economic prospects such as increased intra-regional trade, enhanced geopolitical influence, strengthened collective security and more coordinated regional responses to conflict. A crucial question, however, is how the EAC can capitalise on the prospects of Somalia’s entry into the bloc while managing the challenges that accompany it. About the authors Nicodemus Minde is a Researcher with the East Africa Peace, Security and Governance Project at the ISS in Nairobi. Guyo Turi is a Research Officer with the East Africa Peace, Security and Governance Project at the ISS in Nairobi. Publications --> Download Policy Brief 215 PDF Development partners This policy brief was funded by the Swedish International Dev
> TIPS industry studies provide a comprehensive overview of key trends in leading industries in South Africa. They aim to provide background for policymakers and researchers, and to strengthen our understanding of current challenges and opportunities in each industry as a basis for a more strategic response. This update of the automotive industry analyses the United States and South Africa trade relationship and the potential impact of the tariff on South Africa’s automotive industry. Tweet Published in Manufacturing Industries and Subsectors back to top Join our newsletter Stay informed about the latest TIPS news, research and events. SIGN UP Category Search Search Vacancies
Africa's maritime ambitions need stronger coordination, stable funding and permanent naval leadership structures to move from policy to practice. Africa can protect its waters, boost trade and power the blue economy, but several obstacles lie in the way. This policy brief makes suggestions about how to turn the continent’s ambitious maritime strategies into real security and prosperity at sea. It charts practical next steps for stronger coordination and African-led solutions. About the authors Denys Reva is a Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) working on maritime security and Africa in the world. Timothy Walker is a Senior Researcher at the ISS working on maritime security. Publications --> Download Policy Brief 209 PDF Development partners This policy brief is funded by the Government of Denmark. The ISS is also grateful for support from the members of the ISS Partnership Forum: the Hanns Seidel Foundation, the European Union, the Open Society Foundations and the governments of Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. Rela
Without direct representation in negotiations, cities must leverage multiple opportunities to influence loss and damage decisions and funding. Cities host most of Africa’s population, economic assets, infrastructure and utilities and will continue to grow throughout the century. Loss and damage instruments and funding help the world’s most vulnerable countries to cope with climate harms. African cities should be at the forefront of these efforts, yet they lack direct representation in negotiations. To influence loss and damage decisions, cities must adopt creative strategies and leverage the multiple opportunities available to act. About the author Aimée-Noël Mbiyozo is a Senior Research Consultant at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). She is a migration expert whose research covers a broad range of intersecting issues, including climate change, gender, refugee rights, violent extremism and citizenship. Publications --> Download Policy Brief 211 PDF Development partners This policy brief is funded by the governments of the Netherlands and Spain. The ISS is also grateful for support from the members of the ISS Partnership Forum: the Hanns Seidel Foundation, the European Union, the Open Society Foundations and the governments of Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. <div class="container-full pt-5 no-print"
MONUSCO remains crucial in the DRC, but needs a more flexible mandate that enables effective protection of civilians. The mandate of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) to protect civilians and stabilise the region is constrained by operational limitations, regional fragmentation and political complexities. As violence between the national army and armed groups escalates and regional political tensions rise, this policy brief calls for a mandate reassessment. The emphasis should be on flexibility, better regional cooperation, clear transition benchmarks, and stronger support for local forces. About the authors Remadji Hoinathy is a Senior Researcher on Central Africa and the Lake Chad Basin at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). Nirvaly Mooloo is a Research Officer on Central Africa and the Lake Chad Basin at the ISS. Philippe Asanzi is an ISS Research Consultant and Associate Professor at Université Pédagogique National in Kinshasa. Publications --> Download Policy Brief 207 PDF <path d="M0 0.652588C0 34.3791 28.0681
Mozambique needs a nuanced approach that can open channels for local conflict resolution. The armed insurgency in Cabo Delgado entered its eighth year in October 2025. Despite extensive military efforts, jihadists remain active and pose a serious threat to military and human security. Now under new leadership, the Mozambican government continues to prioritise an exclusively militarised response even though this approach has consistently failed to contain violent extremism. Attempts to resolve the conflict through dialogue have had little impact as they lack government support. About the author Borges Nhamirre is a research consultant on southern Africa at the Institute for Security Studies. His focus areas include violent extremism, governance, elections and transnational organised crime. Borges has a master’s degree in security studies from Joaquim Chissano University, Mozambique and is studying towards a doctoral degree in ethnicity and conflict at Queen’s University Belfast, United Kingdom. Publications --> Download Policy Brief 204 PDF Development partners The ISS is grateful for support from the members of the ISS Partnership Forum: the Hanns Seidel Foundation, the European Union, the Open Society Foundations and the governments of Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.
> Domestic agricultural output has more than doubled since 1994. Last year, South Africa was the 32nd largest agricultural exporter in the world. The sector has played a major role in establishing national (though not household) food security. Although we remain a country of “two agricultures”, not least because of the inertia of government, overall, the sector has benefitted substantially under democracy. We need to focus on what we can fix to promote inclusivity and not become mired in the “doom-saying” by some international (and local) players. No one denies that South Africa's agriculture faces various challenges, including stock theft, animal diseases, inept municipalities, crime, and poorly maintained roads, among others. Stories of the failings of land reform farms add to the challenges facing this sector. But this is not the complete story, not even close. Presenting such challenges as evidence that South Africa's agricultural sector is under siege, and suggesting that the U.S. President, Donald Trump, will be the saviour of our domestic challenges, is misleading and counterproductive. These are challenges that will be resolved by South Africans, the government, organised agriculture, and other social partners. Most notably, the constant doom that some among us continue to proclaim, suggesting that the sector is under threat, also risks presenting the sector as an unsustainable supplier of agricultural produce to an uninformed international observer. The reality of the South African farming sector is quite different. The sector has grown tremendously since the dawn of democracy in 1994. Data from the Department of Agriculture shows that domestic agricultural output in 2023/24 was more than twice that in 1994 . There is widespread expansion in output across all major subsectors: livestock, horticulture, and field crops. Drivers of progress New production technologies, improved farming skills, growing demand (l
> Upheaval in the global external environment, including the recent COVID-19 pandemic, infectious disease outbreaks such as the Marburg virus, and the most recent development aid funding cuts, has created a sense of urgency among African nations to relook at health systems resilience and self-sufficiency in the supply of healthcare products. This Working Paper focuses on how South Africa’s strategic engagement in the Group of 20 (G20) could enhance its ability to mobilise international partnerships, influence global pharmaceutical policy, and attract investment for pharmaceutical manufacturing to facilitate export-led sector growth. Tweet Published in Trade and Industry back to top Join our newsletter Stay informed about the latest TIPS news, research and events. SIGN UP Category Search Search Vacancies
How can the region leverage its youth majority to achieve inclusive governance, despite persistent barriers and instability risks? Enhancing youth engagement in East Africa’s governance, peace and security is imperative for regional stability and sustainable development. With more than 70% of the population under 35, young people have the potential to shape a more inclusive and peaceful future. However, structural, social and institutional barriers still limit their meaningful participation, increasing the risk of marginalisation, disillusionment and instability across the region. About the author Nicodemus Minde is a researcher with the East Africa Peace and Security Governance Programme at the Institute for Security Studies in Nairobi. Publications --> Download Policy Brief 208 PDF Development partners This policy brief was funded by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency. The ISS is grateful for support from the members of the ISS Partnership Forum: the Hanns Seidel Foundation, the European Union, the Open Society Foundations and the governments of Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. Related content <a class="btn btn-success btn-sm me-2 mb-3" target="_blank" href="/countrie
As arguably the most powerful minilateral, the G20 should be pursued as a primary platform for Africa’s climate ambition. The 2025 G20 Summit is the first held in Africa. Hosted by South Africa, it is the fourth consecutive Global South G20 presidency, taking place alongside Brazil’s hosting of the 30th United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP30). Could this combination of a minilateral (G20) and multilateral (COP30) hosted by global south countries re-energise the climate action agenda and unlock climate finance for Africa and the developing world? About the authors Dhesigen Naidoo is Senior Research Associate in the Climate Risk and Human Security project at the Institute for Security Studies. Manisha Gulati is an Independent Adviser on a portfolio of themes around climate change and sustainable development, and supports the Climate Risk and Human Security project at the ISS. Publications --> Download Policy Brief 213 PDF Development partners The ISS is grateful for support from the members of the ISS Partnership Forum: the Hanns Seidel Foundation, the European Union, the Open Society Foundations and the governments of Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.
Organised corruption in local government disrupts the provision of essential services and erodes public trust in the state. The more organised, normalised and profitable corruption becomes in local government across South Africa, the less incentive there will be for good governance. This has serious implications for service delivery, infrastructure maintenance and development, and economic growth. This policy brief examines whether and to what extent corruption in South African municipalities is organised, and whether this understanding can help disrupt it. About the author Romi Sigsworth is a Research Consultant for the Justice and Violence Prevention Programme and the ENACT Organised Crime Programme at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). She was previously an ISS gender specialist and a senior researcher at the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation. She has a Master’s in Women’s Studies from Oxford University. Publications --> Download Policy Brief 212 PDF Development partners This policy brief is funded by United Kingdom International Development. ENACT is funded by the European Union and implemented by the Institute for Security Studies in partnership with INTERPOL and the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime. The ISS is also grateful for support from the members of the ISS Partnership Forum: the Hanns Seidel Foundation, the European Union, the Open Society Foundations and the governments of Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. </d
Africa must be a co-creator at COP30, fostering innovation and shaping a more just, equitable climate finance architecture. Africa’s path to the 30th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP30) faces persistent climate finance and governance challenges. The COP29 decision to mobilise US$300 billion annually by 2035 to help developing countries deal with climate change impacts covers less than 4.3% of global needs. Africa must be a co-creator at COP30, fostering innovation and shaping a more just, equitable climate finance architecture. About the author Kgaugelo Mkumbeni is a Research Officer at the Institute for Security Studies. She has also served as a member of the Southern African Development Community Youth Parliament, and was the youth representative for South Africa for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, working with the Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment. Publications --> Download Policy Brief 210 PDF Development partners The ISS is grateful for support from the members of the ISS Partnership Forum: the Hanns Seidel Foundation, the European Union, the Open Society Foundations and the governments of Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. Related content
Can Africa’s young innovators harness AI for peace amid digital divides and policy gaps? Young people in Africa are revolutionising peacebuilding through artificial intelligence (AI) and digital technologies. They are not just consumers, but also creators of knowledge, transforming how we approach early warning, communication and governance. However, digital divides, inadequate policies and discriminatory structures risk stifling progress. As Africa’s policy framework on AI takes shape, this report advocates for inclusive, accountable frameworks that empower young people to drive Africa’s digital peace future. About the author Emmaculate Asige Liaga is a Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies. Acknowledgement The author expresses her sincere gratitude to all those who contributed to the development of this policy brief which results from a joint ISS-UNDP-AUC and Inclusive Peace session at the Geneva Peace Week meets Addis that took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in April 2025. Special thanks to Amel Ouchenane and Raquel Leandro from the United Nations Development Programme for their valuable insights and contributions. The author also thanks Taye Abdulkadir, from the AU (Y4P Program) and Philip Poppelreuter from Inclusive Peace for their insightful guidance throughout the review process. Publications --> Download Policy Brief 203 PDF
The business sector should take the lead on two proven international methods to proactively deal with systemic corruption. In a context of systemic corruption, business needs to lead the search for solutions. This policy brief highlights new research showing that integrity is in the long-term financial interests of companies. It presents two international good practice methods that business can use to proactively reduce corruption risk: anti-corruption collective action to prevent corruption in sectors; and anti-corruption compliance programmes to prevent and detect corruption in companies. About the authors Colette Ashton is a Research Consultant at the Institute for Security Studies. She is an anti-corruption lawyer and a champion of ethical business practices. She holds a Master’s degree in Anti-Corruption from the UN-founded International Anti-Corruption Academy and a BA Hons LLB from the University of Cape Town. Erin Klazar is an investigative researcher with an Master's in IT (Information Science) degree from the University of Pretoria. She has multi-disciplinary experience in anti-corruption work, including at the State Capture Commission. She is currently a part-time senior researcher with the Anti-Corruption Coalition at the Centre for Business Ethics, Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS). Publications --> Download Policy Brief 205 PDF <
> There is a shortage of jobs but no shortage of work to be done in our communities. What would it mean to design a strategy to address joblessness that is centred around the work that needs doing for the common good, rather than focusing only on the work that markets find valuable? Democratic South Africa was born with unemployment as one of its many wounds , and in the years since, it has remained at the top of the policy agenda. Today more than four-in-10 working-age adults in South Africa are unemployed or too discouraged to keep looking for work. We know that the experience of unemployment is a deeply corrosive one for both individuals and society. It registers in poll after poll as the problem that most worries us. The consequences of unemployment, too, are widely recognised. It makes people spectators in their communities: standing outside, looking in, unable to contribute. For young people especially, it delays or derails the milestones for social belonging. And because unemployment is the single biggest determinant of poverty , it is also a mechanism through which inequality reproduces itself. Framing a crisis The way a problem is framed shapes the response. One reason that interventions to address unemployment have been insufficient, we argue, lies in the framing itself. When we say, "unemployment crisis," attention is implicitly directed to those without work: their qualifications and skills, their job-seeking strategies, their attitudes. The jobseeker becomes the problem to be solved. This has produced its own minor economy of supply-side interventions: another skills certificate, another work-readiness intervention, another CV workshop, and so on. When these fail, the focus turns to entrepreneurial mindsets and ambitions, even though successful enterprise requires capital, information, connections, and customers with disposable income - all factors that existing structural inequalities inhibit and jo
Will Tanzania’s 29 October elections reinforce authoritarian practices rather than promote democratic governance? As Tanzania approaches its general elections on 29 October 2025, there is a significant risk that the polls will reinforce authoritarian practices rather than promote democratic governance. The ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi, has consolidated power around President Samia Suluhu Hassan and disqualified the main opposition parties from the presidential race. Despite reforms that established the Independent National Electoral Commission, executive influence continues to undermine its credibility. About the author Nicodemus Minde is a Researcher with the East Africa Peace and Security Governance Programme at the Institute for Security Studies in Nairobi. Publications --> Download Policy Brief 206 PDF Development partners This policy brief is funded by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency. The ISS is grateful for support from the members of the ISS Partnership Forum: the Hanns Seidel Foundation, the European Union, the Open Society Foundations and the governments of Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. Related content <a class="btn btn-success btn-sm me-2 mb-3" target="_blank" href="/
> The Presidential Economic Advisory Council appointed last year has released its January Advisory Briefs. In support of South Africa’s G20 leadership, the Council focused on both global and domestic aspects of the transition to a green economy and fiscal debt issues. It has not yet brought its considerable expertise to bear on South Africa’s pressing investment, growth, employment and social development challenges. South Africa’s second Presidential Economic Advisory Council (PEAC) has published the “Advisory Briefs” prepared for its inaugural meeting in January this year. As in the past, these have been posted many months in arrears, and do not reflect the council’s advice on the global trade and financial uncertainty of recent months. We are advised that the council met on 28 August and that it again discussed climate change financing issues and South Africa’s budget strategy, while also discussing informal sector employment. Although the press release that accompanied the council’s January meeting indicated “the need to position South Africa for growth in a rapidly changing global environment,” the published briefs do not address the country’s investment, social development and employment challenges. They focus mainly on global and industrial policy aspects of the green transition, while also putting the spotlight on rising debt, fiscal policy, and low-cost administrative “fixes”. The only other publication by the council so far this year has been a Business Day opinion piece jointly drafted with the National Planning Commission and the Presidential Climate Change Commission that endorsed blended finance approaches to South Africa’s Just Energy Transition Investment Plan (JET-IP). The JET-IP , approved by Cabinet in October 2022, is an ambitious R1.5 trillion proposal to mobilise domestic and international funding for South Africa’s energy transition, including investment in green hydrogen and electric vehicle production. Altho
> What impact did South Africa’s nationwide curfew of December 2020 have on COVID-19 cases? The evidence, based on daily case data, shows a sharp and immediate decline in infections following the curfew’s implementation. The findings highlight the value of targeted restrictions, particularly when combined with alcohol bans, and offer policy lessons on timing, communication, and equity in designing effective public health interventions. Introduction When South Africa faced a sharp surge in COVID-19 cases during the pandemic’s second wave in late December 2020, the government moved swiftly to impose a nationwide nighttime curfew. Starting on 29 December, movement was prohibited between 9pm and 6am. The rationale was straightforward: reduce late-night gatherings, especially those linked to alcohol consumption, and thereby cut opportunities for the virus to spread. But did the curfew actually work? Public debates at the time were divided. Some argued that it was a blunt instrument that punished millions who posed little risk, while others believed that curfews offered a crucial, targeted alternative to harsher full-scale lockdowns. Until recently, there was little rigorous evidence to settle this debate in the South African context. What the data shows Using daily COVID-19 case data from early 2020 to the end of 2021, I examined whether the December 2020 curfew had a measurable effect on infections. The analysis employs a R egression D iscontinuity D esign (RDD), depicted in Figure 1 , focusing on the days immediately before and after the curfew was introduced. RDD is a way of studying policy effects by comparing outcomes just before and after a policy intervention date. This “natural experiment” provides a clean way to isolate the impact of the curfew from other factors, since the policy was imposed suddenly and uniformly across the country. Figure 1: R egression Discontinuity Source: Author’s own computation The results show a cl
> How can the cotton, textiles and apparel regional value chain drive the implementations of the AfCFTA? The key message of this paper is that the AfCFTA should be implemented in a manner that addresses the existing asymmetries between the member states and the need for all members to benefit from the agreement. The questions that the paper sets to answer are the following: how can the 55 member states consisting of 33 Least Developed Countries (LDCs), 16 Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDC) and six Small Island Developing States (SIDS) integrate in a manner that is mutually beneficial, sharing the benefits of free trade while compensating smaller economies and more vulnerable sectors – in both large and small economies – from adjustments and job losses? What trade and industrial policy measures and mechanisms are required to ensure that the benefits of AfCFTA are spread to poorer and smaller economies? What investments are required to support the development of cross-border infrastructure needed to advance intra-regional trade? How can the AfCFTA advance both democratic institution building and inclusive economic development to make democracies both resilient and sustainable? How can the Cotton, Textiles and Apparel Regional Value Chain drive the Implementation of the AfCFTA? Last modified on 11 September 2025 Published in Trade and Industry More in this category: « Development of the cosmetics sector strategy in South Africa back to top Join our newsletter Stay informed about the latest TIPS news, research and events. SIGN UP Category Search Search Vacancies
Can Nigeria harness AI and drones to advance effective landmine clearance strategies? Over the past decade, Nigeria has been grappling with a threat of a new kind: improvised landmines. As federal authorities step up efforts to address the issue, this policy brief explores the potential of technologies such as airborne remote sensing and artificial intelligence (AI) to enhance landmine detection. About the author Moussa Soumahoro is a Researcher in the African Peace and Security Governance programme of the Institute for Security Studies. His research focuses on unconstitutional changes of government, political transitions, organised crime, mine action and assessments of vulnerabilities and resilience. Publications --> Download Policy Brief 202 PDF Development partners The ISS is grateful for support from the members of the ISS Partnership Forum: the Hanns Seidel Foundation, the European Union, the Open Society Foundations and the governments of Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. Related content Arms control and disarmament
> Expanding access to electricity has been a major achievement of post-apartheid South Africa, yet affordability remains a persistent challenge for low-income households. To address this, the government introduced Free Basic Electricity (FBE) in 2003, offering 50 kWh of free electricity per month to indigent households. The study on which this article is based provides the first quantitative analysis of FBE’s effects on household welfare since its inception. We find receiving the FBE subsidy is associated with a shift towards clean cooking, investment in essential appliances, and small but significant improvements in literacy, writing, and numeracy. However, the subsidy does not yet reach all its intended beneficiaries: we indicate that institutional weaknesses need to be addressed alongside review of the value of the benefit. Introduction South Africa’s post-apartheid electrification program is widely recognized as one of the most successful in the world. Between 1996 and 2014, the proportion of households with access to electricity rose from 54% to 86%. [1] However, while the programme successfully connected millions of households to the grid, affordability remained a major barrier for low-income families. Many newly electrified households could not afford to purchase electricity, forcing them to continue to rely on unsafe and unhealthy fuels such as paraffin, wood, and coal. These fuels have been found to have severe health, environmental and socio-economic impacts . Energy poverty in South Africa manifests in the persistent use of unsafe fuels despite having access to electricity. Free Basic Electricity In response to this challenge, the Free Basic Electricity (FBE) policy was introduced in 2003 as a measure to alleviate energy poverty. The policy aimed to provide a basic level of free electricity, set at 50 Kilowatt hours (kWh) per month for qualifying households. Policymakers considered this allocation sufficient to meet essential needs , suc
Can a new continental maritime governance framework support Africa's transition to decarbonisation and environmental sustainability? A two-pronged, adaptive and proactive approach to addressing climate change in Africa’s maritime transport and ports sector is needed. By reducing emissions and building climate resilience in the maritime sector, Africa can aim to future-proof the sector by both mitigating its environmental impact and strengthening its capacity to withstand climate-related disruptions, while supporting the sustainable development of its blue economy. About the authors Judy Beaumont is International Ocean Institute – Southern Africa Director. She has worked in the environmental sector for 30 years, focusing on environmental sustainability, ocean and coastal management, and climate change response. Shannon Hampton is a Marine Biologist who has worked in ocean governance in Africa for over a decade. David Willima is a Maritime Researcher with the Institute for Security Studies’ Climate Risk and Human Security Project. Publications --> Download Policy Brief 200 PDF <clipPath id="clip0_111_2037"
> South Africa, albeit more than other African countries, has contributed a nominal amount to the global stock of GHG emissions. However, it is imperative that it shifts to a green industrialisation path, for two main reasons. First to avert looming risks arising from fundamental geo-political and economic shifts in the global economy. Second, to take advantage of opportunities this shift presents for South Africa’s industrialisation. Greening industrialisation and industrial policy represents an opportunity for South Africa to shift from fossil-fuel intensive stagnation to a higher value-added, labour-absorbing and less carbon-intensive economy. Last modified on 18 August 2025 Published in Sustainable Growth More in this category: « TIPS Working Paper How can South Africa engage the EU (and other G20 members) on CBAM and advance a 'Just Transition' in Africa during its G20 Presidency and beyond back to top Join our newsletter Stay informed about the latest TIPS news, research and events. SIGN UP Category Search Search Vacancies Training
> The case for reform of public employment programmes (PEPs) has become increasingly urgent, as South Africa grapples with an ongoing unemployment crisis – alongside the need to address some scepticism about whether these programmes are delivering meaningful value for participants, society and the economy. The purpose of reform of PEPs is to improve the outcomes and impacts from the public investments being made, for participants, for the society and for the economy. This paper focuses on a particular dimension of that agenda, related to the modalities of delivery of public employment programmes and the relative merits of approaches that “mainstream” public employment into the budgets of existing government programmes, where employment is an ancillary outcome, compared to more programmatic approaches to the design, rollout and scale-up of programmes which have public employment as their main purpose. Published in Inequality and Economic Inclusion More in this category: « Inclusive business as employment generator in rural settlements back to top Join our newsletter Stay informed about the latest TIPS news, research and events. SIGN UP Category Search Search Vacancies Training
> This paper is intended to contribute to the discussion on how to build a broader framework to respond to the EU CBAM and engage in diplomacy with the EU to support South Africa and Africa’s “just energy transition”. With South Africa being the Presidency of the G20 in 2025, this also provides African countries with an excellent opportunity to engage with all G20 members (including the United States (US)) on how to restore the integrity of the multilateral trading system and advance a just transition for African countries that also advances their economic development and social transformation. Last modified on 28 July 2025 Published in Sustainable Growth More in this category: « TIPS Working Paper Greening Industrial Policy in South Africa: Insights from China, the United States and the European Union Greening South Africa's Industrial Policy » back to top Join our newsletter Stay informed about the latest TIPS news, research and events. SIGN UP Category Search Search Vacancies <s
Given the evidence about what works and the major return on violence prevention investments, South Africa must scale up its efforts. Violence in South Africa has an enormous cost on individuals, health and social protection systems, and the economy. There is growing evidence about the substantial return on investment that violence prevention can deliver, and about what works to prevent violence. Now is the time to invest in evidence-based interventions to prevent all forms of violence. This policy brief summarises lessons learnt from research, policy and practice over the past three years. About the authors Senzikile Bengu (ISS), Harsha Dayal (Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation), Gwen Dereymaeker (Department of Health and Wellness, Western Cape Provincial Government), Wilmi Dippenaar (South African Parenting Programme Implementers Network), Anik Gevers (independent consultant), Chandré Gould (ISS), Thamsanqa Mzaku (Phaphama Initiatives), Andisiwe Makwecana (ISS), Mercilene T Machisa (South African Medical Research Council), Pinky Mahlangu (SAMRC), Sinelizwi Ncaluka (MOSAIC), Penelope Parenzee (Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, University of Cape Town), Jill Ryan (University of Stellenbosch), Nwabisa Shai (SAMRC), Yandisa Sikweyiya (SAMRC). Publications --> Download Policy Brief 199 PDF Development partners This policy brief is funded by the Government of Finland and the Wellspring Philanthropic Fund. The ISS is also grateful for support from the members of the ISS Partnership Forum: the Hanns Seidel Foundation, the European Union, the Open Society Foundations and the governments of Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.
> This report is a summary of a feasibility study that explores the potential of promoting timber in South African construction by addressing challenges and leveraging benefits. It emphasises capacity building and demand creation deliverables to unlock timber’s environmental, economic, and social benefits in various construction industries. The study was prepared for TIPS on behalf of the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition by Enterprises University of Pretoria (Pty) Ltd Last modified on 20 July 2025 Published in Trade and Industry More in this category: « Terms of Reference: Development of the Forest Products Research Strategy for South Africa back to top Join our newsletter Stay informed about the latest TIPS news, research and events. SIGN UP Category Search Search Vacancies Training <li class="g-menu-item g-menu-item-type-alias g-menu-item-260 g-parent g-standard g-menu-item-lin
> The aims of this study were to review current policies and initiatives in the cosmetics sector, including funding support; developing a cosmetic sector strategy over the short- and long-terms; and defining funding and technical models to support the implementation of the strategy. It comprises a brief literature review, analysis of the data provided by international and local agencies, findings from the survey of cosmetic and retail firms in South Africa, and recommendations for the way forward. Last modified on 22 July 2025 Published in Trade and Industry More in this category: « Options for localising steel inputs for the infrastructure build programme The AfCFTA: From negotiations to implementation - A developmental regionalism approach » back to top Join our newsletter Stay informed about the latest TIPS news, research and events. SIGN UP Category Search Search Vacancies Training
Short-term legal reforms could boost the SIU’s successful anti-corruption record and expand its role in corruption prevention. The Special Investigating Unit (SIU) is one of South Africa’s most effective anti-corruption agencies. It has a good civil litigation track record, an organisational culture of excellence and is supported by a dedicated Special Tribunal. Given the large scale of corruption in the country, several reforms could further strengthen the unit. The research for this policy brief was undertaken in cooperation with the SIU. About the authors David Bruce is a researcher on policing, criminal justice and corruption and an ISS Consultant. Colette Ashton is an ISS Research Consultant and anti-corruption lawyer. Cheryl Frank is the Project Manager of the ISS Anti-Corruption and Accountability Project. Publications --> Download Policy Brief 198 PDF Development partners This policy brief was funded by the UK International Development from the UK government; however, the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK government’s official policies. The ISS is also grateful for support from the members of the I
This policy brief provides evidence and analysis that refutes the claim of a genocide against white farmers. Farm attacks are a serious crime problem requiring dedicated law enforcement attention, but they do not amount to genocide. They represent a small part of violent crime overall in South Africa and their patterns are consistent with criminal rather than political motives. Recent statistics show a decline in violent farm crime. Effective rural safety solutions include stronger policing, community cooperation and tackling the root causes of South Africa’s broader crime challenges. About the authors Gareth Newham is the Head of the ISS Justice and Violence Prevention Programme and Lizette Lancaster is the Manager of the ISS Crime and Justice Information and Analysis Hub (crimehub.org). Publications --> Download Policy Brief 201 PDF Development partners This policy brief is funded by the Hanns Seidel Foundation. The ISS is also grateful for support from the members of the ISS Partnership Forum: the Hanns Seidel Foundation, the European Union, the Open Society Foundations and the governments of Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. </d
> Green Industrial Policy (Green IP) aims to advance green industries and transform existing sectors to support the move towards low-carbon economies. Traditionally, industrial policy has focused on enhancing productivity and economic prosperity by supporting specific industries. However, the growing urgency of climate change has caused a shift towards Green IP, which attempts to balance economic growth with sustainable development. Hence, the world’s economic powerhouses, including the European Union, United States, and China, have pivoted their industrial strategies to prioritise sustainability. This working paper aims to examine international practices of Green Industrial Policy and draw lessons for greening South Africa’s industrial policy. Last modified on 18 August 2025 Published in Sustainable Growth More in this category: « How South Africa’s G20 Presidency can advance climate resilience, developmental regionalism in Africa, and an equitable multilateral trading system TIPS Working Paper How can South Africa engage the EU (and other G20 members) on CBAM and advance a 'Just Transition' in Africa during its G20 Presidency and beyond » back to top Join our newsletter Stay informed about the latest TIPS news, research and events. SIGN UP Category Search Search Vacancies
> From 1 December 2024, South Africa assumed the Presidency of the G20. South Africa has a unique role to play in the G20 process. Its presidency follows that of a troika of other major developing countries: Brazil (2024), India (2023) and Indonesia (2022), and is expected to carry forward and build on the huge contribution these developing countries have made to the G20 agenda and work programme. At the handing-over ceremony President Cyril Pamaphose announced that South Africa’s G20 Presidency will advance three high-level priorities: Inclusive Economic Growth, Industrialisation, Employment and Inequality; Food Security; and Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Innovation for Sustainable Development - and establish three dedicated task forces. This Working Paper focuses on the first of the three priorities.The purpose of the paper is to inform the debate of the task force on Inclusive Economic Growth, Industrialisation, Employment and Inequality. It looks at the changing global context impacting on globalisation and international trade and investment; discusses the impact of climate change, particularly on developing countries and Africa, and sets out a framework for a just transition; and provides an assessment of the imbalances and asymmetries of the global trading system, particularly on Africa, and discusses proposals for reform of the global trade architecture. Last modified on 28 January 2025 Published in Sustainable Growth Topic: Industrialisation Employment Inequality Economic Growth Related Research Employment metrics in South Africa’s electricity value chains | Policy Briefs Employment trends in the South African economy | Policy Briefs Inequality in South Africa: An Overview | Inequality and Economic Inclusion A case for water and sanitation in South Africa's post-lockdown economic recovery stimulus package | Policy Briefs A case for water and sanitation in South Africa's post-lockdown economic recovery stimulus package | Green Econom
> The steel value chain has been in a long-term downturn since the mid-2000s. Only the mini mills, which produce long steel, and parts of downstream manufacturing have grown. The new public infrastructure build programme, especially for electricity and rail, should support recovery by boosting domestic demand. It may, however, just fuel imports unless accompanied by policies to promote sustainable local procurement. This paper reviews the economic logic behind localisation and experiences in the public infrastructure push in the 2010s. It outlines the main instruments currently in place to support localisation – that is, tariffs, product designations, and support for actual and potential suppliers. An assessment of the costs, benefits and risks of these instruments follows. The final section indicates some next steps. Last modified on 05 March 2025 Published in Trade and Industry Topic: Steel industry Value Chains Related Research Industry study: International Trends in the Steel Industry | Manufacturing Industries and Subsectors Industry Study: Technological Change in the Steel Industry | Manufacturing Industries and Subsectors Localising vanadium battery production for South Africa's energy security | Green Economy A review of vanadium redox flow battery (VRFB) market demand and costs | Policy Briefs Regional wool value chain | Trade and Industry More in this category: « Evaluation of the industry/sector master plan process Development of the cosmetics sector strategy in South Africa » back to top Join our newsletter Stay informed about the latest TIPS news, research and events. SIGN UP Category Search <form action="/research-archive/trade-and-industry/itemlist/filter" name="K2Fi
> Presentation TIPS Senior Economist Dr Neva Makgetla presented at the Portfolio Committee on Trade, Industry and Competition on 30 October 2024, where she shared key outcomes from ther masterplans evaluation. Watch online: Last modified on 05 March 2025 Published in Trade and Industry More in this category: « Draft of the South African Medical Devices Masterplan – Value Chain 2024 Options for localising steel inputs for the infrastructure build programme » back to top Join our newsletter Stay informed about the latest TIPS news, research and events. SIGN UP Category Search Search Vacancies Training
> The medical devices sector in South Africa is characterised by its complexity and diversity, involving numerous products, companies, and rapid innovation cycles. This sector, despite not being a major employment generator, plays a crucial role in healthcare delivery and offers significant growth potential through both local manufacturing and international investments. Currently, the sector contributes substantially to South Africa's trade deficit, due to high import levels driven by disease. The development of a comprehensive Masterplan for this sector aims to address the trade deficit, encourage localisation, and boost export revenues. This Masterplan is informed by a detailed value chain analysis based on the 2022 Medical Devices Landscape study by the South African Medical Research Council and trade data from Trade & Industrial Policy Strategies. The analysis identifies key challenges and opportunities within the sector, highlighting the need for strategic interventions to foster growth. This research comprises the main report and six annexures. Download or read online: Main Report: Draft of the South African Medical Devices Masterplan – Value Chain 2024 Download or read online: Annexure 1: Trade in medical devices Annexure 2: Methodology of HS Codes for medical devices Annexure 3: Working group workshop on quick win interventions Annexure 4A: Case study - Turkey Annexure 4B: Case study - Development of medical devices value chain in Costa Rica Annexure 5: Manufacturing financial data Last modified on 10 December 2024 Published in Trade and Industry More in this category: « Options for long steel: An evaluation Evaluation of the industry/sector master plan process » back to top Join our newsletter Stay informed about the latest TIPS news, research and events. SIGN UP Category Search Search <input type="submit" value="Search" class="btn btn-prima
> In late 2023, ArcelorMittal South Africa (AMSA) announced it would close down its long steel unit, including its mill at Newcastle, unless government, its workers and its customers increased their support. In early July 2024, it said it would delay the closure depending, again, on greater support from stakeholders. This paper explores the factors behind AMSA’s threat to close its long steel production; analyses the costs, benefits and risks for different constituencies; and on that basis indicates critical decision points for government and for stakeholders. Last modified on 05 March 2025 Published in Trade and Industry More in this category: « South Africa's petrochemicals and basic chemicals in the context of South Africa's energy transition: Sasol's Secunda coal-to-chemicals-and-liquids facility Draft of the South African Medical Devices Masterplan – Value Chain 2024 » back to top Join our newsletter Stay informed about the latest TIPS news, research and events. SIGN UP Category Search Search Vacancies
> The central question of this paper and policy brief is: what is the future of the South African petrochemicals and plastics, ammonia, fertiliser, explosives and other chemical value chains of the Secunda petrochemical complex in the light of Sasol’s stated greenhouse gas emission reduction plans and other assessed business constraints? Given the risks that a declining Secunda output pose to the South African economy, this paper identifies several possible economic development substitutes, roughly compared against policy objectives, as possible targets for further detailed quantitative and financial analysis. The policy brief draws on the information in the main report. This research was supported by the African Climate Foundation. Main Report Download a copy or read online: South Africa's petrochemicals and basic chemicals in the context of South Africa's energy transition focussing on Sasol's Secunda coal-to-chemicals-and-liquids facility Policy Brief Download or read online: Petrochemicals and South Africas energy transition Sasols Secunda coal to chemicals and liquids facility Last modified on 16 October 2024 Published in Trade and Industry More in this category: « Supply security issues pertaining to the designation and exemption of the South African petroleum industry (SAPIA) from the Competition Act Options for long steel: An evaluation » back to top Join our newsletter Stay informed about the latest TIPS news, research and events. SIGN UP Category Search Search <div clas
> The European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) entered its transition period on 1 October 2023, with the first CBAM report for the fourth quarter of 2023 submitted on 29 February 2024. Key industries most affected in South Africa are iron, steel and aluminium. The transition period will run for over two years, ending in December 2025. South Africa is not ready financially and administratively to comply with CBAM requirements during the transition period. South Africa is not ready financially and administratively to comply with CBAM requirements during the transition period. Issues include domestic industries struggling to deal with logistical and energy problems, i.e. the collapse of Transnet infrastructure and loadshedding, short timelines for the transition, lack of awareness of decarbonisation and climate change measures, increasing costs of accessing global markets amid greening global value chains, incompatible infrastructure of accounting GHG emissions, and the rise of carbon clubs as a form of protecting industries in the Global North. It is paramount to act collaboratively on these issues. Government and affected industries, labour unions and researchers, need to work together to find solutions on CBAM for both large and small exporters. This paper relies heavily on industry-government-researchers workshops on the iron and steel and aluminium value chains held in November 2023, which formed part of initial efforts to raise these issues and try to find solutions in adapting trade to green international trade laws introduced in the Global North. Last modified on 05 March 2025 Published in Climate Change More in this category: « The European Green Deal (EGD) and its implications for African Trade Border Carbon Adjustments Research: Strategic Pathways to Mitigate Adverse Impacts » back to top Join our newsletter Stay informed about the latest TIPS news, research and events. SIGN UP Category Search Search <div id="sid
> Participants in the petroleum industry value chain, represented by the South African Petroleum Industry Association (SAPIA), are currently granted exemption from the Competition Act largely on the basis of ensuring security of supply of petroleum products. This exemption was invoked in 2002 for 18 months to ensure fuel supply security after the termination of the Main Supply Agreement whereby oil companies in South Africa were obliged to uplift and market a substantial proportion of Sasol’s fuel production from its plants at Sasolburg and Secunda. The Designation and Exemption was not renewed. However, after severe supply shortages were experienced in 2005, the Moerane Commission of Inquiry recommended its reinstatement. Following the 2010 World Cup, SAPIA applied for, and was granted, exemption between 3 October 2011 and 31 December 2015 with some conditions being attached after 2011. Since 2015, the exemption has since been extended some 21 times. The continuous exemption of the fuel industry value chain over a period of more than two decades constitutes a risk to the integrity of Competition Policy. The Department of Trade, Industry and Competition (the dtic) and the Competition Commission are currently evaluating the merits of SAPIA’s 2020 application in this context. This paper draws on a confidential report of an investigation commissioned by the dtic to assess the merits of SAPIA’s application for further Designation of the South African petroleum industry. It examines the technical and infrastructural root causes of supply security risks and identifies measures that would contribute to reducing such risks, thereby eliminating the need for a general exemption of the fuel industry from the Competition Act. Last modified on 23 May 2024 Published in Trade and Industry Topic: Petroleum industry More in this category: « Electrical Equipment Regional Value Chain Between South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe 2024 South Africa's petrochemicals and
> The demand for electricity in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region is anticipated to double from 280 terawatt hours (TWh) in 2010 to 570 TWh by 2030. By extension, the region will require significant amounts of electrical equipment, which includes items that are used for generation, conversion, transmission, supply, control, and utilisation of electric energy. The SADC region is a net importer of electrical equipment, although South Africa supplies some of the equipment, including cables and structural steel products to the region, and Zambia produces copper wire on a large scale. If more local requirements for electrical equipment were produced in the region, it would stimulate investment, innovation, manufacturing, and job creation both directly and indirectly. This regional value chain report examines whether SADC countries can move up the value chain and produce more inputs. It considers opportunities for further value addition in three Southern African countries – South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Last modified on 23 May 2024 Published in Trade and Industry Topic: Regional value chains Related Research Promoting intra-SADC trade through regional industrial value chains: A case study of import opportunities for South Africa | Trade and Industry A developmental regionalism approach to the AfCFTA and Rules of Origin for the cotton, textiles and apparel regional value chain | Trade and Industry Unlocking a regional plastics value chain between Mozambique and South Africa | Policy Briefs Future-proofing the plastics value chain in Southern Africa | Trade and Industry The electrotechnical industry regional value chain in Southern Africa A case for South Africa and Zambia | Trade and Industry More in this category: « Comparative perspective on BRICS economies: Trade potential and limitations Supply security issues pertaining to the designation and exemption of the South African petroleum industry (SAPIA) from the Competition Act » b
| Theme | Papers |
|---|---|
| general | 125 |
| growth | 7 |
| monetary | 4 |
| employment | 3 |
| fiscal | 2 |
| agriculture | 2 |
| labour | 2 |
| industrialisation | 2 |
| productivity | 2 |
| structural reform | 2 |
| competition | 2 |
| regulation | 2 |
| governance | 1 |
| digital | 1 |
| investment | 1 |
About This Data
Research papers are gathered from a set of South African policy and economics institutions — currently CDE, DPRU (UCT), Econ3x3, ERSA, ISS, SA-TIED, SAIIA, and TIPS. Each paper is mirrored into the evidence graph (see docs/EVIDENCE_ARCHITECTURE.md) so its themes connect to the binding constraints tracked in the policy ideas database.