Correction, October 2026

Corrected in the description

• Was: passed by Parliament in 2022 but returned unsigned after President Ramaphosa declined assent citing AGOA-related IP concerns raised by the US USTR
  Now: first passed by Parliament in 2019 and returned by President Ramaphosa in 2020 over constitutional concerns, re-passed in 2024 and then referred by the President to the Constitutional Court in October 2024 (GoLegal)
• Was: The AGOA complication: the USTR identified the CAB's fair use provisions as potentially inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement three-step test, threatening preferential market access if signed.
  Now: The US trade complication: the USTR in October 2019 accepted a petition from the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA), which attacked the CAB's fair use provisions, and opened a review of South Africa's GSP trade preferences. (BusinessTech, 2019)
• Was: A revised CAB must satisfy TRIPS Article 13 while preserving meaningful educational fair use and implementing Marrakesh disability access commitments.
  Now: On 26 June 2026 the Constitutional Court upheld the fair use clause (section 12A) but declared the section 12D(1)–(5) educational copying exceptions unconstitutional, returning the bill to Parliament to revise those provisions. (Knowledge Governance (on [2026] ZACC 26), 2026)

Still in the text, not verified

• PC on Trade BRRRs 2022–2024 documenting the education vs SAMRO/publishers tension
• DTI and DIRCO managing diplomatic and legislative tracks in parallel

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate of digital-economy gains found. Internally inconsistent: 0.1-0.2% of GDP is roughly R7-15bn per year, while the first clause gives R5-15bn over 5 years. The only quantified study found (PwC 2017, commissioned by publishers) projects losses: a 33% (R2.1bn) decline in publishing sales. (source)

Corrected in the description

• Was: Interim remedies issued in 2023 include mandatory listing of rival products on dominant platforms, prohibition on parity pricing clauses, and data access rights for third-party sellers.
  Now: Remedies in the July 2023 final report include removal of Booking.com's restrictive pricing clauses, separation of Takealot's retail division from its marketplace, and Google search changes to give smaller South African platforms visibility. (GoLegal, 2023)
• Was: The final report (2024) recommends structural remedies modelled on the EU Digital Markets Act — including mandatory data portability, interoperability requirements, and algorithm transparency obligations.
  Now: The remedies are platform-specific and also require Google to implement in South Africa the changes it makes in Europe to address self-preferencing. (TechCabal, 31 July 2023)
• Was: The Digital Platforms Competition Framework extends buyer power regulations (introduced in the Competition Amendment Act 2018 for agri-food markets) to digital platform markets.
  Now: The buyer power provisions introduced by the Competition Amendment Act 2018 already apply to e-commerce and online services, which were designated alongside agro-processing and grocery retail in 2020. (Engineering News, 18 May 2020)
• Was: App store commission rates of 15–30% are specifically flagged as an excessive pricing concern under Section 8 of the Competition Act.
  Now: The final report found app stores unconstrained in the commission fees they charge paid app developers and required Apple and Google to drop anti-steering rules. (Access Partnership, 2023)

Still in the text, not verified

• 'over 60% of South African SMMEs report digital platforms as their primary sales channel' (and its attribution to PC on Trade BRRRs)

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found in the OIPMI reporting; 0.2-0.5% of GDP is roughly R15-38bn a year, out of proportion to remedies like listing-fee cuts and disclosure rules.

Corrected in the description

• Was: USD 2.8 billion in 2023
  Now: USD 3.2 billion in 2023 (Daily Maverick, 22 Oct 2025)
• Was: AGOA's current authorisation expires in September 2025
  Now: AGOA lapsed on 30 September 2025 and was retroactively extended in February 2026 only until 31 December 2026 (IOL, 4 Feb 2026)
• Was: The PC on Trade's BRRR 2024 flagged both the urgency of AGOA retention and the structural dependence on preferential access as a long-term vulnerability for SA exporters.
  Now: The PC on Trade's 2022 BRRR supported extending AGOA beyond 2025 and urged the Minister to secure South Africa's inclusion in an extension. (PMG, Trade, Industry and Competition committee, 8 Nov 2022)

Still in the text, not verified

• Copyright Amendment Bill and Russia non-alignment as US concerns (not checked)
• AGOA Retention Strategy / Post-AGOA Diversification Strategy as named DIRCO/DTIC documents

Impact estimate

Replaced with the nearest sourced figure. Audit verdict: Partly sourced. The rand range brackets one published estimate (Mackay: R27.9bn of AGOA exports in 2022) but US import statistics put 2022 AGOA entries at R59.6bn, so 'R15-30bn' understates the US-side figure. The 60,000-80,000 jobs figure has no source found. (source)

Status that looks out of date (not yet changed)

current_status should reflect AGOA's lapse (30 Sep 2025) and the retroactive extension only to 31 Dec 2026.

Corrected in the description

• Was: in force since 2021
  Now: in force since 2019 and trading since 2021 (AfCFTA Secretariat)
• Was: The IMF estimates AfCFTA full implementation could boost SA GDP by 1.5% annually by 2035.
  Now: World Bank (2020) modelling suggests full AfCFTA implementation could raise South Africa's income by about 4% by 2035. (Ecofin Agency, reporting World Bank 2020 study)

Still in the text, not verified

• DTIC AfCFTA Action Plan (2023) with 10 priority sectors and 47 NTB actions (no such plan found by either pass)
• ITAC/SARS capacity limits and slow ratification of investment/competition/IP protocols
• Market size of 1.4 billion people (Secretariat says about 1.3 billion)

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: Contradicted by a published figure. The only published SA-specific estimate found is the World Bank (2020) ~4% income gain by 2035 under full implementation (incl. trade facilitation), which differs from the 0.5-1.5% range. The R50-150bn export figure is unsourced; actual SA exports under AfCFTA preferences were about R820m from Jan 2024 to Mar 2025 (dtic). (source)

Corrected in the description

• Was: employs 110,000 direct workers and 440,000 in the supply chain
  Now: supports more than 116,000 manufacturing jobs and about 500,000 formal jobs in the automotive supply chain (BusinessDay, 7 May 2024)
• Was: contributing 4.9% of GDP and R210 billion in exports annually
  Now: contributing 5.3% of GDP and a record R270.8 billion in exports in 2023 (BusinessDay, 7 May 2024)
• Was: extending the APDP (Automotive Production and Development Programme) to Phase 3 with EV-specific investment allowances
  Now: EV production support in addition to the existing APDP (Automotive Production and Development Programme), including the 150% investment allowance for EV and hydrogen vehicle production from 1 March 2026 announced in the 2024 Budget (National Treasury Budget 2024 (via acts.co.za))
• Was: ICE vehicle exports to the US (under AGOA) remain the industry's main revenue source through 2030
  Now: ICE vehicle exports to the EU, the industry's largest export market, remain the industry's main revenue source (BusinessDay, 7 May 2024)

Still in the text, not verified

• DTIC consulted NAACAM, NAAMSA and named OEMs (Toyota, VW, BMW, Ford, Isuzu)
• White Paper proposes municipal EV charging rollout plan, battery cell assembly facility and MERSETA skills programme
• EV platform decisions must be secured by 2025–2026 for 2030+ production
• PC on Trade BRRRs 2023–2024 flag the EV White Paper timeline as behind schedule

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found. 15,000-25,000 new jobs by 2030 would equal 13-22% of the sector's entire ~116,000 direct workforce, implausible when EV output is still marginal and EVs largely substitute for ICE lines; 0.2-0.4% GDP (~R15-30bn) is also unsupported.

Corrected in the description

• Was: green hydrogen for direct reduction ironmaking in the Northern Cape
  Now: green hydrogen for direct reduction ironmaking at Saldanha in the Western Cape (Daily Maverick, 18 Oct 2022)
• Was: The Presidential Hydrogen Commission, established under Operation Vulindlela, coordinates across DMRE, DTIC, DSIT, and DBSA.
  Now: A project pipeline has been identified under the Green Hydrogen National Programme. (Engineering News, 29 Nov 2022)
• Was: R2.4 billion in catalytic funding from the JETP partnerships is earmarked for hydrogen demonstration projects
  Now: JET partner funding allocated to green hydrogen totalled about R8.2 billion across 19 projects as at 31 March 2026 (PMG, Minister of Electricity and Energy reply NW4210, 2026)
• Was: electrolyser cost (currently USD 800–1,200/kW) and green electricity price, both declining rapidly
  Now: electrolyser cost (USD 500–1,100/kW for Chinese alkaline systems but USD 1,900–2,500/kW outside China in 2025) and green electricity price (IEA commentary, 2025)

Still in the text, not verified

• 'three near-term project clusters' framing (not found in GHCS sources)
• green ammonia cluster replacing imported grey ammonia
• existing industrial gas infrastructure / PGM framing

Impact estimate

Replaced with the nearest sourced figure. Audit verdict: Contradicted by a published figure. The R300bn pipeline is sourced (Green Hydrogen National Programme, Nov 2022, 19 projects; no '10 years' horizon stated). Government's own GHCS figures differ materially from the jobs and GDP ranges: ~370,000 jobs and up to 3.6% of GDP by 2050 (Cabinet statement, Oct 2023). (source)

Status that looks out of date (not yet changed)

Possibly overstated if status is 'implemented': Daily Maverick (May 2026) reports JET hydrogen finance crowded out by electricity projects.

Corrected in the description

• Was: safeguard duties on steel imports (activated by ITAC in 2023)
  Now: safeguard duties on flat-rolled steel imports (investigation initiated by ITAC in February 2024; definitive duties gazetted in May 2025) (ITAC media release, 2025)
• Was: announced the closure of its Longs division in 2024 (affecting 3,500 workers)
  Now: announced the wind-down of its Longs business in January 2025 (affecting about 3,500 jobs), after first flagging a possible closure in November 2023 (Business Report, 6 Jan 2025)
• Was: The Energy Bounce-Back scheme directly addresses energy cost competitiveness for steel producers.
  Now: (deleted) (National Treasury, 8 Aug 2023)

Still in the text, not verified

• 2021–2030 plan period
• AMSA, Columbus Stainless and SEIFSA named as partners
• 'Steel Development Fund' for energy efficiency (plan lists 'Resource Mobilisation and the Steel Fund')
• local procurement designations as a master-plan measure

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: Contradicted by a published figure. No published estimate was found for the GDP or import-substitution ranges. The '120,000 direct steel-sector jobs' figure conflicts with the roughly 200,000 workers cited when the master plan was signed. (source)

Corrected in the description

• Was: targets doubling the sector's contribution to GDP and employment by 2030
  Now: targets new jobs by 2030 (Fibre2Fashion; Engineering News, 11 Sep 2020)
• Was: The sector employs approximately 120,000 workers, concentrated in the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal.
  Now: The sector employs more than 500,000 people, including about 250,000 in manufacturing, concentrated in the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. (SAnews (dtic, Minister Patel), May 2024)

Still in the text, not verified

• retailers '(SACCI/RFI)'
• 'facilitated by a designated products list under the Preferential Procurement Regulations'
• 'concentrated in the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal'
• attribution of the customs-fraud point to PC on Trade BRRRs (supported for a June 2022 committee meeting)

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found. '120,000 jobs preserved' conflates the plan's target of ~120,000 NEW jobs with current employment (itself contested, 69,000-250,000). 0.1-0.2% of GDP (~R7-15bn) is plausible in magnitude, but the jobs component is wrong in kind.

Corrected in the description

• Was: encompasses 11 designated zones
  Now: encompasses 12 designated zones (nine of them operational) (Engineering News, 24 Jun 2026)
• Was: The PC on Trade BRRR 2024 cited governance failures at Nkomazi, unresolved traditional leader land disputes, and inadequate utilities as root causes.
  Now: In March 2025 the NCOP Select Committee on Economic Development and Trade heard that Nkomazi remained hamstrung by governance failures and poor coordination, with bulk water infrastructure still incomplete. (PMG, NCOP Select Committee on Economic Development and Trade, 26 Mar 2025)

Still in the text, not verified

• The MTBPS 2025 allocates R4.2 billion to SEZ infrastructure over the MTEF period
• 'strengthening the SEZ Advisory Board' / IDMS link (proposal framing)

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate. The whole SEZ programme had R31.7bn cumulative investment and ~28,000 jobs after a decade (dtic, June 2026); R50-100bn in 5 years and 0.2-0.5% of GDP (~R15-38bn/yr) for a portfolio rationalisation is implausibly high. (source)

Corrected in the description

• Was: employing approximately 36,000 workers directly and another 30,000 in feed, hatcheries, and processing
  Now: employing more than 58,000 people directly and more than 55,000 indirectly across the value chain (Daily Maverick (opinion), 28 Jan 2026)
• Was: ITAC investigations confirmed dumping margins of 13–62% on EU imports, leading to provisional anti-dumping duties in 2022 and final determinations in 2023
  Now: ITAC's investigation into imports from Brazil, Denmark, Ireland, Poland and Spain led to provisional anti-dumping duties in December 2021 and final duties that were approved in July 2022, suspended for 12 months and took effect in August 2023 (ITAC media releases (final determination; end of suspension))
• Was: targeted a 25% reduction in imports and 26,000 additional jobs
  Now: targeted nearly 4,000 additional jobs and R1.5 billion in new producer investment (SAnews, 2019)
• Was: SARI (SA Poultry Association)
  Now: the SA Poultry Association (SAPA) (Agribook)

Still in the text, not verified

• Named signatories Astral Foods, Rainbow Chicken and AMCU/FAWU
• '— partially met' outcome of the Master Plan
• '2025 review' focus areas
• PC on Agriculture BRRRs 2023–2024 findings on avian influenza and small-scale producers
• Master Plan dates (2019–2023, under review)

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate. '35,000 jobs preserved' and 'reduce import surge by 30-40%' are unsourced; R4-8bn 'protection' has no defined base. Master plan job target was only ~4,000.

Corrected in the description

• Was: paying taxes (27 annual payments vs. OECD average of 11)
  Now: paying taxes (World Bank Doing Business 2020, South Africa profile)
• Was: BizPortal, live since 2020,
  Now: BizPortal, launched in November 2019, (ITWeb, 5 Nov 2019)

Still in the text, not verified

• SA 'ranked poorly' on starting a business and paying taxes
• CIPC 1-day registration target; SARS SME relief/turnover tax for firms below R1 million
• Presidency Red Tape Reduction impact assessment (2024): 12 million regulatory-hours, 6,000 FTE
• BizPortal processed fewer than 20% of registrations by 2024 due to SARS-CIPC integration
• single SMME compliance certificate proposal

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found. 0.2-0.5% of GDP is about R15-38bn, below the stated R30-60bn of 'unlocked output'. The 100k-200k jobs figure is unsupported. The magnitude is aspirational for a red-tape programme and has no basis.

Corrected in the description

• Was: (initially agri-food), the Competition Commission and DTIC proposed extending buyer power regulations to digital platform markets in 2024
  Now: , the Minister designated e-commerce and online services for the buyer power provisions in 2020, alongside agro-processing and grocery retail (Engineering News, 18 May 2020)
• Was: Takealot charges 6–30% depending on category
  Now: Takealot charges success fees that vary by category (Briefly News, 2024 (secondary))

Still in the text, not verified

• 'three platform categories' framework and the 'Digital Platforms Framework' as an instrument (none found)
• alignment with EU Digital Markets Act standards
• SMME Development Committee (NCOP) finding on platform commissions

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate; R10-25bn a year of consumer surplus is large relative to SA online retail (well under R100bn a year in sales).

Corrected in the description

• Was: which distributes approximately R3 billion annually from lottery proceeds to charitable
  Now: which had a grant budget of about R1.5 billion from lottery proceeds for charitable (Parliament of SA (SCOPA statement))
• Was: The Special Investigating Unit (SIU) investigation completed in 2023 identified R3.1 billion in irregular, fruitless, and wasteful expenditure across the NLC distribution portfolio
  Now: The Special Investigating Unit (SIU) investigation, still under way in 2025–26, is probing over R2 billion in grants across the NLC distribution portfolio (Parliament of SA (SCOPA statement), 2025)

Still in the text, not verified

• NLC Amendment Act under parliamentary development since 2022 and its listed proposals
• PC on Trade BRRRs 2022–2024 ranking NLC among the worst-governed entities
• arts organisations excluded by politically connected intermediaries during COVID-19

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found. R2-5bn a year exceeds the NLC's entire ~R1.5bn annual grant budget, so it cannot all be 'redirected' lottery funds.

Corrected in the description

• Was: formalised through the Preferential Procurement Regulations (2022) and the Public Procurement Act (2023)
  Now: formalised through the 2011 and 2017 Preferential Procurement Regulations (local content was dropped from the 2022 Regulations) and now provided for in the Public Procurement Act (2024) (National Treasury parliamentary reply PQ 989, 2024; ENSafrica, July 2024)
• Was: must be sourced domestically
  Now: had to be sourced domestically (National Treasury parliamentary reply PQ 989, 2024)
• Was: state procurement at R1.3 trillion annually (including SOEs) represents approximately 20% of GDP
  Now: state procurement of around R1 trillion a year is the single largest item of public spending (Daily Investor)
• Was: The PC on Trade BRRRs 2021–2024 document widespread non-compliance, particularly in SOE procurement, and recommend mandatory reporting with consequence management for non-compliant institutions.
  Now: The PC on Trade BRRRs have called for a system to monitor adherence to localisation regulations, particularly existing designations. (PMG, Trade, Industry and Competition BRRR, ATC 19 Nov 2021)

Still in the text, not verified

• 'construction materials' as a designated category
• the reform-agenda list (switchgear, solar panels, steel structures, pharmaceutical APIs; SEDA/IDC linkage)

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found. Magnitude (R7-22bn GDP; R20-40bn of a ~R1tn procurement base) is not absurd, but the legal basis for designation lapsed under PPR 2022 and the PPA 2024 s20 regime is still to be operationalised.

Corrected in the description

• Was: Microsoft's Skills to Succeed initiative
  Now: Microsoft's EEIPs (R500 million in 2011 and R208 million in 2020) (dtic EEIP briefing to Parliament, 15 Feb 2022)
• Was: Ford's enterprise supplier development fund
  Now: a R6 billion collective EEIP by seven automotive OEMs (2021) (dtic EEIP briefing to Parliament, 15 Feb 2022)

Still in the text, not verified

• pharmaceutical company R&D commitments as approved EEIPs
• DTIC 'EEIP Expansion' proposal (fintech, mining services, agro-processing frameworks)
• EEIP approval backlogs averaging 18 months per PC on Trade BRRRs

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate. For context, all approved EEIPs from 2007-2021 total 'more than R8 billion' (DTIC), so R10-20bn of new investment over a few years would be ambitious but not absurd; the 5,000-10,000 new black-owned enterprises figure has no basis. (source)

Corrected in the description

• Was: operationalised through DSIT's 4IR Strategy (2022)
  Now: set out in the Commission's report gazetted in October 2020 (ITWeb, Oct 2020)
• Was: targeting 1 million digital skills graduates by 2030 across three tiers: digital literacy for workers, applied digital skills for technicians, and advanced digital skills for engineers and data scientists
  Now: in support of the President's 2019 pledge to train one million young people in data science and related skills by 2030 (Engineering News, 26 Jul 2019)
• Was: (rolled out to Grades 3–7 from 2023)
  Now: (piloted in Grades R–3 from 2021 and gazetted for Grades R–9 in 2024) (BusinessTech, 2024)

Still in the text, not verified

• Partnerships with TECH4SA, WeThinkCode and uMsinitihi (TECH4SA and uMsinitihi not found anywhere)
• Coordination by DHET and SETAs (MICT SETA, EWSETA)
• PC on Science and Technology BRRR findings on budget line and coordination failure
• Textbook Chapter 5 claim

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found. 'R50-100bn in avoided skills import costs' has no basis (SA does not import skills on that scale; that is 0.7-1.3% of GDP); the GDP range is a model-made figure.

Corrected in the description

• Was: investigations average 18–24 months (against the WTO-compliant target of 12)
  Now: investigations are targeted for completion within 14 months, with final decisions within 14–18 months (the WTO maximum is 18 months) (PMG, Minister's parliamentary reply)
• Was: R1.7 trillion import base
  Now: R1.8 trillion import base (SARS trade statistics, December 2024)

Still in the text, not verified

• import surveillance unit has fewer than 15 analysts
• SARS customs data interface poorly integrated
• PC on Trade BRRRs 2023–2024 call ITAC the enforcement backbone of every master plan

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate was found. The R5-10bn protected output and 20-30k jobs are model-made but not absurd for steel, poultry and footwear remedies. The specific proposals (levy, 6-month fast-track) also appear unsourced.

Corrected in the description

• Was: production incentive (R400–600 per locally-produced vehicle) and assembly allowance (duty credit certificates for component imports offsetting 30% of import duty)
  Now: production incentive (rebate credits based on local value addition) and assembly allowance (duty credit certificates for component imports) (SARS, APDP Phase 2 Regulations, 2021)
• Was: add a volume assembly allowance for manufacturers above 50,000 units per year
  Now: replace the vehicle assembly allowance with a volume assembly localisation allowance for manufacturers producing at least 10,000 units per year (SARS, APDP Phase 2 Regulations, 2021)
• Was: The programme's total fiscal cost is approximately R12 billion per year in foregone customs duty and direct incentives
  Now: The programme carries a substantial fiscal cost in foregone customs duty and direct incentives (BusinessTech (Donald MacKay), 2025)
• Was: an industry that generates R210 billion in export revenue
  Now: an industry that generated a record R270.8 billion in export revenue in 2023 (BusinessDay, 7 May 2024)

Still in the text, not verified

• 'new component manufacturer rebate' in Phase 2
• BRRR (PC on Trade) attribution re Toyota Prospecton and APDP Phase 3
• 'ICE-platform-agnostic' EV claim

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: Partly sourced. Jobs component roughly sourced (BusinessDay: OEMs and suppliers account for more than 116,000 manufacturing jobs). R800bn production value and 0.4-0.8% GDP are not from any published estimate; magnitudes not implausible but unsourced. (source)

Corrected in the description

• Was: expanded the bloc to BRICS+ with Saudi Arabia, UAE, Ethiopia, Iran, Egypt, and Argentina.
  Now: invited Saudi Arabia, UAE, Ethiopia, Iran, Egypt, and Argentina to join; Argentina declined in December 2023. (Buenos Aires Times, Dec 2023)
• Was: The MTBPS 2025 notes that BRICS+ trade accounts for 24% of SA's total trade but 35% of mineral export value — making BRICS+ a strategically irreplaceable commercial relationship.
  Now: A 2025 parliamentary reply by the Minister of Trade, Industry and Competition put BRICS+ at 19% of SA's exports and 36% of its imports in 2025. (PMG, dtic reply NW652 (2025))
• Was: The South African Reserve Bank's Project Khokha 2 explored CBDC (Central Bank Digital Currency) interoperability as the settlement infrastructure.
  Now: The South African Reserve Bank took part in the BIS-led Project Dunbar, which tested a shared multi-CBDC platform for cross-border settlement; its separate Project Khokha 2 tested tokenised debenture settlement. (BIS central bankers' speech, 2022)
• Was: complicates SA's AGOA retention, FATF greylisting exit, and diplomatic standing with the EU
  Now: complicates SA's AGOA retention and diplomatic standing with the EU, and must not jeopardise its October 2025 FATF grey-list exit (Bowmans, Oct 2025)

Still in the text, not verified

• SA chairmanship priorities (local currency settlement, NDB rand lending, standards harmonisation)
• PC on Finance BRRRs flagging the BRICS/AGOA/EU tension

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate. 0.1-0.3% of GDP (~R8-23bn/yr) from payment-corridor savings is implausible given intra-BRICS local-currency settlement remains marginal.

Corrected in the description

• Was: links directly to the Electricity Regulation Amendment Act (ERA, signed August 2024), which removed the licensing threshold for embedded generation
  Now: links to the December 2022 amendment of Schedule 2 of the Electricity Regulation Act, which removed the licensing threshold for embedded generation (Operation Vulindlela / Presidency, 2024)
• Was: Industrial energy users—especially in manufacturing, mining, and agriculture—are the primary beneficiaries, with the DTI tracking uptake through the industrial energy cadastre.
  Now: The loan guarantee is aimed at households and small and medium businesses (turnover of R300 million or less). (gov.za (National Treasury), 2023)

Still in the text, not verified

• 'cutting downtime costs estimated at R20 billion per month' (SARB Feb 2023 range of R204m-R899m/day, roughly R6bn-R27bn/month, brackets it but does not state it)
• 'gas backup capacity' as an eligible use

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No estimate exists for this scheme. It attributes to a small SME/household loan guarantee (R8bn of guarantee room) the GDP gain of ending load-shedding altogether. SARB put load-shedding costs at R204m-R899m/day and about 2 percentage points of growth. (source)

Status that looks out of date (not yet changed)

Pass-1 notes say the Energy Bounce Back scheme ran from August 2023 to 30 August 2024, so an 'implemented' status should note it has ended (no source URL given in the notes).

Corrected in the description

• Was: the General Laws Amendment Act (2022), Financial Sector Laws Amendment Act (2022), and subsequent amendments to the Companies Act and Trust Property Control Act
  Now: the General Laws (Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Terrorism Financing) Amendment Act 22 of 2022, which amended the Trust Property Control Act, Nonprofit Organisations Act, FIC Act, Companies Act and Financial Sector Regulation Act, and the Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorism and Related Activities Amendment Act 23 of 2022 (National Treasury media statement (gov.za), 2023)
• Was: South Africa exited the greylist in October 2025 after addressing most action items.
  Now: South Africa exited the greylist on 24 October 2025 after addressing all 22 action items. (National Treasury, 24 Oct 2025)

Still in the text, not verified

• greylisting raised correspondent banking costs and deterred portfolio investment (framing, not checked)

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate of R15-25bn a year in correspondent-banking savings was found. Analysts at the time of exit (Webber Wentzel, Moody's, RMB, Investec) said the greylisting penalty was already priced in and expected only marginally lower borrowing costs, so 50-100bps attributed to the exit is implausible. The 'sovereign credit upgrade' is presented as a consequence without a source. (source)

Corrected in the description

• Was: The reform was developed under the Pension Funds Act (amended by the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 2023)
  Now: The reform was enacted through the Revenue Laws Amendment Act (signed June 2024) and the Pension Funds Amendment Act (signed July 2024) (Daily Maverick, 2 Jun 2024)

Still in the text, not verified

• R10.6 billion tax from 2.1 million withdrawals in the first four months
• PC on Finance BRRRs 2022–2024 on retirement-pot adequacy

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: Contradicted by a published figure. SARS reported R43.42bn already paid out within five months, so a R30-60bn three-year range badly understates withdrawals; the adequacy claim is unsourced. (source)

Corrected in the description

• Was: debt service costs consuming over 20% of consolidated expenditure
  Now: debt service costs consuming about 21% of revenue (National Treasury, Budget Review 2026, ch. 1)

Still in the text, not verified

• 'improved SOE fiscal transfers' as a driver of debt decline
• investment-grade upgrade would reduce borrowing costs

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found. Total debt-service costs are R420.6bn (2025/26) rising to R469.3bn (2028/29); cutting debt from the projected 76.5% to just under 75% of GDP (~1.5pp, roughly R120bn of debt on a ~R7.8tn GDP) would save on the order of R10-15bn a year, not R50-100bn. The 0.5-1.0% growth dividend is also unsourced. (source)

Corrected in the description

• Was: with revenue shortfalls estimated at R300+ billion over that period
  Now: with the period estimated to have cost at least R142 billion in uncollected tax (Daily Maverick, 28 Jun 2018)
• Was: The rebuilding programme under Commissioner Edward Kieswetter has restored
  Now: The rebuilding programme under former Commissioner Edward Kieswetter (succeeded by Dr Ngobani Makhubu from 1 May 2026) restored (gov.za, 2 Apr 2026)
• Was: approximately 25.5% by 2024/25
  Now: 25.1% in 2024/25 (National Treasury, Budget Review 2026, ch. 4)

Still in the text, not verified

• tax-to-GDP starting point 'under 24%'
• re-establishment of HWI unit and Large Business Centre (consistent with record, not sourced)

Impact estimate

Replaced with the nearest sourced figure. Audit verdict: Partly sourced. SARS committed to at least R20bn extra from its debt recovery project, with an 'aspiration' of close to R50bn (Kieswetter, May 2025). R80bn upper bound and the 0.3-0.5% GDP fiscal-space framing are unsourced. (source)

Corrected in the description

• Was: streamlining the Treasury Approval process (TA I–III)
  Now: implementing the amended Treasury Regulation 16 (gazetted 7 February 2025, with a simplified approval pathway for projects below R2 billion) (Engineering News, 20 Feb 2025)
• Was: The Infrastructure Fund, established in 2020 and housed at the DBSA, is intended to blend concessional and private capital but has deployed limited capital to date.
  Now: The Infrastructure Fund, housed at the DBSA, has structured 26 blended-finance projects with a combined capital value of R130.8bn and is being consolidated into the new Infrastructure Finance and Implementation Support Agency (IFISA) from April 2026. (BusinessDay, 25 Feb 2026)
• Was: The government's Infrastructure South Africa (ISA) pipeline lists over R1 trillion in projects
  Now: The 2026 Budget provides R1.07 trillion for public-sector infrastructure over three years (BusinessDay, 2 Sep 2026)

Still in the text, not verified

• PPP approval timelines averaging 4–7 years
• PPP pipeline 'largely stalled since the 2010s'

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate for this reform. Magnitude is not absurd: the Infrastructure Fund expects R67.3bn of private capital on its current projects, so R100-200bn over 5 years is optimistic but same order. The 0.3-0.6% GDP uplift is unsourced. (source)

Corrected in the description

• Was: (R110 per day for 9 million recipients)
  Now: (R370 per month for about 8.3 million recipients) (BusinessDay, 8 Aug 2026)
• Was: (R530 per month for 13 million children)
  Now: (R560 per month for 13 million children) (GroundUp, 2026 Budget)
• Was: The MTBPS 2025 commits to resolving the SRD grant's legal status by 2026/27.
  Now: The MTBPS 2025 extended the SRD grant by 14 months to March 2027. (EWN, 12 Nov 2025)

Still in the text, not verified

• '13 million children' (CSG count)
• the 'Inclusive Growth Spending Review, proposed in the 2024 Budget'
• 'The textbook (Chapter 8)' characterisation
• claims about international evidence on conditionality

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found. Reallocating R20-40bn would be 55-110% of the whole SRD budget (R35-37bn), and the GDP gain is model-made.

Corrected in the description

• Was: entered a debt standstill in 2020 after a R5 billion guarantee call triggered a liquidity crisis
  Now: defaulted on its debt obligations on 1 April 2020 and remained in default until a liability solution with lenders took effect in September 2024 (PMG committee meeting 35777; Land Bank media statement, 9 Sep 2024)
• Was: The Land Bank Amendment Act (2023) clarified its development mandate and SARB exemption status.
  Now: The Financial Matters Amendment Act (2023) amended the Land Bank Act to replace judicial management with business rescue. (gov.za, Financial Matters Amendment Act 9 of 2023)

Still in the text, not verified

• commercial farmers previously 85% of the book
• Blended Finance co-funding by USAID
• PC on Agriculture noting improved liquidity but ongoing NPL concerns

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate was found. R10-20bn of lending capacity is in the range of the Land Bank's book, but the farmer counts and GDP share are model-made.

Corrected in the description

• Was: starting at R127 per tonne CO₂ equivalent (2019), escalating under a schedule to reach R600–800 per tonne by 2035 (Phase 2, beginning 2026)
  Now: starting at R120 per tonne CO₂ equivalent (2019), escalating under a schedule to R308 per tonne in 2026 and R462 per tonne in 2030 (Phase 2, beginning 2026) (SARS/Treasury Phase 2 discussion paper 2024 (trajectory); R120 from Daily Maverick 3 Jun 2019, https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-06-03-south-africas-carbon-tax-raises-questions-and-hot-air/)
• Was: , averaging approximately R160–200 per tonne for most large emitters in 2024/25
  Now: (deleted) (Daily Maverick, 3 Jun 2019)
• Was: Phase 2 implementation, which begins in January 2026, reduces allowances and raises the effective carbon price substantially, with revenue implications estimated at R28–35 billion annually by 2030 for SARS.
  Now: Phase 2 implementation, which began in January 2026, retains the basic tax-free allowance until 2030 and raises the offset allowance by five percentage points. (Engineering News, 19 Feb 2025; revenue line from National Treasury Budget Review 2025 ch.4)
• Was: but this offset mechanism expires and
  Now: and the electricity price neutrality commitment has been extended to the end of 2030, while (Engineering News, 19 Feb 2025)

Still in the text, not verified

• PC on Finance BRRRs 2023–2024 on absence of a revenue recycling framework
• Industrial exemption requests adjudicated by SARS and DMRE
• Revenue must be directed to JET IP, Eskom closure fund and SMME support

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate. Carbon tax collections have been in the low single-digit billions (R1.8bn estimated for 2019/20), and Treasury does not earmark receipts, so R10-20bn 'redirected' is implausible in magnitude and in mechanism.

Corrected in the description

• Was: addresses 22 action items across six priority areas
  Now: addresses 22 action items linked to eight strategic deficiencies (Moonstone)
• Was: the General Laws Amendment Act (2022) and the Protected Disclosures Amendment Act
  Now: the General Laws (Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Terrorism Financing) Amendment Act (2022) and the Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorism and Related Activities Amendment Act (2022) (National Treasury via gov.za, Jan 2023)
• Was: FATF on-site assessment in late 2024 determined progress sufficient for grey list exit, expected in mid-2025.
  Now: After a FATF on-site visit in July 2025, South Africa was removed from the grey list at the October 2025 FATF plenary. (National Treasury media statement, 24 Oct 2025)

Still in the text, not verified

• NCOP Select Committee on Security and Justice monitors provincial DNFBP implementation
• inter-agency Action Plan agencies listed (National Treasury, FIC, SAPS, NPA, SARB)

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate of correspondent-banking savings found. Treasury's Feb 2023 statement was headlined as expecting greylisting to have 'limited impact' (headline only, not fetched), which sits uneasily with R15-25bn/yr savings from exit. (source)

Status that looks out of date (not yet changed)

SA exited the FATF grey list on 24 October 2025; if current_status implies grey-listing is ongoing, it is outdated. The idea's framing (monitoring implementation to exit) may need re-scoping to post-exit monitoring.

Corrected in the description

• Was: tabled in Parliament in 2024
  Now: tabled in Parliament in 2022 (B21-2022), signed into law in June 2024 as Act 4 of 2024, (gov.za, 11 Jun 2024; PMG bill page https://pmg.org.za/bill/1101/)
• Was: removes discretionary waiver powers that have been captured by politically connected developers
  Now: permits rebates or exemptions only for categories set out in a municipality's development charges policy, with reasons and an alternative funding source (Municipal Fiscal Powers and Functions Amendment Act 4 of 2024, s9E)
• Was: requires municipalities to maintain a development charge reserve fund for bulk infrastructure investment
  Now: requires development charges to be used to fund capital infrastructure (or repay related borrowing) (Municipal Fiscal Powers and Functions Amendment Act 4 of 2024, s9A(3))

Still in the text, not verified

• endorsement by 'PC on Finance BRRRs'
• PC on Finance BRRRs 2020–2023 flagging under-charging of development charges
• 'based on actual bulk infrastructure cost per connection'

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published revenue estimate found. The two halves do not agree: R1-3bn a year of extra revenue cannot cut transfer dependence by 5-10%, because transfers to local government are well over R100bn a year.

Status that looks out of date (not yet changed)

current_status 'under_review' is stale: enacted as Act 4 of 2024 (assented 11 June 2024); consider 'implemented'.

Corrected in the description

• Was: South Africa's Cooperative Banks Development Agency (CBDA), established under the Cooperative Banks Act (2007), oversees
  Now: South Africa's Cooperative Banks Development Agency (CBDA), established under the Cooperative Banks Act (2007) and merged into the Small Enterprise Development and Finance Agency (Sedfa) on 1 October 2024, oversaw (CBDA NewsFlash (National Treasury), 2024)
• Was: approximately 40 registered cooperative financial institutions (CFIs) with combined assets under R500 million
  Now: 30 registered co-operative banking institutions (6 co-operative banks and 24 CFIs) with combined assets of about R656 million (February 2024) (CBDA Annual Report 2023/24)

Still in the text, not verified

• FSD Africa and UNCDF co-funded CFI pilot programmes in KZN and Gauteng townships (pass 2 found none; recommends deletion)
• listed proposals (tiered licensing, SARB ring-fencing below R50m, IDC first-loss, Post Bank integration)

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found. The whole sector holds R594m in deposits and has about 18,000 members, so 'R5-10bn new deposits' (roughly 10-17x the current sector) and '2-3M unbanked residents' are implausible. 0.1% of GDP is about R7-8bn. (source)

Corrected in the description

• Was: with assets exceeding R2.4 trillion
  Now: with assets of R2.69 trillion (March 2025) (GEPF, 2024/25 results)
• Was: R120–240 billion
  Now: R135–270 billion (GEPF, 2024/25 results (5–10% of R2.69tn))

Still in the text, not verified

• 'The GEPF Infrastructure Fund vehicle and blended finance structures with DBSA are under development.'
• 'As of early 2026, the mandate revision is under actuarial and regulatory review, with GEPF trustees cautious about concentration risk.'

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate; R50-100bn is under 4% of GEPF assets, so plausible in magnitude, but the GDP and returns claims are assertions. It is also inconsistent with the description's own R120-240bn.

Corrected in the description

• Was: The Financial Matters Amendment Act and the Insurance Act (18 of 2017) created
  Now: The Insurance Act (18 of 2017) created (PolicyVault, Financial Matters Amendment Act 2019 summary)

Still in the text, not verified

• FSCA oversees approximately 12 licensed microinsurers
• microinsurance expense ratios >60%
• PC on Finance concerns about PPR enforcement and debit-order abuse of grant recipients

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found; magnitude is not obviously implausible for SA's funeral-cover market but has no stated basis.

Corrected in the description

• Was: R850 billion in 2025/26
  Now: R633.2 billion in 2025/26 (National Treasury, Budget Review May 2025, ch.6)
• Was: has not been fundamentally revised since 2002
  Now: has been under review since 2015, with only incremental changes such as the health risk-adjusted index (2010, redesigned in the 2022 MTEF) (PMG, Treasury/FFC briefing (2024))
• Was: and basic services
  Now: a basic (population) share, and smaller poverty, economic activity and institutional components (PMG, Treasury/FFC briefing (2024))

Still in the text, not verified

• FFC proposals on KZN/EC TB/HIV under-compensation and a ring-fenced maintenance grant
• MTBPS 2025 commitment to complete review by the 2026 Budget
• Health component 'weighted by population and poverty'

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate. A formula revision redistributes a fixed pool; R15-30bn would be 14-28% of the entire R106bn LGES, so the 'gain' framing is implausible unless the vertical split also changes.

Corrected in the description

• Was: The IRP 2024 Update revises
  Now: The IRP 2025 revises (tralac, 31 Oct 2025)
• Was: accelerated coal retirement timelines aligned with Just Energy Transition commitments
  Now: delayed coal retirement timelines (Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr, 19 Nov 2025)
• Was: As of early 2026, the draft IRP remains under public comment, delayed partly by political contestation over coal phase-down timelines in Mpumalanga.
  Now: Cabinet approved the final IRP 2025 in October 2025. (tralac, 31 Oct 2025)
• Was: Finalisation would unlock
  Now: Finalisation is expected to unlock

Still in the text, not verified

• revised demand projections reflecting load-shedding's suppressive effect
• NERSA licensing framework role

Impact estimate

Replaced with the nearest sourced figure. Audit verdict: Partly sourced. The SARB estimated load-shedding would deduct about 2 percentage points from 2023 GDP growth; R100-200bn is roughly consistent (2% of GDP ~R140bn) but no source gives that rand range. Attributing this gain to the IRP is questionable: load-shedding was largely suspended from 2024, before IRP finalisation. (source)

Status that looks out of date (not yet changed)

IRP finalised: Cabinet approved IRP 2025 in October 2025 (gazetted 28 Oct 2025). If current_status says draft/under consultation, it is outdated.

Corrected in the description

• Was: Eskom applied to NERSA for a 20-year life extension beyond the original 2024 decommissioning date.
  Now: Eskom applied to the National Nuclear Regulator (NNR) for a 20-year life extension beyond the original 2024 (Unit 1) and 2025 (Unit 2) licence end dates. (World Nuclear News, Jul 2024)
• Was: Unit 2 life extension approval is pending regulatory review.
  Now: Unit 2's 20-year life extension was approved by the NNR in November 2025, allowing operation until 9 November 2045. (World Nuclear News, Nov 2025)
• Was: The life extension avoids decommissioning costs of R20+ billion and preserves
  Now: The life extension, costed by Eskom at about R21 billion, defers decommissioning and preserves (Cape Argus (IOL))
• Was: As of early 2026, Unit 1 has returned to service under extended licence; Unit 2 steam generator replacement is scheduled, with full dual-unit extended operation expected by 2025–26.
  Now: Both units now operate under extended licences: Unit 1 to 2044 and Unit 2 to 2045, after Unit 2's steam generator replacement was completed and it returned to service in December 2024. (World Nuclear News, Nov 2025 (Unit 2 licence) and Dec 2024/Jan 2025 (Unit 2 return to service))

Still in the text, not verified

• 'avoids decommissioning' framing aside, Western Cape grid-stability claims are generic

Impact estimate

Replaced with the nearest sourced figure. Audit verdict: Contradicted by a published figure. '900MW baseload capacity maintained' contradicts the description and sources: both units (1,860 MWe) were extended. The R30-50bn and 0.2-0.4% GDP figures have no published source. (source)

Status that looks out of date (not yet changed)

current_status 'partially_implemented' looks stale: both units hold 20-year licences (Unit 1 to 2044, Unit 2 to 2045); consider 'implemented'.

Corrected in the description

• Was: South Africa's Integrated Resource Plan (IRP 2023/24) includes 2,500 MW of new nuclear capacity as part of the baseload mix, a policy direction endorsed by Cabinet in 2024
  Now: South Africa's Integrated Resource Plan (IRP 2025), announced in October 2025, calls for 5,200 MW of new nuclear generation by 2039, up from the 2,500 MW in IRP 2019, (World Nuclear News, Oct 2025)
• Was: The current programme, led by DMRE
  Now: The current programme, led by the Department of Electricity and Energy (World Nuclear News, Oct 2025)
• Was: Thyspunt (Eastern Cape) and Bantamsklip
  Now: Thyspunt (Eastern Cape) and Duynefontein (Western Cape) (World Nuclear News)

Still in the text, not verified

• MTBPS 2025 note on financing through Eskom's balance sheet or a project vehicle (pass 2 recommends deleting the MTBPS attribution)
• R100–200 billion government guarantee
• NNECC role and SMR/LWR competitive procurement
• named vendors all engaging with the process
• NNR capacity as the regulatory bottleneck

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published nuclear-specific cost was found. IRP 2025 gives R2.23tn for the whole plan, not for nuclear. R200-400bn for 2.5-5.2 GW is plausible in magnitude, but '0.5-1.0% GDP baseload contribution' is unsourced.

Corrected in the description

• Was: approximately 160 municipal distributors
  Now: 178 licensed electricity distributors (Energize, 2025)
• Was: NERSA's approval process under the MFMA
  Now: NERSA's approval process under the Electricity Regulation Act (Dullah Omar Institute, Local Government Bulletin, Nov–Dec 2025)
• Was: As of early 2026, NERSA's municipal tariff review process has been initiated but standardisation is nascent and politically contested
  Now: NERSA required cost-of-supply studies for all 2025/26 municipal tariff applications, and 177 of 178 licensed distributors submitted them, though implementation is politically contested (BusinessTech, 2025; Energize, 2025)

Still in the text, not verified

• 'Several municipalities — including Ekurhuleni and eThekwini — face electricity distribution entity (EDE) viability questions'
• 'politically contested in councils dependent on electricity revenue surpluses'

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found. Municipal electricity revenue is well over R100bn a year, so R10-20bn is not impossible, but both ranges appear model-generated.

Corrected in the description

• Was: The 2024 update addresses
  Now: The forthcoming IEP is expected to address (Polity, 23 Aug 2024)

Still in the text, not verified

• As of early 2026, the updated IEP has been published in draft
• IEP frames hydrogen economy ambitions

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate. The flagship Richards Bay terminal is about US$1bn (~R18bn) and its FID is deferred to 2028; R50-100bn mobilised and 0.2-0.4% of GDP are not grounded. (source)

Corrected in the description

• Was: NERSA's budget is approved through the National Assembly (creating political exposure)
  Now: NERSA's funds include money appropriated by Parliament alongside levies and licence fees (creating political exposure) (National Energy Regulator Act 40 of 2004, s12)

Still in the text, not verified

• World Bank and IEA have both flagged regulatory independence as a key risk
• Electricity methodology not updated for a multi-generator market

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate. A gain of 0.1-0.3% of GDP (about R7-22bn) is plausible as a general regulatory-certainty effect, but it is a model-made figure.

Corrected in the description

• Was: The updated programme model uses an ESCO (Energy Services Company) delivery mechanism with a monthly service fee replacing upfront capital cost. Municipalities and utilities procure installations via competitive tender; Eskom rebates provide fiscal support.
  Now: The DMRE procured about 87,000 locally manufactured units (2015–2018) for installation through municipalities; Eskom terminated its solar water heater rebate programme in 2014, and by 2024 there was no manufacturing of new units pending a review of the programme. (PMG, Portfolio Committee on Energy, 18 Sep 2024)
• Was: SABS accreditation standards for imported Chinese SWH units address quality failures that plagued earlier rounds.
  Now: The programme carried a 70% local-content requirement; damaged and stolen units, storage costs of R324.8 million and an AGSA-reported material loss of about R310 million in 2021/22 plagued delivery. (PMG, Portfolio Committee on Energy, 18 Sep 2024)

Still in the text, not verified

• SWH reduce household electricity consumption by 30–40%
• programme targets low-income (subsidised) and middle-income (financed) households
• potential to reduce residential peak demand by 400–600 MW

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found. R5-10bn of avoided electricity costs for 500,000 households means R10-20k per household. That is plausible only as a cumulative multi-year saving and is unstated as such. The programme has installed about 58,600 units in 15 years, so 500,000 households has no basis. '0.05-0.1% GDP demand reduction' is not a meaningful metric.

Corrected in the description

• Was: It creates the National Transmission Company SA (NTCSA) as an independent transmission system operator,
  Now: It provides for an independent Transmission System Operator, to be formed within five years of assent to replace the Eskom subsidiary National Transmission Company SA (NTCSA), (Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr, 15 Jan 2025)
• Was: Full market operationalisation requires secondary regulations, NERSA licensing rules, and NTCSA capitalisation — all pending as of early 2026.
  Now: Market operationalisation is under way but incomplete: NTCSA received a market operator licence in December 2025, internal trading on the South African Wholesale Electricity Market launched in April 2026, and external trading is targeted for early 2027. (Operation Vulindlela Progress Report Q1 2026)

Still in the text, not verified

• industrial electricity cost reduction of 15–25%
• 'ending Eskom's statutory monopoly over generation and supply'

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate tying ERAA to these numbers. A GDP effect of this size is plausible for a reform that removes a binding constraint, but the upper end is optimistic, and the 15-25% cost cut is unsourced.

Status that looks out of date (not yet changed)

current_status 'implemented' overstates: the Act is in force but SAWEM is only in internal trading.

Corrected in the description

• Was: The Gas Amendment Bill (2024)
  Now: The Gas Amendment Bill (2023) (BusinessTech, 2024)
• Was: South Africa currently imports LNG on a spot basis through the Gravity floating storage regasification unit (FSRU) at Richards Bay, but lacks a permanent LNG import infrastructure framework.
  Now: South Africa does not yet have an LNG import terminal: the first, the Zululand Energy Terminal at Richards Bay, has deferred its final investment decision to 2028, and the country lacks a permanent LNG import infrastructure framework. (Pipeline & Gas Journal, Mar 2026)
• Was: As of early 2026, the Bill has passed Parliament and awaits Presidential assent; secondary licensing regulations are under NERSA development.
  Now: As of August 2026, the Bill was still before the Portfolio Committee on Electricity and Energy, which concluded public hearings on 12 August 2026. (Parliament of SA, 13 Aug 2026)

Still in the text, not verified

• virtual gas pipelines provision
• Sasol gas network dependence framing

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found. 0.2-0.4% of GDP is ~R16-31bn a year; R80-150bn of gas infrastructure over 10 years is within the range of LNG terminal plus gas-power proposals, but the first terminal's FID is now 2028.

Status that looks out of date (not yet changed)

Findings show the Bill had not passed Parliament: still before the PC on Electricity and Energy in August 2026. Any status saying 'passed' or 'awaiting assent' is wrong.

Corrected in the description

• Was: assented to by President Ramaphosa in November 2024
  Now: assented to by President Ramaphosa on 25 October 2024 (Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr, 1 Nov 2024)
• Was: a 20% free-carry state participation right for PETROSA (the state oil company, formerly PetroSA)
  Now: a repayable 20% carried interest for the State Petroleum Company (Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr, 1 Nov 2024)
• Was: with the Brulpadda and Luiperd fields (operated by TotalEnergies) representing potential multi-billion barrel reserves whose development has been delayed by legislative uncertainty
  Now: while TotalEnergies exited the Brulpadda and Luiperd gas discoveries off the southern coast (Block 11B/12B) in 2024, saying they were too challenging to develop and monetise for the South African market (TotalEnergies via Business Wire, 29 July 2024)

Still in the text, not verified

• 'TotalEnergies, Shell, and other majors have been exploring in the Orange Basin'
• 'Gas discoveries in the Karoo and offshore could provide a domestic supply solution to the looming industrial gas shortage'

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found (search budget exhausted before a dedicated search). Offshore gas developments of this scale are plausible but hypothetical given no commercial discovery is under development.

Status that looks out of date (not yet changed)

Title says 'Bill' and status is 'stalled', but the Upstream Petroleum Resources Development Act was assented to on 25 October 2024 (gazetted 29 October 2024); title and status should be updated after checking commencement.

Corrected in the description

• Was: The Critical Minerals Beneficiation Strategy, led by DMRE,
  Now: The Critical Minerals and Metals Strategy (May 2025), led by DMRE, (IEA policy database)

Still in the text, not verified

• strategy directly links to the EU Critical Raw Materials Act
• several PGM beneficiation projects in feasibility stage

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate. Internally inconsistent: 0.3-0.7% of GDP is ~R23-53bn per year, whereas R50-150bn over 10 years is only R5-15bn per year; the 15,000-30,000 jobs figure is unsourced.

Corrected in the description

• Was: Reform proposals call for partial deregulation of inland retail margins while retaining regulation of the fuel levy and RAF components.
  Now: The DMRE's July 2022 proposal was to replace the regulated price of 93 octane petrol with a price cap, while the fuel levy and RAF levy remain set by government. (BusinessDay, 23 May 2023)
• Was: The Energy White Paper (2019) and Competition Commission market inquiry (2023) both identified the regulated model as a barrier to efficiency.
  Now: The Competition Commission's LPG market inquiry (launched 2014) found that regulated maximum prices did not incentivise refineries to prioritise LPG production. (PMG committee meeting)

Still in the text, not verified

• Single-price model suppresses investment in LPG/CNG and new entrants
• Parliamentary BRRRs on a coastal-to-inland cross-subsidy (doubtful: inland prices carry transport differentials)
• Liquid Fuels Charter as preferred approach

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate for the government's 93-octane price cap was found. The DA claimed full deregulation could cut pump prices by 'up to R9/l', but that is a party claim for a different reform. Retail margins (~R2.42/l) are mostly absorbed by rent and operating costs, so R5-15bn in savings from a partial margin deregulation looks overstated.

Corrected in the description

• Was: The DMRE's DOM Unit
  Now: The Department of Mineral and Petroleum Resources' DOM programme (IOL, 31 May 2026)
• Was: the Mines and Minerals Development Bill
  Now: the draft Mineral Resources Development Bill (IOL Business Report, 15 May 2025)
• Was: Rand Water's AMD pumping operation costs R2 billion annually, a preventable outlay
  Now: The state's acid mine drainage treatment programme, implemented by the Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority, is a preventable outlay (Miningmx, 2012)

Still in the text, not verified

• fund capitalised through royalty levies, the draft Mineral Resources Development Bill and green bonds
• Parliamentary BRRRs flagged the Western Basin AMD threat repeatedly 2021–2024
• international models (Superfund, Canada) inform fund design

Impact estimate

Replaced with the nearest sourced figure. Audit verdict: Partly sourced. The base liability (about R49bn, DMRE 2019) is sourced and roughly matches the 'R50-100bn' lower bound. The 'R10-25bn resolved' range and the upper bound are model-made. (source)

Corrected in the description

• Was: Koeberg Unit 3 planning and IRP 2019 allocation of 2,500 MW of new nuclear
  Now: the IRP 2025 allocation of 5,200 MW of new nuclear by 2039, with Thyspunt as Eskom's preferred site (World Nuclear Association, World Nuclear Outlook (SA), 2026; also trade.gov IRP 2025 note)
• Was: Cabinet approved the nuclear procurement programme in 2023.
  Now: NERSA concurred, with suspensive conditions, in a ministerial determination for 2,500 MW of new nuclear, but the determination was withdrawn in August 2024 for further public consultation. (World Nuclear News, Aug 2024; BusinessDay, 16 Aug 2024)

Still in the text, not verified

• NNR staffing calibrated for Koeberg's two units
• Committee on Mineral Resources BRRRs on NNR budget
• IAEA/EDF/KEPCO partnerships 'under active negotiation'
• NNR Act amendment as part of reform

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate. The '100x return' is a rhetorical ratio of build cost to regulator spend, not an economic return; the R200-400bn build cost is unsourced.

Status that looks out of date (not yet changed)

Pass 1 notes 'partially_implemented' looks optimistic as no procurement has started.

Corrected in the description

• Was: As of early 2026, NTCSA is partially ring-fenced within Eskom, awaiting full legal separation and independent capitalisation.
  Now: NTCSA has traded as an Eskom subsidiary since July 2024; in December 2025 the minister approved keeping it as the transmission asset owner within Eskom Holdings while a separate state-owned Transmission System Operator is established outside Eskom. (Eskom, Dec 2025)

Still in the text, not verified

• over 5 GW of renewable projects unable to connect

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found for this reform. Magnitude is not absurd given the R440bn transmission plan, but the GDP range and private-investment range are model-made.

Corrected in the description

• Was: NSFAS funds approximately 500,000 students at universities and 440,000 at TVET colleges, with total expenditure exceeding R50 billion annually
  Now: NSFAS funds approximately 580,000 students at universities and 231,000 at TVET colleges, with a budget of about R48.7 billion for the 2025 academic year (PMG briefing, 2025)
• Was: is developing an income-contingent loan component for students above the R350,000 household income threshold
  Now: has set up a Missing Middle loan fund, capitalised at R3 billion, for students with household income between R350,000 and R600,000 (PMG, ministerial reply)
• Was: As of early 2026, the task team's recommendations have been published
  Now: As of May 2026, work on a new student funding model was still under way (BusinessDay, 29 May 2026)

Still in the text, not verified

• '(collection rate below 5%)'
• 'The Sustainable Funding Model review, overseen by a Ministerial Task Team'
• 'faces significant student organisation opposition'

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate. '100,000 additional annual graduates' would be a very large share of SA's annual graduate output. 'R20-40bn human capital formation' has no defined base.

Corrected in the description

• Was: which enrol approximately 700,000 students
  Now: which enrol approximately 540,000 students (PMG, Higher Education portfolio committee, 25 Mar 2026)

Still in the text, not verified

• artisan shortage estimated at over 40,000
• DHET TVET recapitalisation plan with lecturer upskilling and equipment grants

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found. '50,000-80,000 qualified artisans per year' is several times SA's historical output and above the NDP's commonly cited goal of 30,000 a year by 2030 (stated from memory; that target could not be re-sourced in this run). The GDP and wage-premium ranges have no basis.

Corrected in the description

• Was: generating approximately R16 billion annually
  Now: with SETA allocations from the levy of about R20 billion a year (Daily Investor)
• Was: As of early 2026, DHET has published a SETA rationalisation framework and several mergers are proposed;
  Now: In the February 2026 State of the Nation Address, the President committed to reforming and reducing the number of SETAs; (Inside Education, Feb 2026)

Still in the text, not verified

• Implementation contested by SETA incumbents
• QCTO integration as central

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate. Redirecting R5-10bn of a roughly R20bn+ SETA allocation is within range, but the GDP effect is asserted.

Corrected in the description

• Was: and DHET reported more than 165,000 withheld at universities over 2022–2024 and 20,950 at TVET colleges
  Now: and DHET reported more than 165,000 withheld at universities over 2022–2024, while SAPCO reported 20,950 at TVET colleges (Parliament of RSA news, May 2026)
• Was: The DBE/DHET digital student records initiative (part of the HEMIS/TVETMIS modernisation programme) is the systemic fix
  Now: DHET's digitised, fast-tracked certification systems, announced in July 2026 as part of a programme to modernise the department's administrative systems, are the systemic fix (SAnews, July 2026)

Still in the text, not verified

• administrative failures list (manual supplementary results processing, SAQA registration delays)
• backlog clearance programme funded through university administration budgets

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: Contradicted by a published figure. Base is wrong: the May 2026 briefing put withheld certificates at ~188,000 (universities, USAf) plus ~21,000 (TVET, SAPCO), about 209,000 in total, not 500,000+. No published earnings-impact estimate found. (source)

Corrected in the description

• Was: Business expenditure on R&D (BERD) is particularly low at 0.3% of GDP, compared to 2.0% in South Korea and 1.2% in Brazil
  Now: Business funded only 27.7% of GERD (R12.0 billion) in 2023/24 (SAnews (HSRC R&D Survey 2023/24))
• Was: has not achieved the uplift anticipated at its 2012 introduction
  Now: has not achieved the uplift anticipated at its 2006 introduction (with pre-approval from 2012) (PMG committee meeting 28916)
• Was: The STI Decadal Plan sets a credible path to 1% of GDP by 2027 and 1.5% by 2032.
  Now: The STI White Paper and Decadal Plan set GERD/GDP targets of 1.1% by 2024 (missed) and 1.5% by 2030. (PMG committee meeting 39448)

Still in the text, not verified

• NDP 1.5% target
• 'fewer than 200 companies claim the incentive annually' (consistent with 91 applications in 2018/19)
• PC on Science BRRRs noting DSIT budget declining in real terms
• 'structural dependence on technology licensing from multinationals'

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published SA estimate found. Raising GERD by ~0.9pp (~R65bn/yr) yielding 0.2-0.5% of GDP (~R15-37bn) is a modest, plausible order of magnitude; the two figures in the text are internally consistent.

Impact estimate

Replaced with the nearest sourced figure. Audit verdict: Partly sourced. The SIU's ~R5bn figure is cumulative over several years (from 2017), not annual recoverable leakage; recoveries so far are in the tens to hundreds of millions. R2-5bn per year is the upper bound of plausible. (source)

Corrected in the description

• Was: The Second Chance Matric Programme (2017)
  Now: The Second Chance Matric Programme (piloted from 2016) (The Citizen, 12 Jan 2016)

Still in the text, not verified

• 3.5 million adults without matric
• enrolments under 300,000
• parliamentary BRRRs on articulation dead-ends

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found. R10-20bn lifetime gains over 200-400k participants is ~R50k per person, which is modest and plausible. The 0.1-0.2% GDP and the NEET reduction are model-made.

Corrected in the description

• Was: and ESETA
  Now: and the Energy and Water SETA (EWSETA) (PMG, ministerial reply)

Still in the text, not verified

• 'DHET's Green Skills programme, developed with the GreenCape cluster and SAPVIA, is developing occupational qualifications through QCTO and piloting short-course upskilling programmes in TVET colleges in the Western Cape and Northern Cape'

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate was found. 'Enables R300bn+ green transition industries' and '0.2-0.4% GDP' credit a skills programme with whole-sector output, which is not a defensible attribution.

Corrected in the description

• Was: Eskom's R400+ billion debt overhang
  Now: Eskom's R356 billion debt load (March 2026) (Green Building Africa, Eskom FY2026 results)

Still in the text, not verified

• restructuring is a condition of the JETP and of DFI debt-restructuring support

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate attributes these gains to unbundling. 'Privatisation unlocks R200-500bn' misstates policy: NTCSA remains 100% Eskom-owned and no privatisation is planned. Load-shedding loss figures are not attributable to unbundling.

Status that looks out of date (not yet changed)

current_status 'implemented' is inconsistent with the description (legal unbundling of generation pending); pass 1 recommends 'partially_implemented'.

Corrected in the description

• Was: Third-party access regulations for freight rail were finalised in December 2024
  Now: Transnet's final Network Statement setting the terms for third-party access to freight rail was published in December 2024 (Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr, 22 Jan 2025)

Still in the text, not verified

• Port terminal concessioning details

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found for these specific ranges. Magnitude is plausible given widely reported large logistics losses, but the figures and the dwell-time percentages are model-made.

Corrected in the description

• Was: the Public Procurement Act (2023)
  Now: the Public Procurement Act (2024) (ENSafrica, July 2024)

Still in the text, not verified

• Section 54 PFMA approvals delay SOE deals by months
• BBBEE scorecard treatment is a barrier in Transnet/PRASA concessions
• Presidential SOE Council covers '10 major commercial SOEs'
• MTBPS 2025: SOE transfers declined from R40bn to R28bn
• 'The textbook (Chapter 3)' Singapore statutory board reference

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate. R20-40bn of procurement savings from 'policy flexibility' and R50-100bn of co-investment are model-made, with no base.

Corrected in the description

• Was: National Treasury assumed R254 billion of Eskom's approximately R400 billion debt burden over a multi-year period extending to 2028/29
  Now: National Treasury committed R254 billion in debt relief against Eskom's debt of about R423 billion (National Treasury, Budget Review 2023; Engineering News, 19 Feb 2025 (revision))
• Was: subject to strict conditions including restructuring milestones, cost reduction targets, and renewable energy procurement progress. The restructuring framework requires Eskom to separate its balance sheets for generation, transmission, and distribution.
  Now: subject to strict conditions including limits on new borrowing and new generation projects, a mechanism for private participation in transmission, and concessioning of coal power stations. (Engineering News, 22 Feb 2023)
• Was: improvement from approximately 58% in 2023 to approximately 69% by 2025
  Now: improvement from approximately 55% in 2023 to approximately 62% in 2025 (EWN / amaBhungane, 11 Feb 2026)

Still in the text, not verified

• 'tranches have been transferred on schedule' as of early 2026
• EAF improvement 'demonstrates progress against restructuring milestones' (causal framing)

Impact estimate

Replaced with the nearest sourced figure. Audit verdict: Partly sourced. The R254bn amount is sourced. 'Saves R20-40bn in annual debt service' loosely matches the R86bn of interest covered over three years (~R29bn a year), but that cost moves to the fiscus rather than being saved. The 'conditional on operational reforms' clause is framing. Superseded by the 2025 Budget Review, which cut the programme to R230bn and extended it to 2028/29 (Codex review). (source)

Corrected in the description

• Was: Funding options include direct state equity injections, development finance institution loans (DBSA, AfDB), and regulated asset base financing under NERSA-approved tariffs.
  Now: Funding is to come partly from the Eskom and NTCSA balance sheets and partly from private capital through the Independent Transmission Programme. (Daily Maverick, 18 Jun 2026)

Still in the text, not verified

• 'renewable energy connection queue backlog' as a TDP purpose

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found for the GDP or jobs figures. The magnitudes are not implausible for a R440bn programme, but the 'R200-400bn grid' wording conflicts with the R440bn TDP.

Corrected in the description

• Was: Denel could not pay salaries for 4,000 employees, defaulted on government-guaranteed bonds,
  Now: Denel could not pay full salaries to its roughly 2,800 employees, delayed interest payments on its debt (the JSE suspended its bonds in 2022 over missing annual statements), (Daily Maverick, 31 May 2021; BusinessDay, 6 Feb 2022)
• Was: The Strategic Equity Partner (SEP) process, initiated in 2023,
  Now: The Strategic Equity Partner (SEP) process, under way since 2019, (Engineering News, 15 Nov 2019)
• Was: The MTBPS 2025 allocates R3.4 billion to Denel over the medium term, conditional on the SEP process completion.
  Now: The 2022 MTBPS allocated R3.4 billion to Denel, subject to strict conditions. (SAnews, Oct 2022)

Still in the text, not verified

• 'The PC on Public Enterprises BRRRs 2020–2024 document Denel's complete institutional collapse...'
• ITAR/national-security complication claim
• business-unit list (Dynamics, Optronics, LMT, Aeronautics) and closure/merger plans

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found. 4,000-8,000 jobs exceeds Denel's actual workforce (~2,800 in 2021); the R10-30bn and R5-10bn figures have no stated basis.

Corrected in the description

• Was: Parliamentary Committee on Public Enterprises BRRRs flagged both as fiscal risks with governance vacuums.
  Now: Parliamentary Committee on Public Enterprises BRRRs flagged both as fiscal risks with governance vacuums; since DPE's dissolution, the Minister of Mineral and Petroleum Resources has assumed responsibility for Alexkor. (PMG committee meeting 39742)

Still in the text, not verified

• Committee on Public Enterprises BRRRs flagged both as fiscal risks with governance vacuums

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate. Total state transfers for the Richtersveld settlement are ~R303m and the PSJV recapitalisation R200m; Alexkor's remaining mine life is ~10 years with depleted resources, so R2-10bn and R5-15bn appear inflated by an order of magnitude.

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. SAA has received no new fiscal allocation since the deal collapsed (Gordhan: no money from the fiscus), so 'R5-15bn in annual fiscal savings' has no current base; the R2-4bn restructuring figure is unsourced. (source)

Corrected in the description

• Was: aligned with DSI's priority sectors (green hydrogen, mining automation, health biotech)
  Now: aligned with DSTI's strategic technology domains (such as artificial intelligence and next-generation computing) (PMG, TIA 2.0 briefing, Feb 2026)
• Was: TIA's administrative overhead absorbs 25–30% of budget
  Now: TIA's administrative spending has drawn repeated calls for reduction (TIA targets about 10% of budget) (PMG, TIA APP hearing, Apr 2026)

Still in the text, not verified

• TIA has supported over 200 companies; commercialisation rate below international benchmarks
• BRRR comparison of attrition with Israel's BIRD Foundation
• Committee name 'Science and Innovation' (committee is Science, Technology and Innovation)

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: Contradicted by a published figure. No published estimate. TIA's own 2026 APP plans 225 IP-based prototypes and 60 product launches, with ~40 diffusions expected. '200-500 spin-offs per year' is an order of magnitude above that. R5-10bn is 5-10x TIA's entire annual income. (source)

Corrected in the description

• Was: A NIPMO Amendment Bill was introduced in Parliament in 2023 but not passed.
  Now: NIPMO has proposed amendments to the IPR-PFRD Act, which it outlined to Parliament's science committee in June 2026. (PMG, June 2026)
• Was: through the NRF's IP Fund
  Now: through NIPMO's IP Fund (PMG, parliamentary reply)

Still in the text, not verified

• NIPMO underfunded and understaffed
• Act modelled on Bayh-Dole; march-in rights deter co-investors
• 36-month disclosure timelines
• industry support strong; march-in rights the political sticking point

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: Contradicted by a published figure. NIPMO reports about 249 new disclosures a year, with 14% licensed or commercialised (around 35 a year), so '500-1,000 new IP licences per year' is an order of magnitude too high. The R5-15bn revenue figure is unsourced. (source)

Corrected in the description

• Was: established by the DSIT in 2019 as a blended finance vehicle to commercialise university and CSIR research, completed its pilot phase (R1.4 billion committed to 42 portfolio companies) in 2023
  Now: run by the DSTI as a fund-of-funds vehicle investing in venture capital funds, completed its 2020/21–2024/25 pilot phase (a R1.3 billion fund that backed 12 venture capital funds and 96 startups) (PMG, DSTI briefing, May 2025)
• Was: Scale-up to R5 billion by 2027—as recommended by the PC on Science and Technology BRRR 2024—requires
  Now: Scaling up the fund requires (ITWeb, Jul 2019)
• Was: co-investment from the PIC and IDC
  Now: expanded co-investment from the PIC and IDC (Innovation Bridge portal, Innovation Fund partners)
• Was: The DSIT's STI Decadal Plan 2022–2032
  Now: The DSTI's STI Decadal Plan 2022–2032 (PMG, DSTI briefing, May 2025)

Still in the text, not verified

• IF 'operates under a company structure rather than a statutory framework'
• '<4% of university patents commercialised vs OECD 18%'
• Innovation Fund as 'the vehicle' for translating public R&D into commercial outcomes

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: Contradicted by a published figure. The whole pilot fund was R1.3bn over five years backing 96 startups; R3-8bn per year for 100-200 startups per year is several times the fund's actual scale. No published estimate of jobs or GDP effect. (source)

Corrected in the description

• Was: The Plan is the most ambitious STI policy framework since the 1996 White Paper.
  Now: The Plan is the implementation plan of the 2019 White Paper on Science, Technology and Innovation. (PMG, Science and Innovation committee meeting)

Still in the text, not verified

• 'gazetted' in 2022 (Cabinet approval in Dec 2022 confirmed)
• eight priority areas list
• R50 billion required for full implementation; MTBPS 2025 non-allocation
• DSI budget declining in real terms
• Committee BRRRs on ambition vs appropriation

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: Partly sourced. The 1.5% GERD/GDP target (by 2030) is sourced; current GERD is 0.61-0.62% of GDP. The GDP impact ranges are unsourced. (source)

Corrected in the description

• Was: The DSIT-led
  Now: The DSTI-led (PMG, Mar 2026)
• Was: As of early 2026, R&D funding has been allocated and the Boegoebaai feasibility study is complete;
  Now: R&D funding has been allocated and Sasol completed a Boegoebaai pre-feasibility study in June 2026; (Quantum Commodity Intelligence, June 2026)

Still in the text, not verified

• 'R&D funding has been allocated'
• programme funding of pilot electrolysis, green ammonia feasibility studies and fuel cell bus deployments with IDC and CSIR
• 'PGM-based electrolyser catalyst reserves'
• Boegoebaai targeting EU RFNBO-compliant exports

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate tied to the R&D programme. 0.3-0.8% of GDP (about R22-60bn) from R&D outputs alone is implausible. R300bn+ in exports by 2035 is not sourced.

Corrected in the description

• Was: with 3,000+ researchers
  Now: with about 1,500 science, engineering and technology staff (PMG, CSIR 2025/26 annual report hearing, 6 Oct 2026)
• Was: covering AI model development, cybersecurity, quantum computing, and advanced semiconductor design
  Now: covering domains including artificial intelligence, cybernetics and robotics; blockchain and cybersecurity; and networking, cloud computing and advanced IoT, at roughly R100 million a year (about R1 billion over 10 years) (PMG, CSIR briefing to PC on Science, Technology and Innovation, Oct 2024)
• Was: Parliamentary Committee on Science and Innovation BRRRs noted CSIR's external industry revenue has increased but foundational R&D is crowded out by short-term commercialisation pressure, eroding the long-term research pipeline.
  Now: In April 2026 the CSIR told the Portfolio Committee on Science, Technology and Innovation that limited state funding had increased its dependence on contract and international funding. (PMG, CSIR APP briefing, 28 Apr 2026)

Still in the text, not verified

• R3.5 billion in annual revenue
• programme mirrors A*STAR and Fraunhofer
• PC4IR (2019) and DSI 4IR Initiative identified CSIR as the natural lead

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found. The programme costs about R1bn over 10 years, so claimed gains of R5-10bn in productivity and R20-40bn in 'applied industry output' have no basis. (source)

Corrected in the description

• Was: The NRF funds approximately 30,000 postgraduate students annually
  Now: The NRF funds 6,000 to 7,000 postgraduate students annually (PMG, NRF briefing, Nov 2024)
• Was: bursary values of R80,000–R120,000 for doctoral students in 2024
  Now: bursary values of R107,318–R182,318 a year for doctoral students in 2024 (DSI-NRF Postgraduate Scholarship Framework for 2024 (Apr 2023))
• Was: doubling doctoral bursary values
  Now: raising doctoral bursary values (DSI-NRF Postgraduate Scholarship Framework for 2024 (Apr 2023))
• Was: The NRF Amendment Act (2019) created the framework for industry partnerships; implementation has been partial.
  Now: The NRF Amendment Act (Act 19 of 2018, assented to in April 2019) extended the Foundation's functions, including its power to enter into agreements with any person or institution. (National Research Foundation Amendment Act 19 of 2018)
• Was: South Africa's PhD production rate of 45 per million population is below the AU target of 100 per million by 2025
  Now: South Africa's PhD production rate of 58 per million population (2023) is below the National Development Plan target of 100 per million by 2030 (DPRU/LMI factsheet, 2025)

Still in the text, not verified

• Proposed doctoral bursary range of R180,000–R250,000
• Industry co-funding for mining, fintech, agri-tech; DSI Decadal Plan link
• Committee BRRR citing bursary inadequacy as cause of slow PhD growth

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate. R3-8bn of 'output value' from about 6-7k funded students is unanchored, and a 1-2 year cut in completion time is not evidenced.

Corrected in the description

• Was: DAFF's Agri-Parks programme provides partial infrastructure.
  Now: The Agri-Parks programme of the former Department of Rural Development and Land Reform provides partial infrastructure. (gov.za, 14 Sep 2015)
• Was: the R14 billion agriculture budget
  Now: the R16.7 billion 2024/25 agriculture, land reform and rural development budget (National Treasury ENE 2024, Vote 29)

Still in the text, not verified

• Parliamentary Committee on Agriculture BRRRs noted the budget is heavily weighted toward land reform
• agri-tech underdeveloped relative to Brazil, Kenya, Netherlands
• proposed SEZ locations by province

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found. 0.1-0.2% of GDP is ~R8-16bn a year, large for an uncosted SEZ cluster proposal.

Corrected in the description

• Was: (including Starlink ground operations)
  Now: (deleted) (Further Africa, 27 Aug 2026)

Still in the text, not verified

• DSI Space Economy Roadmap (2017) and R21bn / 10,000 jobs by 2030 target
• residual capability of Denel Spaceteq
• proposed satellite manufacturing cluster at the Cape Peninsula
• 'geographic positioning near optimal orbital inclinations'

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found. SANSA has a R2.1bn funding shortfall, only R9.8m of a R170m EOSAT-1 allocation spent, and no national EO satellite; R5-15bn in commercial satellite revenue has no visible basis.

Corrected in the description

• Was: The IP Laws Amendment Act (2013) created an IKS database through CIPC, but implementation has been slow.
  Now: The IP Laws Amendment Act (2013) provided for a national database for recording indigenous knowledge, but a decade later the Act had still not been brought into force. (Creamer Media, 8 Dec 2023)
• Was: which secured R1.5 million in annual payments to San and Khoikhoi communities
  Now: which set a benefit-sharing levy of 1.5% of the farm-gate price of rooibos for San and Khoikhoi communities (Food For Mzansi)
• Was: needs legislative backing through the Traditional Knowledge Bill, in draft since 2017
  Now: rests on the Protection, Promotion, Development and Management of Indigenous Knowledge Act, 2019, which was assented to on 13 August 2019 but has not yet come into force (Lawlibrary (SAFLII))

Still in the text, not verified

• DSI's revised IKS Policy (2023) (only a 2004 IKS Policy found)
• Hoodia case framing
• PC on Trade and Industry BRRRs on IKS case backlog and NIPMO-equivalent

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate. R2-5bn a year in IKS licensing and royalty revenue would be orders of magnitude above the flagship rooibos benefit-sharing deal (tens of millions of rand at most).

Corrected in the description

• Was: New locomotive deliveries from the Gibela contract (Alstom) are being phased in.
  Now: New locally manufactured electric multiple unit (EMU) trains from the Gibela contract (Alstom-led) are being phased in. (PMG, Sept 2024)

Still in the text, not verified

• 'beginning with the Central Line (Cape Town) and Soweto corridors' (Central Line Chris Hani corridor reopened 29 May 2025; Soweto not found)
• 'requires sustained capex of R15–20 billion per year'
• 'Recovery Plan, overseen by PRASA's reconstituted board'

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: Contradicted by a published figure. '2M+ daily commuters' conflicts with PRASA's own numbers: 40m passengers a year now (~130k per working day) and a 2026/27 target of 186m a year (~600k per day). The GDP and productivity figures are unsourced. (source)

Corrected in the description

• Was: with jurisdiction over ports, freight rail, and potentially airports
  Now: with jurisdiction over the economic regulation of road, rail, sea and air transport (Bowmans)
• Was: Currently, Transnet self-regulates its own port and rail tariffs, creating conflicts of interest
  Now: Currently, port tariffs are regulated by the separate Ports Regulator, while, before the Economic Regulation of Transport Act, no policy or legislation regulated third-party access to Transnet's rail network, creating conflicts of interest (Ports Regulator; Bowmans ("there is no other policy or legislation regulating this access by third parties"))

Still in the text, not verified

• As of early 2026, the TER remains unestablished (consistent with an Oct 2025 parliamentary reply, not confirmed for 2026)

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate was found. 0.1-0.2% of GDP (about R8-15bn) is in the same range as the R5-15bn cost-savings figure, so the two are internally consistent but model-made.

Corrected in the description

• Was: fuel levy revenue of R45 billion annually (2025/26)
  Now: revenue of R47.8 billion in 2025/26 (TopAuto, 2026)
• Was: The reform eliminates the R20 billion in legal fees and disbursements that currently absorb 40% of the RAF's total payments, redirecting them to claimant benefits.
  Now: The reform eliminates legal costs, which the RAF put at R10.6 billion in one year, redirecting them to claimant benefits. (BusinessTech, Apr 2021)
• Was: (protecting a R20 billion annual fee income)
  Now: (deleted) (BusinessTech, Apr 2021)

Still in the text, not verified

• PC on Transport BRRRs 2021–2024 unanimously recommending reform for a decade; legal profession as primary obstacle
• National Treasury fiscal risk register ranks RAF the highest-risk contingent liability
• 'covers only current claims'

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate. RAF is funded by the fuel levy, not motor insurance premiums, so a 10-20% premium reduction is not a coherent mechanism; R30-50bn risk reduction is small relative to the R345bn+ liability and unexplained.

Corrected in the description

• Was: Third-party access regulations were finalised in December 2024
  Now: Transnet's final Network Statement setting the terms for third-party access was published in December 2024 (Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr, 22 Jan 2025)

Still in the text, not verified

• no private operator had network access in 2022

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found; plausible in magnitude but model-made. Overlaps idea 59's estimate (risk of double counting).

Corrected in the description

• Was: Transnet Port Terminals (TPT) retains infrastructure ownership under proposed models.
  Now: Under the Durban Pier 2 concession, Transnet Port Terminals (TPT) holds 51% of the operating company and ICTSI 49%, with ICTSI responsible for terminal operations. (Bizcommunity, Dec 2025)
• Was: As of early 2026, RFP processes for terminal concessions at Durban have been initiated but face union resistance and regulatory delays under the EROT framework.
  Now: In December 2025 Transnet signed a long-delayed 25-year partnership with ICTSI for Durban Container Terminal Pier 2, taking effect on 1 January 2026. (Engineering News, 10 Dec 2025)

Still in the text, not verified

• Durban ship turnaround 3–4 days vs under 12 hours at leading ports
• logistics cost reduction of 15–30%

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found. 0.2-0.4% of GDP is plausible in magnitude given port-inefficiency cost estimates, but it is not sourced.

Corrected in the description

• Was: debt of approximately R20 billion
  Now: debt of approximately R43 billion (SAnews)
• Was: with tariffs increased by 4.84% effective 1 March 2025
  Now: with tariffs most recently increased by 3.12% effective 1 March 2026 (Engineering News, 19 Feb 2026)

Still in the text, not verified

• Department of Transport developing a Road Funding Policy
• R1 trillion infrastructure programme

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found. R20-40bn of 'stable road funding secured' and R50-100bn of avoided deferred maintenance are model-made ranges with no stated period. The R5-10bn in vehicle operating costs has no basis.

Corrected in the description

• Was: established under the National Railway Safety Regulator Act (2002),
  Now: established under the National Railway Safety Regulator Act (2002) and continued under the Railway Safety Act (30 of 2024), (The Presidency, 5 Dec 2024)
• Was: across approximately 23,000 km of track
  Now: (deleted) (US International Trade Administration)
• Was: (Kempton Park 2018, Cape Town 2019)
  Now: (Kempton Park 2018, Mountain View, Pretoria 2019) (Gulf News, 8 Jan 2019)

Still in the text, not verified

• 'granting independent enforcement powers parallel to the NERSA model' and AIIB-style board as reform content
• 'Parliamentary Committee on Transport BRRRs noted the RSR cannot effectively enforce compliance against large state operators like Transnet'

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate. R10-30bn of 'prevented accident losses' has no basis and is large relative to RSR-reported occurrence costs.

Corrected in the description

• Was: through 250,000 vehicles operated by 16,000 taxi associations
  Now: through about 200,000 minibus taxis organised in roughly 1,200 taxi associations (Daily Maverick, 10 Aug 2023)
• Was: The R1.8 billion Taxi Relief Fund (COVID-era)
  Now: The R1.135 billion Taxi Relief Fund (COVID-era) (Daily Dispatch, 19 Jun 2020)

Still in the text, not verified

• PC on Transport BRRRs flag taxi violence and absence of driver labour protection
• the Golden Arrow/Dial-A-Ride model for taxi routes
• incorporation enabling access to SEFA and SITA procurement

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found; not assessed further because the search budget ran out.

Corrected in the description

• Was: Networks in Johannesburg (Rea Vaya BRT), Cape Town (MyCiTi), George, and Rustenburg are operational; a further 12 cities have approved IPTN plans at various stages of implementation
  Now: Networks in Johannesburg (Rea Vaya), Cape Town (MyCiTi), Tshwane (A Re Yeng), Ekurhuleni (Harambee), Nelson Mandela Bay (Libhongolethu), Mangaung (Hauweng), Polokwane (Leeto la Polokwane), Rustenburg (Yarona) and George are operational (Sunday Times, 25 Oct 2025)
• Was: the dominant mode serving 65% of users
  Now: the dominant mode, used by 80.2% of workers who used public transport in 2020 (Stats SA, National Household Travel Survey 2020)
• Was: The PTNG allocation for 2025/26 is R11.6 billion
  Now: The PTNG allocation for 2025/26 is R7.2 billion (National Treasury, PTNG payment schedule 2025/26)
• Was: but per-km costs of BRT construction in SA (R70–120 million/km) are among the highest globally
  Now: and South Africa's BRT spending per kilometre of busway is on par with many systems in Latin America and Asia (The Conversation, 2017)

Still in the text, not verified

• Smart-card payment, real-time info and scheduling remain aspirational in most cities
• GABS/Autopax frameworks

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate located. Magnitudes (R7-22bn) are not absurd for urban mobility, but '500,000+ daily users' far exceeds current BRT ridership and is unanchored.

Corrected in the description

• Was: 3,900 km coastline, two major ocean trade routes, and five commercial ports
  Now: 2,954 km coastline, two major ocean trade routes, and eight commercial ports (Africa Ports)

Still in the text, not verified

• '2050 Maritime Industry Master Plan'
• SAMSA runs the SA Maritime Training Academy
• PC on Transport BRRRs: SAMSA budget insufficient for port state control
• no meaningful cabotage policy; few SA-flagged vessels

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found; magnitude (R10-25bn revenue, 5,000-10,000 jobs) is not absurd for the sector, but the Coega/East London IDZ link is unsupported.

Corrected in the description

• Was: it transfers admissions and language policy decision-making from school governing bodies (SGBs) to provincial education departments (PEDs)
  Now: it gives provincial heads of department final approval, after consultation, over the admissions and language policies drawn up by school governing bodies (SGBs) (PMG committee meeting 38888)
• Was: The DBE estimates compulsory Grade R requires an additional 12,000 classrooms and 18,000 teachers nationally.
  Now: The DBE estimated the Bill's extra staff and infrastructure needs at up to R17.2 billion a year (R4.77 billion for staff and R12.43 billion for infrastructure). (PMG, Aug 2023)

Still in the text, not verified

• Western Cape and Afrikaans organisations' Constitutional Court challenge
• 'after a decade of parliamentary contestation'
• PC on Basic Education BRRRs flagging Grade R infrastructure as binding constraint

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found. Long-run human-capital GDP gains of this order are not implausible, but the figures are model-made. The only sourced fiscal figure is the DBE cost of up to R17.2bn a year.

Corrected in the description

• Was: The Constitutional Court-ordered function shift of Early Childhood Development (ECD) from the Department of Social Development (DSD) to the Department of Basic Education (DBE) was completed in 2022
  Now: The function shift of Early Childhood Development (ECD) from the Department of Social Development (DSD) to the Department of Basic Education (DBE), effected by Presidential Proclamation, was completed in 2022 (PMG, Basic Education committee)
• Was: approximately 50,000 registered ECD centres serving 1.2 million children under age 6
  Now: approximately 42,000 ECD programmes (many unregistered) serving about 1.6 million children (PMG, Basic Education committee)
• Was: R2.5 billion in conditional grants (the ECD Conditional Grant)
  Now: a combined ECD budget of about R3.87 billion, including the ECD Conditional Grant, (PMG, Basic Education committee)

Still in the text, not verified

• 30,000 centres below norms and standards
• practitioner pay R2,000–3,500 per month
• ECD Action Plan (2022–2025)
• PC on Basic Education BRRR naming compliance the top risk

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate was found. '400,000 ECD children per cohort' is inconsistent with about 1.6 million children enrolled across roughly 4-5 age cohorts and about 1m births a year. The 0.2-0.5% GDP figure is model-made.

Corrected in the description

• Was: Fundza Lushaka
  Now: Funza Lushaka (GrantZA)
• Was: As of early 2026, the DBE's Reading Panel recommendations await full Cabinet endorsement and budget appropriation.
  Now: In February 2026 the 2030 Reading Panel, chaired by former Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka of the UMLAMBO Foundation, called for meaningful budgets for reading resources. (DBE, Feb 2026)

Still in the text, not verified

• 'The National Reading and Literacy Crisis Response Programme consolidates DBE initiatives ...' (no DBE programme of this name found)
• teacher coaching in phonics and school library provisioning as programme priorities

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published SA estimate found; long-run growth effects of this order appear in the cognitive-skills literature, so the magnitude is plausible, but the figures are not sourced.

Corrected in the description

• Was: South Africa produced only 9,000 mathematics pass rates above 60% at Grade 12 level in 2023—an inadequate pipeline
  Now: Only 41,273 full-time Grade 12 candidates achieved 60% or more in mathematics in 2023—a narrow pipeline (DBE, NSC 2023 Report, Table 2.1)

Still in the text, not verified

• an estimated 15,000 unfilled posts in mathematics and science
• cost estimate R2.5 billion over 5 years for 5,000 teachers
• WITSEd and STADIO as existing delivery platforms

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate. 50,000-100,000 extra STEM graduates a year from 5,000 additional teachers is implausible; it would be a multiple of South Africa's entire current annual SET graduate output.

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: Partly sourced. DBE says R32bn is needed for classrooms and R14bn for toilets, and seeks R20bn a year to meet targets by 2030. '3M learners' and the GDP effect are unsourced. (source)

Corrected in the description

• Was: attendance research shows NSNP participation increases school attendance by 8–12% and measurably improves learning outcomes, particularly in the Foundation Phase
  Now: evaluation evidence suggests school feeding can improve enrolment and attendance, though evidence on learner performance is mixed (DPME/DBE NSNP evaluation)

Still in the text, not verified

• Auditor-General 2023 report: irregular expenditure over R1.5bn in three provinces incl. ghost schools
• BRRR synthesis: R600m–R1bn recoverable savings a year
• 'one of South Africa's most effective social protection programmes'

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. 'R10-15bn in annual NSNP savings' is equal to or larger than the programme's entire annual budget (about R10bn), so it is impossible. It also contradicts the description's own R600m-R1bn savings figure. The R3-5bn leakage reduction is also unsourced.

Corrected in the description

• Was: South Africa's constitution recognises 11 official languages
  Now: South Africa's constitution recognises 12 official languages, including South African Sign Language (PMG, Constitution Eighteenth Amendment Bill)
• Was: The DBE's Language in Education Policy (LiEP, 1997) mandates mother-tongue-based multilingual education (MTBMLE) in the Foundation Phase but implementation has been inconsistent
  Now: The Language in Education Policy (LiEP, 1997) promotes additive multilingualism and home-language maintenance but does not mandate mother-tongue-based multilingual education (MTBMLE) in the Foundation Phase, and implementation has been inconsistent (LiEP 1997 text (Polity))

Still in the text, not verified

• PIRLS 2021 last place 'directly linked to inadequate mother-tongue literacy instruction'
• inconsistency particularly in Nguni and Sotho language groups

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate. R10-20bn of avoided repetition costs is a very large share of a roughly R30bn+ annual repetition cost estimate, and the 20-30% reading gain is unsourced.

Corrected in the description

• Was: The DBE's Learner Transport Policy (2015)
  Now: The National Learner Transport Policy (2015), developed by the Department of Transport with the DBE, (UCT Libraries government publications, 30 Oct 2015)

Still in the text, not verified

• 5–7 million learners travelling more than 5 km
• 'BRRRs consistently flagged' (loosely supported by committee/appropriations recommendations, not BRRR text)

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found; '10-15% dropout reduction' and 'R5-10bn attendance gains' have no stated basis. Not assessed further (search budget exhausted).

Corrected in the description

• Was: approximately 460 special schools
  Now: approximately 489 special schools (PMG, DBE briefing Sept 2023)

Still in the text, not verified

• DBE plan to convert 30% of ordinary schools, stalled under 10%
• SASA amendments for reasonable accommodation under consideration

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate. The '600,000 learners' figure is unanchored (special schools enrol ~137,500), and the rand figures have no stated basis. DBE cited a R21bn budget shortfall for making special schools no-fee by 2030, a cost not a benefit.

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate. R3-8bn is about 1-2.5% of the basic education budget; savings of this size would require large post reductions, so the upper end is doubtful.

Corrected in the description

• Was: approximately 83,000 immovable state assets valued at over R100 billion
  Now: approximately 88,000 immovable state properties with an asset-register value of about R151 billion (PMG, Apr 2026; PMG meeting 41545 (Sept 2025))

Still in the text, not verified

• 'National Treasury spending reviews have identified the PMTE portfolio as a significant unrealised fiscal asset.'
• reform list (disposals, land for affordable housing, facilities management system)

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found. The only sourced figure is R205.5m in savings from lease renegotiations (2024/25). Annual savings of R5-15bn would exceed what is plausible from rationalising the leased portfolio. (source)

Corrected in the description

• Was: manages over R100 billion in infrastructure programmes — including EPWP
  Now: has a R24.5 billion medium-term budget on its main vote and a R56.7 billion medium-term allocation for its Property Management Trading Entity — covering EPWP (PMG, DPWI 2026/27 APP briefing)
• Was: covering BAS and LOGIS financial system implementation
  Now: covering systems modernisation (an ERP project on hold since 2020 and PMTE's migration to the Archibus system) (PMG, DPWI 2026/27 APP briefing)

Still in the text, not verified

• enterprise renewal programme is under review by SCOPA

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate was found. 'R5-10bn procurement savings' plus 'R10-20bn avoided overruns' is comparable to the entire main-vote MTEF (R24.5bn), which is implausible for a systems-renewal programme.

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate. 0.1-0.3% of GDP is ~R8-23bn a year; evidence on transitions is thin (e.g. 54 of 206 certified apprentices absorbed by private employers per the Nov 2025 briefing), so the magnitude is not supported.

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate; no period given for the R20-50bn and the 40% average time-overrun base is unsourced. Inconsistent with the description's own R5-8bn/yr underspend framing.

Corrected in the description

• Was: suffers chronic underfunding of maintenance estimated by DPWI at R1 billion annually in deferred costs.
  Now: suffers chronic underfunding of maintenance; the Minister of Public Works and Infrastructure put the maintenance backlog on properties in DPWI's custodianship at approximately R30 billion in 2025. (Cape Argus/IOL, 15 Sep 2025)

Still in the text, not verified

• Treasury/DPWI 'Maintenance Delivery Improvement Programme' ring-fencing 1–1.5% of replacement value

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found. 'R5-10bn annual saving' is 5-10 times the R1bn of deferred maintenance the description itself states, and 'extends asset life by 20-30 years' is unsupported.

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found. Only 34 PPPs have closed in more than 20 years, mostly before 2007, so mobilising R50-100bn for social infrastructure through PPP rule changes has no basis. 0.2-0.4% of GDP (about R15-30bn a year) is also unsupported. (source)

Corrected in the description

• Was: DPWI's Green Building Framework (2022)
  Now: The Department of Public Works' green building policy (launched in 2018) (Fin24, 3 Oct 2018)

Still in the text, not verified

• government owns or leases approximately 83,000 properties through the PMTE
• energy costs R4–6 billion annually
• policy sets aspirational targets but lacks binding standards or enforcement
• GIAMA Ministerial Determination could mandate Green Star

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. R5-10bn of savings would exceed the description's own R4-6bn annual energy bill, so the figure is internally inconsistent.

Corrected in the description

• Was: Operation Vulindlela identified public land release as a Phase I priority
  Now: Operation Vulindlela Phase II (2025) commits to accelerating the release of public land for affordable housing (National Treasury, OV Phase II fact sheet, May 2025)

Still in the text, not verified

• causes of slow progress (coordination failures, valuation disputes, competing claims)
• DPWI land holdings examples (former military bases, unused hospitals)

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found; 300,000-500,000 units and R50-100bn not assessed (search budget exhausted).

Corrected in the description

• Was: (signed June 2023)
  Now: (signed 15 May 2024) (Department of Health)
• Was: Full implementation, including mandatory enrolment and the transfer of private medical scheme members, is envisioned post-2030.
  Now: Phase 2 (2026–2028) introduces mandatory prepayment through the NHI Fund; full implementation, including the transfer of private medical scheme members, has no fixed date. (BusinessTech)
• Was: National Treasury estimates put the full NHI at R200–300 billion annually (current combined public and private health spending is R650 billion), but critics argue the model requires R450+ billion given expanded benefits and population.
  Now: the NHI White Paper estimated the scheme would cost around R256 billion a year. (BusinessTech)
• Was: The PC on Health BRRRs 2023–2024 note that Phase 1 implementation is behind schedule on provider accreditation and ICT system procurement.
  Now: In October 2025 the Financial and Fiscal Commission told the PC on Health that NHI implementation was at risk from vacancies, procurement challenges and an unimplemented health information system. (Business Report, 7 Oct 2025)

Still in the text, not verified

• World Bank, IMF and rating agencies flagging NHI fiscal risk

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published GDP-impact estimate found. A financing need of R200-400bn (2.7-5.4% of GDP) is in the range of public debate, but no source was confirmed. The 1-2% GDP gain is unanchored.

Corrected in the description

• Was: has invested approximately USD 6.5 billion in South Africa's HIV/AIDS response since 2004, currently providing around USD 650 million annually (roughly R12 billion)
  Now: has funded South Africa's HIV/AIDS response since 2003, recently providing approximately USD 400 million (R8.5 billion) a year, about 17% of the national HIV/AIDS budget, (Cape Times/IOL, 22 Dec 2025)
• Was: The Trump administration's 2025 executive order initiating a review of all PEPFAR programming
  Now: The Trump administration's January 2025 executive order pausing US foreign development assistance pending a 90-day review (Executive Order 14169, 20 Jan 2025)
• Was: The DOH's PEPFAR Transition Plan (2024–2027) proposes phased domestic absorption of the HIV programme into the NHI conditional grant framework, using HIV/AIDS conditional grant increase of R8 billion over three years to absorb the highest-priority programmes.
  Now: National Treasury allocated an emergency R753 million to the Department of Health in July 2025, including R590 million through the HIV/Aids component of the District Health Programme Grant, to absorb the highest-priority programmes. (SAnews, July 2025 (date corroborated by BusinessDay, 9 July 2025))

Still in the text, not verified

• 'antiretroviral treatment for 5.5 million people'
• 'approximately 2 million patients on PEPFAR-supported ART programmes'
• '15,000 community health workers employed through PEPFAR-funded NGOs'
• '47 PEPFAR-supported laboratory facilities'
• GFATM/EU bridge financing

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate matching this range. Replacing PEPFAR's roughly USD 400m+ a year implies about R7-8bn, so R8-15bn is high at the top; 'R50-100bn long-term AIDS costs' has no source.

Corrected in the description

• Was: approximately 5,000 medical graduates
  Now: approximately 2,200 medical graduates (EWN, 7 Mar 2025)
• Was: (doctor-to-population ratio of 0.9 per 1,000 vs. WHO recommended 2.5)
  Now: (deleted) (Bulletin of the WHO, 2013)

Still in the text, not verified

• 14,000 nursing and 3,000 allied health graduates annually
• 20,000–30,000 qualified health professionals unemployed or underemployed
• R5 billion per year emergency health workforce allocation (proposal)
• PC on Health BRRRs 2022–2024: Eastern Cape 8,000 funded vacant posts

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found. R5-10bn for 25-40k workers implies ~R200-250k per worker per year, which is low for doctors but plausible for a nurse-heavy mix. The worker count echoes the unverified 20-30k unemployed figure.

Corrected in the description

• Was: South Africa has the world's highest absolute burden of tuberculosis, with approximately 300,000 new cases and 55,000 deaths annually, disproportionately affecting HIV-positive individuals and mineworkers.
  Now: South Africa ranks 12th highest of all countries in TB cases per 100,000 people; the WHO estimates that 249,000 people fell ill with TB and around 54,000 died of it in 2024, with HIV-positive individuals and mineworkers disproportionately affected. (Spotlight, 12 Nov 2025 (WHO Global TB Report 2025); WHO TB fact sheet)
• Was: targets a 90% reduction in TB incidence and mortality by 2030
  Now: targets an 80% reduction in TB incidence and a 90% reduction in TB deaths by 2030 (against 2015) (PMC article on End TB Strategy)

Still in the text, not verified

• TB costs an estimated 0.5% of GDP annually
• Existence of a named 'TB Elimination Acceleration Programme'
• As of early 2026 incidence declining; provincial funding gaps

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate was found. The R30,000 average treatment cost is unsourced. 300,000 x R30,000 = R9bn total treatment spend, so 'R5-10bn cost reduction' would mean eliminating nearly all treatment cost. '0.2-0.4% GDP' is unsourced.

Corrected in the description

• Was: , implements the integrated patient registration system (IPRS) across all PHC facilities, and deploys the digital health record system (HPRS) to enable continuity of care
  Now: and extends the Health Patient Registration System (HPRS), the registration database intended as the backbone of an electronic health patient record, across all PHC facilities to enable continuity of care (BusinessTech)
• Was: an estimated 15,000 CHWs employed through PEPFAR-funded NGOs face retrenchment as US funding winds down
  Now: more than 8,000 health workers funded through USAID/PEPFAR, over half of that workforce, lost their jobs in 2025 when US funding was cut (AP via KSAT, 15 May 2025)

Still in the text, not verified

• 44,455 CHWs employed by DoH (reply NW882, April 2026)
• PC on Health BRRRs 2022–2024 flagged CHW contractualisation
• R8–12 billion annually for full CHW formalisation

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate. Avoided costs of R15-30bn a year would exceed the description's own R8-12bn cost of formalisation and are a large share of provincial hospital budgets; not supported.

Corrected in the description

• Was: fewer than 20 psychiatrists per million people (WHO recommends 1 per 10,000)
  Now: fewer than 0.5 psychiatrists per 100,000 people (PMC article (SA psychiatry workforce))
• Was: The Life Esidimeni tragedy (2017)
  Now: The Life Esidimeni tragedy (2016) (PMG committee meeting 23968)

Still in the text, not verified

• Mental Health Care Act Amendment 'under preparation since 2020' and its contents
• mental health 'unfunded within the PHC grant'
• 2025 MTBPS has no dedicated mental health appropriation
• PC on Health BRRR recommendations

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate located (search budget exhausted). Orders of magnitude are not absurd but figures are model-made.

Corrected in the description

• Was: has not been substantively updated since the Tobacco Products Control Act (1993)
  Now: rests on the Tobacco Products Control Act (1993), last amended in 2008 (Tobacco Control Laws (CTFK))
• Was: was tabled in 2018 and approved by Cabinet in 2022
  Now: was published for public comment in 2018 and approved by Cabinet for submission to Parliament in 2022 (BusinessDay, 26 Sep 2022)

Still in the text, not verified

• delay due to DoH–DTIC jurisdictional disputes
• PC on Health BRRRs flagging stalled progress

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found. Magnitudes are not absurd, but the 3-5 percentage point prevalence drop and the GDP figure are model-made.

Status that looks out of date (not yet changed)

Bill still before the PC on Health (motion of desirability adopted June 2026); not enacted.

Corrected in the description

• Was: Seven of South Africa's nine provincial health departments received qualified audit opinions from the Auditor-General in 2023/24
  Now: Only three of South Africa's nine provincial health departments (Free State, Mpumalanga and Western Cape) achieved clean audits from the Auditor-General in 2023/24 (PMG, AGSA briefing to PC on Health, 15 Oct 2024)
• Was: crises: the same departments that were placed under Section 100 interventions in 2011–2013 are again in distress.
  Now: crises; Limpopo's health department was placed under Section 100 in December 2011. (Cabinet statement, 5 Dec 2011)

Still in the text, not verified

• 'The Provincial Health Department Turnaround Programme (modelled on ... MFIP) deploys specialist ... teams to the three worst-performing provinces (Eastern Cape, Limpopo, North West) with a 2-year intensive support mandate'
• 'The PC on Health BRRRs 2022–2024 document the cyclical nature of provincial health crises'
• Limpopo Health 'is again in distress'

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found. 'R10-20bn efficiency gains' and '15-20% cost overrun reduction' are model-made. Turnaround teams for 3 provinces 'improving outcomes in 5-8 provinces' is internally inconsistent.

Corrected in the description

• Was: a National Reference Price List (NRPL) setting benchmark tariffs for all procedures, compulsory quality reporting
  Now: compulsory quality reporting (Government Gazette No. 30110, 23 Jul 2007 (via acts.co.za))
• Was: the NRPL has been delayed by legal challenges from private hospital groups and specialist associations (HASA, SAMA), and the Council
  Now: the Council (Government Gazette No. 30110, 23 Jul 2007 (via acts.co.za))
• Was: The MTBPS 2025 notes that private healthcare costs constitute 45% of total health spending
  Now: Private healthcare accounts for about half of total health spending (Daily Maverick, 30 Sep 2019)

Still in the text, not verified

• 140+ recommendations
• PC on Health BRRRs 2021–2024 consistently flag HMI implementation delays
• CMS lacks enforcement capacity

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate. R5-15bn is under 10% of private health spending; medical scheme membership of about 9 million is roughly right.

Corrected in the description

• Was: The African Medicines Agency (AMA) was established under the African Union framework and opened its headquarters in Yaoundé, Cameroon in 2021 after South Africa ratified the AMA Treaty.
  Now: The African Medicines Agency (AMA) was established under the African Union framework; South Africa's Parliament considered ratification of the AMA Treaty in 2023. (PMG, Health committee, 26 May 2023)

Still in the text, not verified

• SAHPRA as reference regulatory authority for AMA
• eCTD/labelling alignment with ICH
• Listed Strategic Plan priorities (documents exist; contents not checked)

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found; not assessed further (search budget exhausted).

Corrected in the description

• Was: The National Small Enterprise Amendment Act (2023) established an Ombud for Small and Medium Enterprises
  Now: The National Small Enterprise Amendment Act (assented to in July 2024) established the Office of the Small Enterprise Ombud Service (Polity, 23 Jul 2024)
• Was: was progressing as of early 2026 but remains incomplete
  Now: appeared stalled as of May 2026, with the appointment of the Small Enterprise Ombudsperson contested in Parliament (PMG, PC on Small Business Development, 6 May 2026)

Still in the text, not verified

• average government payment period to SMEs exceeds 90 days
• Payment of Suppliers regulations have had limited enforcement success

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate. A single ombud office whose head has not been appointed is unlikely to resolve R5-15bn a year in disputes or protect 50,000-100,000 SMMEs; the failure-rate reduction is unanchored.

Corrected in the description

• Was: National Treasury Instruction 3 of 2021/22 mandated that all national and provincial departments reserve 30% of all procurement contracts for Small, Medium, and Micro Enterprises (SMMEs), township enterprises, and cooperatives
  Now: The Preferential Procurement Regulations (2017) made subcontracting of at least 30% compulsory for tenders above R30 million, to benefit Small, Medium, and Micro Enterprises (SMMEs), township enterprises, and cooperatives (Engineering News, 10 Mar 2017)

Still in the text, not verified

• R120bn a year that should flow to small businesses
• DSBD SMME Barometer (2024) and 18% prime-contract figure
• Jobs Fund impact evaluation (2023) multiplier finding

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate; magnitudes are not absurd, but they rest on the unverified R120bn base and the unlocated SMME Barometer.

Corrected in the description

• Was: The Small Enterprise Finance Agency (SEFA), a subsidiary of the IDC, provides
  Now: The Small Enterprise Finance Agency (SEFA), formerly an IDC subsidiary and now merged with SEDA and the Co-operative Banks Development Agency into the Small Enterprise Development and Finance Agency (SEDFA), provides (PMG, Small Business Development committee)
• Was: Its R2.5 billion annual deployment
  Now: Its roughly R1.6 billion in annual disbursements (Engineering News, 27 Mar 2024)

Still in the text, not verified

• 55% Gauteng concentration
• NPL rates above 30%
• SMME Equity Fund proposed in the 2024 Budget
• listed refocus proposals (40% manufacturing allocation, Jobs Fund partnership)

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found. An extra R10-20bn a year would be roughly 4-8x SEDFA's entire multi-year R11.5bn funding target. The 35% SMME GDP share was not verified.

Corrected in the description

• Was: but integration with SARS eFiling, municipal systems, and sector-specific licences remains incomplete
  Now: and already links company registration with SARS tax registration, UIF and Compensation Fund registration, B-BBEE certificates and business bank accounts, but integration with municipal systems and sector-specific licences remains incomplete (BizPortal (CIPC))
• Was: the Department of Labour's systems
  Now: the Department of Employment and Labour's systems (PMG, DEL APP 2024/25)

Still in the text, not verified

• 'The Presidential Working Group on Small Business has identified compliance fragmentation as a top constraint.'
• 'As of early 2026, BizPortal handles basic registrations but multi-agency integration milestones are behind schedule.'

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate was found. '200,000+ new formal business registrations per year' is not plausible as an increment, because CIPC already registers several hundred thousand companies a year (base not verified here). The GDP and R5-10bn figures are model-made.

Corrected in the description

• Was: The Department of Trade, Industry and Competition's National Cannabis Master Plan
  Now: The National Cannabis Master Plan, led by the Department of Agriculture, (SAnews)

Still in the text, not verified

• 2,031 hemp cultivation permits issued
• Master Plan identifies EU/UK/US medicinal export priority; competitiveness vs Colombia and Morocco
• provincial recognition frameworks for traditional growers in EC and KZN

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found in this pass (the master plan contains its own projections that should be checked). Magnitudes are modest and not implausible.

Corrected in the description

• Was: The Small Enterprise Development Agency (SEDA) operates
  Now: The Small Enterprise Development Agency (SEDA), now merged with SEFA and the Co-operative Banks Development Agency into the Small Enterprise Development and Finance Agency (SEDFA), operates (PMG, SEDFA annual report 2024/25)

Still in the text, not verified

• 2024 DSBD performance review finding services generic (PMG Oct 2024 says SEDA met 100% of 2023/24 targets)
• BRRRs flagging admin spend over 40% of budget

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate. SEDFA reported non-financial support to over 70,000 enterprises in 2024/25 (PMG 15 Oct 2025), so the onboarding range is plausible in scale; the rand and failure-rate figures are model-made. (source)

Status that looks out of date (not yet changed)

Title/framing still refers to SEDA as a standalone agency; it is now part of SEDFA.

Corrected in the description

• Was: SEDA incubation
  Now: SEDFA (formerly SEDA) incubation (PMG, PC on Small Business Development, 6 May 2026)
• Was: a DSBD evaluation found an 80-90% failure rate within five years
  Now: an EU-funded study (Eising and Shenxane, 2011) found a cooperative mortality rate of 88% (Polity, 24 Jun 2016)

Still in the text, not verified

• programme has disbursed 'hundreds of millions' in grants
• IDC cooperative financing window

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate. 300,000-500,000 members in viable cooperatives, and 0.1-0.2% of GDP from redirecting a small grant programme, are implausible in magnitude.

Corrected in the description

• Was: employs an estimated 2.8-3.2 million workers
  Now: employs about 3.7 million workers (21.4% of the 17.1 million people employed in Q4 2025) (Stats SA, QLFS Q4:2025)
• Was: Turnover Tax regime for businesses below R1 million annual turnover
  Now: Turnover Tax regime for micro businesses with turnover up to R2.3 million a year (R1 million before 1 April 2026) (EWN, 17 Sep 2026)

Still in the text, not verified

• Turnover Tax 'slow uptake due to administrative complexity' (SARS conceded promotion 'has not been up to scratch')
• DSBD Informal Economy Policy Framework (2019)
• Operation Vulindlela spatial-economy work identifying informal economy formalisation

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found. 'R10-20bn new tax revenue from 3M+ traders formalised' implies R3,000-7,000 tax per trader and assumes the entire informal workforce formalises. Most informal traders earn far below the tax thresholds, so this is implausible. '30-40% less street trading conflict' is invented.

Corrected in the description

• Was: requires corporations rated above Level 5 to invest 3% of net profit after tax
  Now: sets targets for measured entities to invest 3% of net profit after tax (2% for supplier development and 1% for enterprise development) (RSM South Africa)
• Was: Estimated annual ESD investment of R8–12 billion
  Now: Estimated annual ESD investment of around R20 billion (EWN, 1 Oct 2025)

Still in the text, not verified

• ESD self-reported with minimal verification
• PC on Trade BRRRs naming ESD the largest compliance-impact gap

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate; R20-40bn of revenue and 0.2-0.4% of GDP from restructuring an R8-12bn annual ESD flow is a large multiplier.

Corrected in the description

• Was: commits R1.5 trillion over 20 years
  Now: sets out approximately R1.5 trillion of investment needs over five years (PMG, Presidency briefing to PC on Electricity and Energy, 20 Nov 2024)
• Was: International Partners Group's $8.5 billion JET-IP commitments
  Now: International Partners Group's JET-IP commitments (US$12.8 billion in overall international pledges as of March 2025, after the US withdrawal) (IPG joint statement (GOV.UK), March 2025)

Still in the text, not verified

• 'The DSBD, in coordination with the Small Enterprise Finance Agency (SEFA), is developing a dedicated JET-SMME Finance Facility...'

Impact estimate

Removed. Audit verdict: No source found. No published estimate found; 10,000-20,000 SMMEs and 'R300bn+ JET economy' have no stated basis. Not assessed further (search budget exhausted).

Corrected in the description

• Was: completing it frees the "digital dividend" spectrum in the 694-862 MHz range
  Now: migration has already freed the "digital dividend" spectrum above 694 MHz (cleared of analogue signals nationally in July 2023) (ITWeb, Aug 2023)
• Was: An estimated 3.5-5 million qualifying low-income households require state-subsidised STBs
  Now: About 1.5 million low-income households qualified for state-subsidised STBs (ITWeb, Jul 2023)
• Was: A 2023 settlement resolved the encoding policy dispute.
  Now: A June 2017 Constitutional Court judgment resolved the encoding policy dispute, upholding the Minister's decision that government-subsidised set-top boxes would not have decryption capacity. (GroundUp / Daily Maverick, 31 Jul 2017)

Status that looks out of date (not yet changed)

current_status 'implemented' conflicts with the description: national ASO below 694 MHz is still incomplete.

Corrected in the description

• Was: faced 18-36 month approval timelines
  Now: waited six to 12 months for wayleave approvals in some metros (Fastest Fibre, 2026 (reporting ACT at ICASA hearings, July 2026))

Still in the text, not verified

• ICASA facilities leasing regulations '(updated 2024)' providing deemed consent, standard fees, mandatory co-location and dark-fibre access
• Operation Vulindlela Phase II priority on RDP enforcement

Corrected in the description

• Was: is a severe administrative bottleneck
  Now: has been a severe administrative bottleneck
• Was: Licence applications routinely take 3-7 years to process; the backlog at DWS exceeded 4,000 applications as of 2024.
  Now: Licence applications historically took years to process; by August 2024 DWS reported that a backlog of more than 1,000 applications had largely been eradicated, and in March 2026 it reported that about 80% of applications were finalised within 90 days. (PMG, 24 Mar 2026; Engineering News, 16 Aug 2024)
• Was: Operation Vulindlela identified water-use licence reform as a Phase II priority
  Now: Operation Vulindlela identified water-use licence reform as a Phase I priority (The Presidency, OV Phase 1 Review, May 2024)

Still in the text, not verified

• deemed-approval provisions within 90 days as part of the reform
• NWRS application platform digitalisation; delegation to CMAs

Corrected in the description

• Was: is proposed as a dedicated state entity
  Now: was established by the NWRIA Act (proclaimed February 2025) as a dedicated state entity (PMG, DWS briefing, Jul 2025)
• Was: 314 major dams
  Now: 323 large dams (gov.za, Water affairs)
• Was: Currently these functions sit within DWS's Water Trading Entity (WTE), which lacks a separate balance sheet, independent governance, and the commercial mandate needed to raise development finance for new infrastructure.
  Now: These functions sat within DWS's Water Trading Entity (WTE), which lacked a separate balance sheet, independent governance, and the commercial mandate needed to raise development finance for new infrastructure; the NWRIA consolidates the WTE, the DWS Infrastructure Branch and TCTA. (PMG, DWS briefing, Jul 2025)
• Was: the R900 billion+ investment gap identified in the National Water and Sanitation Master Plan
  Now: the R333 billion funding shortfall (against about R898 billion of required investment over ten years) identified in the National Water and Sanitation Master Plan (Engineering News, 28 Nov 2019)
• Was: As of early 2026, the Water and Sanitation Amendment Bill has been tabled in Parliament but not yet enacted.
  Now: TCTA's staff, assets and loans were scheduled to transfer to the agency on 1 April 2026. (PMG, DWS briefing, Jul 2025)

Still in the text, not verified

• NWRIA could mobilise R50–100 billion in development finance

Corrected in the description

• Was: As of early 2026
  Now: As of mid-2026 (Railmarket, 14 May 2026)
• Was: third-party access regulations were finalised in December 2024
  Now: Transnet's final Network Statement for third-party rail access was published in December 2024 (Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr, 22 Jan 2025)
• Was: their services are reported as expected to start from April 2027
  Now: some are expected to begin services before the end of 2026 and the remainder during 2027 (Railmarket, May 2026)

Still in the text, not verified

• agreements concluded 'under Operation Vulindlela Phase II'

Corrected in the description

• Was: allows holders of qualifications in designated scarce-skills occupations to enter and reside in SA without a prior job offer
  Now: allows holders of qualifications in designated scarce-skills occupations to work and reside in SA, but applicants need a formal offer of employment from a South African employer (Intergate Immigration (corroborated by Xpatweb, 'The New Critical Skills List – A Firm Offer Of Employment Is A Must'))
• Was: The revised Critical Skills List gazetted in 2022 expanded qualifying occupation categories.
  Now: The Critical Skills List was last revised in October 2023 and covers 142 occupations; DHA said in February 2026 that it was due for review. (PMG, DHA briefing, Feb 2026; Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr, 16 Oct 2023)
• Was: As of early 2026, DHA has implemented processing improvements and piloted a trusted-employer programme allowing pre-certified companies to recruit foreign professionals with expedited approvals.
  Now: DHA has implemented processing improvements and runs a Trusted Employer Scheme (launched on 11 October 2023, with Phase II launched in July 2026) that simplifies visa applications for accredited employers. (SAnews, Oct 2023 and 21 July 2026)

Still in the text, not verified

• 'Operation Vulindlela Phase II committed to reducing the Critical Skills Visa turnaround to 4-8 weeks and implementing a dedicated fast-track lane for priority skills categories.'
• 'DHA has implemented processing improvements'

Status that looks out of date (not yet changed)

Pass-1 notes: 'implemented' overstates things, since DHA said in February 2026 that the Critical Skills List is due for review.

Corrected in the description

• Was: As of early 2026, the e-visa system has been launched for a limited set of nationalities and visa categories.
  Now: The Electronic Travel Authorisation (ETA) system now processes applications within 24 hours, and its expansion to all countries was targeted for September 2026. (Operation Vulindlela Q1 2026/27 progress report)
• Was: tourism contributes approximately 2.9% of GDP directly
  Now: tourism contributed about 3.5% of GDP directly in 2022 (Stats SA, Tourism Satellite Account)
• Was: Expanding e-visa eligibility to the 10 highest-volume source markets would generate an estimated 1-2 million additional annual arrivals.
  Now: (deleted) (Operation Vulindlela Q1 2026/27 progress report)

Still in the text, not verified

• supports over 700,000 jobs
• National Tourism Sector Strategy target of restoring 15 million arrivals

Corrected in the description

• Was: set at R27.58 per hour in 2024
  Now: set at R30.23 per hour from 1 March 2026 (EWN, 5 Feb 2026)
• Was: agriculture and domestic work have lower sectoral rates
  Now: farm and domestic workers have been aligned with the full NMW since 2022 (only EPWP workers have a lower rate) (gov.za, Minister Nxesi NMW statement (2024))
• Was: With strict unemployment at 31.9% (Q4 2024)
  Now: With strict unemployment at 33.6% (Q2 2026) (BusinessTech, Aug 2026 (Stats SA QLFS Q2 2026))

Still in the text, not verified

• Committee questioned the adequacy of the annual CPI-plus adjustment formula
• Parliamentary hearings on in-work poverty/employment effects

Corrected in the description

• Was: handles over 200,000 dispute cases annually
  Now: registered nearly 200,000 referrals (193,069) in 2024/25 (BusinessDay, 23 Sep 2026)

Still in the text, not verified

• commissioner vacancy rates above 20% in some regions
• conciliation settlement rates declined from historic highs
• average case resolution times of 30+ days

Corrected in the description

• Was: earning below R6,500/month
  Now: earning below R7,500/month (SARS, ETI changes from 1 Apr 2025)
• Was: Treasury estimates the ETI supports approximately 700,000 jobs annually at a fiscal cost of ~R6bn.
  Now: The ETI's fiscal cost was R7bn in 2020/21, R6bn in 2021/22 and R4.8bn in 2022/23. (BusinessDay, 30 Dec 2025 (citing 2025 Budget Review))

Still in the text, not verified

• 'Parliamentary review' of deadweight losses and eligibility expansion

Corrected in the description

• Was: IT systems dating from the 1990s
  Now: a troubled SAP-based claims system (CompEasy) introduced in 2019 (ITWeb)
• Was: consecutive adverse audit opinions
  Now: consecutive disclaimer audit opinions (PC on Employment and Labour BRRR, Oct 2025)

Still in the text, not verified

• claims backlog exceeding 100,000 cases

Corrected in the description

• Was: The committee held dedicated workshops in 2025 on activation strategies, examining models from Brazil and India.
  Now: The committee undertook a study tour to Brazil from 20 to 28 March 2026 to assess how unemployment insurance is integrated with skills development, job placement and active labour market policies. (PMG, Employment and Labour committee report ATC260612, 10 June 2026)

Still in the text, not verified

• 'the highest unemployment rate among major economies'
• 'scale remains inadequate'

Corrected in the description

• Was: requiring 60-day consultation periods and social plans for employers with 50+ employees
  Now: requiring a 60-day period to lapse before termination notices are issued (CEOSA)
• Was: strengthen mandatory social plan requirements
  Now: make social plans mandatory (CEOSA (consequential edit: LRA does not mandate social plans))

Still in the text, not verified

• proposed amendments (not attributed to any bill or department document)

Corrected in the description

• Was: approximately 3 million informal economy workers
  Now: about 5.7 million workers in informal employment (Q4 2025) (Stats SA, QLFS Q4 2025)

Still in the text, not verified

• Committee hearings on elder care, farm worker conditions and CEDAW compliance (committee unnamed)
• Platform work grown without clear regulatory coverage

Corrected in the description

• Was: SAPS detective-to-case ratios in some provinces exceed 1:100, far above the recommended 1:25.
  Now: The Auditor-General found in 2026 that some SAPS detectives manage 600 to 800 dockets each. (Daily Maverick, 2 Oct 2026)

Still in the text, not verified

• 2025/26 BRRR recommended ring-fenced detective/forensic funding
• '20% serious crime conviction rate'

Corrected in the description

• Was: expanded Thuthuzela Care Centres, dedicated FCS units, and the National Register for Sex Offenders
  Now: expanded Thuthuzela Care Centres and dedicated FCS units (Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007, s42)

Corrected in the description

• Was: has fewer than 500 investigators for 180,000+ SAPS members
  Now: has only 167 investigators, each assigned about 300 cases a year (EWN, 28 Jan 2025)

Still in the text, not verified

• leadership disputes documented in a February 2025 committee session

Corrected in the description

• Was: an industry worth ~R70bn annually
  Now: an industry estimated to be worth about R50 billion (BusinessTech, May 2024)

Still in the text, not verified

• training standards and community-conflict incidents as committee topics (the foreign-ownership debate dates from 2012–2014)

Corrected in the description

• Was: between SAPS, DMRE, and the Department of Home Affairs
  Now: between SAPS, the Department of Mineral and Petroleum Resources, and the Department of Home Affairs (PMG committee meeting 39742)

Corrected in the description

• Was: The SANDF has been deployed in support of SAPS for internal security operations and border protection under successive Presidential authorisations.
  Now: The SANDF has been deployed in support of SAPS for internal security operations under successive Presidential authorisations, and has been responsible for borderline control since a November 2009 Cabinet decision. (ISS Today)
• Was: The March 2026 committee session examined the deployment alongside the Mkhwanazi Committee report on police-military coordination.
  Now: (deleted) (IOL, 15 Jul 2026)

Still in the text, not verified

• Committee questioned replacing SANDF border deployment with a SAPS border policing unit
• Cost-effectiveness relative to police capacity

Corrected in the description

• Was: The NPA, under NDPP Shamila Batohi (appointed 2019),
  Now: The NPA, led by NDPP Shamila Batohi from 2019 and by Andy Mothibi since February 2026, (Wikipedia, Andy Mothibi)
• Was: The June 2025 Annual Performance Plan review noted that NPA conviction rates have improved but remain below the 92% target in priority crime categories.
  Now: In October 2024 the NPA's stated conviction-rate targets were 87% for high courts, 74% for regional courts and 88% for district courts. (PMG, Justice committee, Oct 2024)

Still in the text, not verified

• IDAC has secured several high-profile convictions
• persistent vacancies in complex commercial crime units

Corrected in the description

• Was: finalised in mid-2025
  Now: with the agency's operationalisation planned for April 2026 (PMG, DWS briefing, Jul 2025)
• Was: The NWRIA Amendment Bill provides the legislative vehicle
  Now: The National Water Resources Infrastructure Agency Act (2024) provides the legislative vehicle, with a 2025 technical Amendment Bill listing the agency under the PFMA (PMG committee meeting 41382, Jul 2025)

Still in the text, not verified

• Vaal system strain from pollution and over-extraction
• cost overruns on major projects as implementation constraint

Corrected in the description

• Was: loses roughly 40% of treated water before it reaches consumers, according to the Department of Water and Sanitation's Blue Drop reports
  Now: has non-revenue water estimated by the Department of Water and Sanitation at 47–48% of municipal supply (PMG, DWS briefing Sept 2025)

Still in the text, not verified

• R9.9 billion annual revenue loss

Corrected in the description

• Was: only 26% of water supply systems achieved safe drinking water status, a steep decline from earlier years
  Now: 46% of water supply systems had poor or bad microbiological water quality compliance, and only 26 of 958 systems qualified for Blue Drop certification (DWS, 5 Dec 2023)
• Was: The Parliamentary Water Caucus deliberated the Bill in February 2026.
  Now: In February 2026 the Portfolio Committee, with the Bill in public participation, sought legal advice on NEDLAC's request to postpone it. (PMG, 24 Feb 2026)

Status that looks out of date (not yet changed)

Status 'drafted' understates progress: the Bill was tabled as B24-2025, briefed to the committee on 11 Nov 2025 and in public participation by Feb 2026.

Corrected in the description

• Was: with Amatola Water and Lepelle Northern Water placed under intervention
  Now: with Amatola Water facing governance turmoil and Lepelle Northern Water recovering from years of governance instability (PMG, Portfolio Committee on Water and Sanitation, Nov 2025)
• Was: The committee reviewed 2024/25 annual reports for Rand Water, uMngeni-uThukela, Magalies, Vaal Central, and Overberg boards in early 2026
  Now: The committee reviewed water board corporate and business plans in November 2025 and the 2024/25 annual reports of Vaal Central and Magalies in March 2026 (PMG, Portfolio Committee on Water and Sanitation, 3 Mar 2026)

Still in the text, not verified

• South Africa's nine water boards
• Rand Water assuming emergency supply functions for Johannesburg
• NWRIA restructuring adds institutional uncertainty

Corrected in the description

• Was: has a backlog of over 900 pending water use licence applications, with average processing times exceeding two years, delaying agricultural and industrial investment
  Now: has improved water use licence turnaround, finalising 80% of applications within 90 days in 2025/26 (up from 35% in 2022/23), although committee members continue to raise concerns about licence backlogs (PMG, 19 May 2026; PMG 4 Aug 2026 (meeting 43419))
• Was: Parliament examined water use transformation in February 2026, with committee members pressing the Minister on the racial skew of existing allocations under the National Water Act.
  Now: Parliament examined water use transformation in May 2026, during a briefing on the National Water Amendment Bill at which the Department reported that commercial agriculture still uses 84% of agricultural water and historically disadvantaged individuals only 3%. (PMG, 19 May 2026 (with Deputy Ministers))

Still in the text, not verified

• DWS lacks processing capacity (now in some tension with the 80%-in-90-days figure)

Corrected in the description

• Was: The National Water Act envisioned nine Catchment Management Agencies to decentralise water governance, but by 2025 only six had been established, with three still awaiting ministerial proclamation.
  Now: The National Water Act provides for Catchment Management Agencies to decentralise water governance; six CMAs have been established nationally, but several were still not fully operational in 2025, with staff transfers from the Department pending. (PMG, PC on Water and Sanitation, 21 Oct 2025)

Still in the text, not verified

• committee reviewed CMA performance plans in June 2025
• CMAs operate largely as advisory bodies

Corrected in the description

• Was: accumulated debts exceeding R4 billion by late 2025, prompting the Minister to authorise Rand Water to assume direct bulk supply functions in parts of Gauteng.
  Now: reported nearly 45% non-revenue water and a R27 billion infrastructure backlog in September 2025. (PMG, Johannesburg Water briefing to the Water and Sanitation committee, 19 Sep 2025 (figures); NT/AGSA briefing, 18 Nov 2025 (the R4bn balance))
• Was: detailing the utility's financial collapse
  Now: detailing the utility's financial and operational decline (PMG, NT/AGSA briefing on Johannesburg Water, 18 Nov 2025)

Still in the text, not verified

• 'serving over 5 million residents'
• Section 139 interventions' poor track record; patronage framing

Corrected in the description

• Was: Over 30,000 households still relied on bucket sanitation as of the 2024/25 DWS quarterly report
  Now: Municipalities reported 44,970 households still using bucket toilets in 2023, according to Stats SA's Non-financial census of municipalities (Stats SA, Mar 2025)
• Was: the 2023 Green Drop assessment found 334 of 995 wastewater treatment works in critical condition
  Now: the 2025 Green Drop report found 396 of 848 municipal wastewater treatment systems in a critical state (TimesLIVE, 5 Oct 2026)

Still in the text, not verified

• AGSA December 2025 water sector report flagging sanitation grant underspending

Corrected in the description

• Was: backed by an $8.5 billion pledge from the EU, US, UK, France, and Germany at COP26
  Now: launched with an $8.5 billion pledge from the EU, US, UK, France, and Germany at COP26 (the US withdrew in March 2025; remaining international pledges total $12.8 billion) (IPG joint statement (European Commission), 19 Mar 2025)
• Was: roughly 72%
  Now: roughly 65% (EWN, 4 Apr 2026)

Still in the text, not verified

• 'has disbursed only a fraction of committed funds by early 2026'
• 'The committee examined the Presidential Climate Commission's mandate in August 2024' (a PCC workshop exists, PMG 39321, date unconfirmed)
• Mpumalanga coal-community and coordination-failure claims

Corrected in the description

• Was: at R190 per tonne of CO2-equivalent
  Now: at R308 per tonne of CO2-equivalent (Anthesis Group, 2026)

Still in the text, not verified

• committee oversight visits to Mpumalanga in late 2024

Corrected in the description

• Was: culminating in its adoption in September 2023 and presidential signature in 2024
  Now: culminating in its passage by the National Assembly in October 2023, NCOP adoption in April 2024 and presidential signature in July 2024 (International Climate Initiative (IKI))

Still in the text, not verified

• Treasury has not ring-fenced adaptation funding; NAS lacks binding expenditure commitments
• Recurring drought in Eastern and Northern Cape

Corrected in the description

• Was: SANParks reported significant funding gaps in its Q1-Q2 2025/26 performance review, with Table Mountain National Park and West Coast parks facing deferred maintenance.
  Now: SANParks briefed the committee in September 2025 on challenges at Table Mountain and West Coast national parks, including crime, encroachment, wildfires and infrastructure, while its Q1-Q2 2025/26 review reported self-generated revenue 11% above target and underspending on infrastructure. (PMG, PC on Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment, 9 Sep 2025 and 3 Feb 2026)

Still in the text, not verified

• 'tourism revenue alone cannot sustain conservation mandates' (not in the Oct 2025 meeting summary)
• funding model relies on gate fees and Treasury transfers

Corrected in the description

• Was: total allowable catch limits set by the Marine Living Resources Fund
  Now: total allowable catch limits set by the Minister under the Marine Living Resources Act (Cape Times, 1 Oct 2025)

Still in the text, not verified

• IUU fishing costs R5–7bn annually per DFFE
• 2021–22 allocation favouring industrial operators over small-scale communities
• 'court-ordered redress of historical dispossession'

Corrected in the description

• Was: the Northern Cape-Saldanha corridor, a designated special economic zone
  Now: the Northern Cape (around the proposed Boegoebaai port and Namakwa special economic zone) and Saldanha Bay, areas (SAnews, 2023)

Still in the text, not verified

• PCC and committee JET-IP hearings examining green hydrogen
• no consolidated permitting framework for hydrogen