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SA Policy Space

Nuclear New Build Programme — 2,500 MW New Nuclear Sites

EnergyProposedLong TermRaised 4× in committeeEnergy

Theme: Nuclear energy

First raisedJul 2024Last discussedNov 2024No committee discussion in 12+ months4 meetings on the record ↓
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Reform at a glance

What changes
Nuclear New Build Programme — 2,500 MW New Nuclear Sites
Responsible actor (recorded)
Department of Mineral Resources and Energy / Eskom / National Treasury / NNR
Recorded status
Proposed — editorial assessment.
Milestone described by this status
Status scope has not yet been independently documented; it may cover only part of this reform.
Next documented milestone
Next milestone not yet documented
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Description

South Africa's Integrated Resource Plan (IRP 2023/24) includes 2,500 MW of new nuclear capacity as part of the baseload mix, a policy direction endorsed by Cabinet in 2024 following two decades of contested proposals (the Zuma-era R1 trillion nuclear deal collapsed in 2017 after court rulings and public outcry). The current programme, led by DMRE in consultation with the National Nuclear Energy Executive Coordination Committee (NNEECC), envisages a competitive procurement process for small modular reactors (SMRs) or conventional light-water reactors at sites including Thyspunt (Eastern Cape) and Bantamsklip. The MTBPS 2025 does not allocate direct capital but notes the programme is to be financed through the Eskom balance sheet or a dedicated project vehicle with an independent power producer (IPP) structure. International technology suppliers (Westinghouse, EDF, Rosatom, CGNPC, NuScale, Holtec) have all engaged with the DMRE process. The NNR capacity constraints for new-build oversight are the regulatory bottleneck. A government financial guarantee of R100–200 billion would be required for any conventional new-build under current debt structures.

Assessment

Growth Impact3/5
Feasibility2/5

Responsible: Department of Mineral Resources and Energy / Eskom / National Treasury / NNR

Feasibility Assessment

Low-medium: IRP target set but financing, procurement, and timeline unresolved. SMR technology not yet commercially proven at scale. Political economy includes strong pro- and anti-nuclear constituencies.

Where the numbers stand

All indicators →
  • Eskom Energy Availability Factor72%2025

    +7 pp from 65% in 2020. Eskom Integrated Reports (Eskom IR)

  • Load Shedding (Electricity Shed)0 GWh2025

    −1798 GWh from 1798 GWh in 2020. CSIR / Eskom (CSIR Energy)

Next official read on this: Mining: production and sales, August 2026 — due 13 October 2026 (Stats SA schedule).

Series tagged to this idea’s binding constraint. The period beside each value is the latest observation this site holds, which can lag the official release: the series are rebuilt offline from the sources named, not read live.

Stakeholder Landscape

Who backs this reform, who needs convincing, and which interests or red lines shape political feasibility.

Backers

16

2 stakeholders

Negotiation weight

8

1 conditional actor

Opposition weight

9

1 opposing actor

Coalition Read

AI-drafted stances · 0 reviewed

61/100Mapped support: mixed

Anchor: COSATU. Highest-leverage swing actor: Business Unity South Africa (BUSA). Most serious blocker: National Treasury.

Political Tractability

—Needs reviewed signals

No reviewed signals · 0% of mapped influence has been reviewed.

Backers2 stakeholders
COSATUCoalition anchorInfluence 9/10

COSATU supports nuclear new build as it creates unionisable, well-paid energy jobs unlike IPP contract work.

Interest: Worker protections under the Labour Relations Act and Basic Conditions of Employment Act; collective bargaining rights; equitable wage growth; just tr…

Concern: Labour market flexibility reforms that erode LRA and BCEA protections; Eskom unbundling without adequate just transition planning for NUM members; pri…

Engagement path: Meaningful social dialogue through NEDLAC before structural reforms are finalised; just transition funding ring-fenced in MTEF; skills retraining and…

National Union of Mineworkers (NUM)Operational backerInfluence 7/10

NUM supports new nuclear build as it creates long-term high-quality energy sector employment comparable to coal generation.

Interest: Mining employment security and worker safety; just transition pace that protects coal-dependent community livelihoods; collective bargaining rights in…

Concern: Accelerated coal phase-out without adequate income support, skills retraining, and community economic diversification; renewable energy job quality —…

Engagement path: Just transition fund with dedicated skills retraining and income support; coal community economic diversification plans with government commitments an…

Negotiation Priorities1 stakeholder
Business Unity South Africa (BUSA)Critical swing actorInfluence 8/10

Both reviewers concur: the brief records no anti-nuclear position; its cost-certainty and regulatory-certainty interests plus the idea's R100-200bn guarantee and unproven SMRs support conditions, not opposition.

Interest: Cross-sector structural reform across energy security, logistics efficiency, regulatory certainty, labour market flexibility, and digital infrastructu…

Concern: Slow implementation pace relative to policy announcements; inconsistency between reform rhetoric and regulatory decisions (e.g. NERSA tariff approvals…

Engagement path: Already actively engaged. Seeks implementation accountability mechanisms with published milestones, predictable regulatory timelines, and NEDLAC outco…

Opposition to Manage1 stakeholder
National TreasuryHigh-risk blockerInfluence 9/10

Treasury opposes new nuclear build due to massive upfront capital costs and long-term contingent liabilities given Eskom's fiscal history.

Interest: Fiscal consolidation with public debt stabilising below 75% of GDP; structural reforms that improve revenue without expanding contingent liabilities;…

Concern: Unfunded mandates in energy transition (JETP co-financing); Eskom's R400bn+ debt and how restructuring socialises costs; reform proposals that create…

Engagement path: Reforms must be fiscally neutral or revenue-positive over the MTEF window; SOE restructuring must demonstrably reduce contingent liabilities; credible…

Watchlist1 stakeholder
EskomHigh-salience observerInfluence 8/10

Eskom is neutral on new nuclear build, recognising baseload value but focused on managing the current fleet and unbundling.

Interest: Managing R400bn+ debt restructuring with government support; maintaining grid stability during the unbundling transition; preserving technical and ins…

Concern: Unbundling of the distribution arm (EDI) could fragment operational coherence and create regulatory gaps; transmission entity capitalisation requires…

Engagement path: Credible debt restructuring plan with government guarantees; adequate transition period for unbundling with clear milestones; grid investment ring-fen…

The question is not whether SA needs nuclear, but whether we can afford it and govern the procurement — both remain open. — Energy Expert Panel, DMRE IRP Review 2023

Implementation Roadmap

The IRP 2023/24 allocates 2,500 MW of new nuclear capacity as firm baseload to complement variable renewables, reversing the post-2017 moratorium following the collapse of the Zuma-era deal. DMRE is leading a competitive procurement process through the NNEECC with technology options including large light-water reactors (AP1000, EPR, VVER, HPR1000) and small modular reactors; a formal RFI process is underway. Site preparation work continues at Thyspunt (Eastern Cape) and desktop reviews at Bantamsklip (Western Cape). A government financial guarantee of R100–200 billion must be accommodated within the fiscal framework and represents the single largest constraint on programme viability.

1

Complete the RFI process and publish a formal Request for Proposals for the 2,500 MW nuclear new-build: technology requirements, financing structures, local content obligations (40% by value target), and skills transfer provisions

Q2–Q4 2025DMRE / NNEECC / National Treasury
2

Finalise site selection between Thyspunt and Bantamsklip: environmental impact assessment under NEMA, NNR site characterisation approval, and National Ports Authority assessment for marine access

Q1–Q4 2026DMRE / NNR / DFFE / National Ports Authority
3

Negotiate the intergovernmental agreement with the selected vendor country (France, Russia, China, USA, or South Korea) establishing technology transfer, financing terms, and the government-to-government guarantee framework

2025–2027DMRE / National Treasury / DIRCO
4

Obtain financial close: structure the funding package (DFI debt, export credit agency support, government guarantee, equity) and have National Treasury publish the contingent liability note in the MTEF

2027–2029National Treasury / DBSA / IPP Office / DMRE
5

NNR construction licence application: submit and obtain construction authorisation under the NNR Act for the selected site and technology

2028–2031Project SPV / Eskom / NNR
6

First-concrete milestone and parliamentary oversight report to Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources and Energy on programme cost and schedule

2031–2032DMRE / Eskom / NNR
Timeline

RFP Q4 2025; site selection 2026; IGA signed 2027; financial close 2029; construction licence 2031; first power ~2035–2038

Estimated Cost

R150–250 billion total capital cost (technology-dependent); government guarantee R100–200 billion; DBSA and industrial development finance may cover 20–30% of debt component

Required Legislation

No new primary legislation required for procurement. Nuclear Energy Act 46 of 1999 and NNR Act 47 of 1999 provide the framework. A ministerial Section 34 determination under the ERA formalises procurement. An amendment to State Finance Guarantee legislation may be required to accommodate the scale of the contingent liability.

Political Feasibility

Nuclear new-build historically divides the ANC (pro-nuclear industrial wing vs. fiscal conservatives). The Zuma-era scandal creates political sensitivity. DA broadly supportive if fiscally sound. GNU dynamics make a R150B+ government guarantee politically difficult without National Treasury concurrence. Labour (NUM, COSATU) supports on job-creation grounds.

International Precedents

UAE's Barakah NPP (4×APR1400) demonstrates a government-to-government procurement model in a non-OECD country — directly relevant. UK's Hinkley Point C provides a cautionary tale on cost overruns. South Korea's domestic nuclear programme (24 operating units, <$3,000/kW) is the global benchmark for cost control.

Evidence & Research

Research corpus →

Links proposed by lexical matching and screened by a calibrated research judge. Follow the paper for the full argument and its caveats.

Policy documents

No linked official-document evidence yet. Coverage is incomplete.

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Status History

tracked since Mar 2026
  1. Recorded as Proposed when status tracking began — held since at least Mar 2026.
    Mar 2026

Data as of 2026-10-10 · latest PMG meeting 2026-10-02